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jjt' v.; " : K 



vaimiRi nsmLiOBises division 


By Author fty of A.C of S.,G-2 
jDated 51 August I9k5 




Prepared toy Military Intelligences Service 


Brigadier General, GSC 
Chief, Military Intelligence Service 


Int.fteq. Cos. 
Far Eastern Spec. 
Scientific Branch 
Mil. Br 
Pac O/B 
Air Ind 
Int Lib 

U.S. Strategic Bossib. Survey 

(In field) 

Rep: 25 Sept. 19^5 

Auth: Col. Alfred McCoraetck 
r Ho. of copies: 75 
$8 SEP !94f 









9 OCT 1945 

|:orey; rd 

This report constitutes a study of German technical 
assistance to the Japanese war effort. The study is based on 
all available intelligence material drawn from all sources. 

It should be realised, however, that information on 
certain aspects of German- Japanese technical liaison is in- 
complete. In particular, is this true with reference to block- 
ade running between Europe and the Far East* 

With regard to document s, plans and blueprints ob- 
tained by Japanese representatives in Germany* it is possible 
that such material was sent to the Far East by courier traffic 
through the various Japanese Embassies in Europe and by 
Japanese diplomatic couriers returning to Japan through Siberia 
Because of this contingency, it must be realized that the study 
is not of necessity complete. 

The study applies to air and land armaments , 
electronics, manufacturing processes^ raw and manufactured 
materials, and interchange of technical personnel* It does not 
cover naval equipment and naval radar * 

It is suggested that this report indicates a field 
which should be a matter of imsaediate investigation by Allied 
intelligence teams due to operate in the Japanese Empire 


Table- of 






Section I: 24 
Jet and rooket propelled aircraft; Jet and 
rocket propulsion units and fuels. 
• Section II: 96 
Conventional aircraft; internal combustion 
engines; aircraft armament; aircraft equipment. 

Section III: iq 5 

Section IVi 199 

Land armaments and ammunition* 
Section T: 219 

Optical equipment a 
Section Vis 22S 

Manufacturing processes; rav/ materials; 

special manufactured materials* 

TAD A: Blockade runners, Europe to the 

Par East, 248 
Ta3 8; Technicians and personnel 255 
TAJ C: Fir ma in Japan associated with 

technical exchanges- 275 
TAB I): Data on jet and rocket propelled 

aircraft j Jet and roc-zst propulalon 

unite and fuels. 280 
TAB li? Data on conventional aircraft. 302 
TAB Fc Data on internal combustion aircraft 

enginen* 332 
TAB Data on eir craft armament. 348 
TAB K; Datu on electronics equipment, 359 
TAB J; Data on armanent and &;nmunition< 373 
TAB K; Material passing through Russia to 

the Far East prior to 22 June 1941. 398 


German Technical Aid to Japan 

Under terms of the Economic Agreement of January 
1943 and the Manufacturing Rights Agreement of March 1944, 
Japan acquired in Germany raw materials, military equipment, 
manufactured goods, manufacturing plans and drawings; and 
technical assistance* Transfer to Japan of acquired 
materiel was effected by blockade runners*— bo th surface 
vessel and submarines-courier and parcel post, and rail 
communication through Siberia* Originally restricted in 
Interest to German equipment in operational use, by a 
January 1945 Hitler order Japan was allov/ed access to all 
German equipment, whether experimental or fully operational* 

Japan* s interests primarily were directed toward 
German equipment, the acquisition of which would improve 
the Empire^ defenses against air attack* In that connection 
Jet^and rocket-propelled aircraft, equipment to improve high- 
altitude performance of conventional aircraft, early warning 
radar and anti-aircraft defensive weapons were strongly 
featured in Japanese negotiations * 


Jet -and rocket^proisel^ % 

Because of their high speed and high-altitude 
performance, and possibly because their employment would 
offer some. relief to an acute aviation gasoline position,, 
Japan made strenuous efforts to acquire all the benefits 
of German jet-and rocket^propulsion aircraft techniques* 
The results of Japan's efforts in this direction may be 
summarized as follows; 

a. mK^165 ? It is believed that there is in Japan 
sufficient information on the LJE-163 to allow the building 
of at least experimental models of that aircraft ■ In mid- 
1944 drawings and plant layouts for plants to manufacture 
the chemical fuels used in the Mhl-163' were handed to Japanese 
representatives in Germany* It is probable that some or all 
of those drawings arrived in the Far East; in addition, a 
large amount of detailed information on the large-scale 
production of those chemical fuels was made available to 
the Japanese in Germany, There Is evidence to suggest that 
production of chemical rocket fuels may have been in pro- 
gress at the Japan Nitrogen Company plant at Konan, Korea. 

be HE~£62t It is not believed that adequate in- 
formation for production of the LiE-282 arrived in the Far 
East. There is evidence, however, that some information on 

tihe experimental model of the 1*3* 282 may have arrived 
in Japan* 

J2* Other .let- propelled aircraf t: There Is little 
Indication that Japan showed any particular interest in 
other German jet-propelled aircraft although the Japans se 
did acquire Information on the HE-162 single- jet fighter; 
a smaller amount of Information on the AR-234 was similarly 
acquired. There is no evidence that Japan intended pro- 
duction of either of those aircraft* 

d, Turbo- X et unX t e I Development of a turbo-jet 
unit was underway in Japan as far back as 1941] the evidence 
suggests that little success was achieved. Groat interest 
was shown in German turbo-jet units, but it is believed that- 
little information on German turbo-jet units v/as carried to 
the Far East by blockade runners. 

Metallurgical pro d.enis apparently handicapped 
Japanese development in this field. Krupp developed two 
special steel alloys for use in German turbo-jet unit ,3, 
Manufacturing rights for those alloys were acquired by Japan* 
but at a date too late to allow shipment to the Far 
of full information on their production and machining. 

e, Campinl en^ne^dyXYS^^ ; Japan has ex- 
perimented with development of a jet unit based on the Oampini 


principle. There is evidence or negotiations between Japan- 
ese representatives in Italy and Cajnpini concerning an air- 
craft powered by Gampini type units; negotiations were con- 
cluded, however^ at a date too late to allow Japan to acquire 
full benefits from such a contract , Camplni-type units, using 
an 80 hp engine, have been found at Yokosuka; they were to 
power a modification of the Baka, 

The Y~l' The V~l was a weapon which appealed 
to the Japanese. The Argus propulsion tube In particular 
was the subject of detailed investigation by Japanese re- 
presentatives in Germany. There is, evidence to suggest that 
Japan intended the use of a piloted version of the V-OL as a 
suicide weapon. 

£• Technicians; German Jet technicians were to 
be transferred to the Far East to supervise production there 
of German jet xjropelled aircraft; In addition, Japanese 
technicians were to be trained in Germany and then returned 
to the Par East. It is believed that no fully trained 
technicians, either German or German- trained Japanese, 
arrived in Japan* 

Conventional aircraft l 

During the period 1941-43, when surface blockade 
running was possible, Japan purchased and shipped to the Par 
East various prototype German aircraft* When submarine 
blockade . running later restricted cargo 3pace ? Japan turned 

to the purchase of plans and blueprints, and of prototypes 
of email aircraft parte. In those later stages her in- 
quiries were directed towards aircraft types with improved 
high-altitude performance. There is no evidence to indicate 
that plans or blueprints of the more recent types of German 
aircraft arrived in the Far East. 

Aircraft engines, the installation of which would 
improve the high altitude performance of existing Japanese 
aircraft, also v/ere of great interest to Japan, However, 
prototypes of only early type German aircraft engines 
arrived in the Far East; some of those engines have been 
manufactured under license in Japan* Sample equipment of 
German power~boost systems was purchased, but shipment to 
the Far East probably was not possible* Some information 
on those boost systems, which improve the altitude performance 
of internal combustion engines, probably reached Tokyo* 

Large quantities of German aircraft guns and 
ammunition were purchased by Japan. Samples of smaller 
caliber guns and ammunition were shipped to the Far East; 
some of those samples have been found on Japanese aircraft . 
Attempts to obtain guns and ammunition of 30 mm caliber and 
above were severely restricted by lade of cargo space. Some 
samples of those larger caliber guns may have arrived 



in the Far East. 

Aircraft rocket armament also greatly interested 
Japanese representatives in Germany* Sample equipment of 
a number of types of rocket armament was purchased; it is 
believed that none of the samples arrived in Japan. 

Japan negotiated x*or German pressuri2e& cabins 
'for high-altitude flying and for associated electrical air- 
craft equipment. Samples of an early type pressurised cabin 
are believed to have arrived in Japan. Extensive purchases 
of German high-level bomb Bights were mainly negatived 
by a lack of shipping space; samples of early type high-level 
sights, however, did arrive in the Far East* 

Reports on the HS-293 radio -controlled, rocket~ 
propelled glider bomb were prepared in Germany for dispatch 
to Tokyo; sample equipment; however, did not reach the Far 
East** There is little evidence that any information on the 
newer types of German guided missiles was passed to the Far 
East. The evidence suggests that Japanese representatives 
in Germany knew little or nothing about those newer guided 

Land armaments and ammu nition; 

Japanese interest in German land armaments has 
covered a very wide field of equipment embracing infantry 



weapons, guns, hcwi-tzers, rocket \ i : ■ jc-etors, coast defense 
and naval guns, armored vehicles; gun controls and predictor 
gear. In many Instances manufacturing rights were acquired 
by Japan, whose representatives in Germany also had 
opportunity to examine manufacturing* processes. 


Japan 3 s interest in acquiring technical assistance 
from Germany in respect to radar and radio equipment gener- 
ally was exceeded only by her interest in German aircraft* 
The Japanese apparently looked to Germany for general tech- 
nical assistance in electronic development, but vere not ae 
Interested in acquiring manufacturing plans and drawings ae 
was the case in other directions* The. Germans delivered to 
the Japanese prototypes of their own equipment and tubes, but 
at least up to the final stages' of the war, did so only in 
respect to material known already to be in Allied hands * The 
Japanese, through Germany, also acquired captured specimens 
of Allied electronic equipment, Various Japanese radar and 
redio technicians were permitted to study German equipment; 
German electronic technicians were shipped to Japan, but are 
reported to have had no success in their mission to the 
Japanese electronics Indus try • 

Toward the end of the war the Germans were more 



willing to divulge complete information on radar 
developments. Generally it may be assumed that Japanese 
technicians in Germany were fully informed on all reoent 
German research in the high-frequency field* 

German technicians with v/hom the Japanese officials 
worked In Germany have expressed the opinion that through 
German liaison the Japanese obtained a very thorough goun&ing 
in electronics research and production* That opinion is 
'based on the assumption~-*in many instances a very doubtful 
assumption~-that the information collected in Ger/oany 
reached Japan* 

Optical e quipme nt* 

Optical glass has been the subject of a close 
association between Japan and Germany over a period of years* 
In the days of surface blockade running, extensive purchases 
of optical glass were made through ordinary commercial channels; 
concurrently, during 1942-43 7 the Japanese Army was buying ; 
and shipping optical glass for specific military purposes* 
With the end of surface blockade running in the spring of 
1943, the familiar pattern of Japanese purchasing policy on 
a new basis was reproduced in respect to optical material* 
Through 1944 the Army and Navy took charge to an increasing 
degree, although Mitsubishi continued to negotiate for, and 


collect data on, glass manufacturing techniques* 
Particularly suitable for submarine cargo, optical glass 
retained a high priori ty for transport to the Far East. 

Manufacturing processes; raw ;, and special manufactured materials : 

Tm ;^quisition by Japan of various German mami** 
faeturing righto also involved the granting of technical 
assistance for the purpose of e stablishing German manu- 
facturing processed in Japan. The Japanese thereby acquired 
a number of important Q-erman manufacturing processes; in- 
cluding the 1*0* Farben hydrogenatlon process, the Henschel 
aircraft mass production system, and techniques for the manu- 
facture of wooden aircraft. 

As a result of these negotiations Japan acquired a 
number of patents, the legality of which is a subject worthy 
of consideration* 

Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-G-erman war, Japan 
acquired considerable quantities of materials in Europe and 
shipped them to the Far East through Siberia* Thereafter, 
Japan was forced to rely upon surface blockade i runners for 
movement of material to the Far East* With the end of that 
channel of supply, certain raw and, manufactured materials of 
the highest priority continued to move from Germany to the Par 
East by submarine right up to the end of the war. Mercury, 



special steels, aluminum, lead, platinum, industrial 
diamonds and ball bearings all were purchased and shipped 
to the Far East in varying quantities. 

information regarding a number of synthetic products 
specially developed in Germany. In most cases simple de- 
scriptions of the product probably were sufficient to allov; 
production of the material in Japan* for more complicated 
material, methods of production v/ere described or demon- 
strated to the Japanese* Included in those special synthetic 
products v/ere materials used in the manufacture and trans~ 
portation of concentrated hydrogen peroxide ; and special 
materials and adhesive s used in the manufacture of wooden 
aircraft • 

Conclusion ? 

Japan of modern German mv equipment and manufacturing 
techniques unfortunately coincided with severe x^estrlctions 
in blockade running between Europe and the Far East, As a 
result, Japan was not able adequately to benefit from Germany 9 
more open attitude toward negotiations. Sample German 
equipment in the Far East mainly is restricted to items which 
were In operational use In the period 1943.-43* Japanese 

Japan acquired. In varying degrees of detail/ 

From the Japanese point of view, the opening up to 




knowledge of more recent German developments generally is 
re3trlcted to descriptive information, supplemented in 
some cases by manufacturing drawings and blueprints* 
Available evidence suggests that Japan had not progressed 
far In the development of more recent German war equipment 
and manufacturing techniques. Plans for intensive develop- 
ment of German equipment in the Far East, under supervision 
of fully trained German or Japanese technicians, were 
negatived to a considerable extent by a lack of shipping 


Introd uction 

a. Economic Agreements of January 1943: 

Technical liaison between Germany and Japan re- 
ciprocated under the German-Japanese Economic Agreement of 
January 1943; a separate Economic Agreement between Japan 
and Italy was concluded at the same time* Both Agreements 
were in general terms and provided for the mutual exchange 
of raw materials, military equipment; manufactured goods, 
technical assistance and drawings, an exchange which had 
been in practical execution for some time past. The Economic 
Agreements \?ere to have a life span equal to that of the 
political Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. 

At the time of the signing of the German-Japanese 
Agreement, public comment stressed very justly *the relative 
wealth and reciprocal possibilities of mutual assistance; 
that is, on the one hand, the great assets of raw materials 
in the hands of the Japanese and required by Germany, and, 
on the other hand, the benefits accruing to Japan from the 
highly efficient German war machine and industrial techniques* 

Broadly speaking, the subjects of exchange between 
Japan and its European Allies have beens 

(1) German and Italian material and techniaal 



(il) German intelligence on Allied technical 
development s« 

In general, techniques and scientific research had pro- 
gressed further fn Gerra&ny than in Japan ; a fact of which 
the Japanese have talten full advantage* Available evidence 
suggests that the Japanese were free to inquire about any 
field of development which interested them; in general,, 
German willingness to impart information appears to have 
been greater in respect to Allied materiel than it was in 
respect to German equipment* 

it would appear that the Germans, rather than volunteer in- 
formation, awaited specific Japanese inquiry* In fact, with 
items of special interest and significance in the nature of 
original weapons and developments, data was not provided 
to the Japanese except after protracted negotiations and, 
on occasion, was subject to direct order of approval of 

b. Manufacturing Ri ghts Agreement; 

In March 1944, a# a corollary to the Economic 
Agreement , Japan concluded with Germany an agreement couched 


In the early stages of execution of the Agreements,* 


in general terms covering the exchange of manufacturing 
rights* That Agreement planned an application of lend-lease 
principles with no arrangements for immediate payment by 
either side until after the war* It was intended that as her 
contribution, Japan should supply many raw materials to 
Germany; in return, Japan would obtain from Germany materials, 
processes, manufacturing rights and technical assistance. 

point in the history of Japanese purchases from Germany, was 
necessitated by the virtual ending of surface blockade-* 
running* Because of the limited cargo space in submarines 
which thereafter carried out blockade running, it was 
necessary to concentrate on the exchange of plans, blueprints, 
manufacturing rights and small prototype equipment, rather 
than the actual purchase of machines, weapons and materiel* 

in the Bale to Japan of many processes and manufacturing 
rights. Originally— by order of Hitler— Japanese interests 
in Germany were restricted to such equipment as was in 
operational use. In January 1945 , however, Hitler reversed 
his decision and ordered that Japan be allowed access to all 
materiel and processes in Germany , even such as were still in 
the experimental and development stage* 

Hie March 1944 Agreement, which marked a turning 

The conclusion of the &aroh 1944 Agreement resulted 

♦ Patent flight s Agreemen t I 

In December 1944, Germany proposed a second 
agreement intended to cover the exchange of Inventions of 
importance to the war. That agreement was to go into effect 
one month after signature and was not to toe abrogated H untll 
6 months after the conclusion of the mutual conduct of the 
war of the two contracting parties. ,r The Agreement appears 
to have been di signed to protect the secrecy of inventions, 
knowledge, experience, methods and instructions regarding 
production, and to prevent confiscation of patents* It was 
thus complementary to the Manufacturing Rights Agreement* 
The Patent Rights Agreement was never signed, apparently 
because of an unwillingness on the part of Japan iahich de- 
layed negotiations until the end of the iiteropean war* 
d* Channels of liaison: 

In Germany technical liaison was channeled through 
the offices of the Japanese iviilltary and Naval Attaches in 
Berlin and technical assistants working on the staffs of those 
two Attach&s, In Japan a Joint Army-Navy Technical Application 
Committee was founded, the function of which was the coor- 
dination for both the Japanese Army and Navy of all 
technical material obtained from Germany* In spite of the 
assistance of that committee, however, there apparently 


was Borne duplication jf inquiry by the two service Be 

Paralleling the Tokyo committee and cooperating 
xvith the Japanese Attach* in Berlin, the Germans set up a 
"Committee on the Provisions of manufacturing Rights to 
Japan. 11 That committee was composed of representatives of 
the Foreign Office, Treasury, War Production Ministries and 
the National Defense Economic Off ie£, and v/orked under the 
chairmanship of the Relchsgruppe Industry* The committee 
received all Japanese proposals as to the acquisition of 
manufacturing rights for military material, although the 
Japanese could carry out prior negotiations with German 
officials or firms. Final authority rested with the High 
Command of the OKW. The Japanese service Attaches in Berlin, 
hov/ever, could negotiate contracts direct with German firms. 
For ordinary commercial non-war material needs the Japanese 
were free to make direct contact with German industry* 

To assist the Japanese in negotiations for German 
Air Force equipment, a special office— the Office of the 
Special Representative for Japan— had the task of advising 
ani assisting the Japanese in their requests and negotiations 
for German air equipment, including air defense equipment. 

In all cases Involving blockade runners, either 


surface or underwater vessels, the trans-shipment to the 
Far East of documents and materiel purchased by Japanese 
representatives in Germany was tte responsibility of the 
German Mavy. 

Qhanne i s of supply ; 

The main channels of supply whereby information 
and materiel were exchanged between Europe and the Far East 
were i 

(i) Surface blockade runners and submarines. 

(ii) Mail by courier and parcel poet, 
presumably through diplomatic channels. 

(iii) Rail communication through Siberia. 

The volume of traffic carried by courier mail and parcel 
post through diplomatic channels cannot be determined. 
Quantity traffic by rail across Siberia was closed with 
the opening of the Rus so-German war, but, nevertheless, 
passage of personnel still continued after that date. 

In addition, the use of long-range aircraft was 
fully considered* One Italian aircraft In 1941 made a 
round-trip flight to Tokyo. From 1941 on negotiations 
were carried out to open an air route between Europe and the 
Far East. Germany planned that such flights should be made 
by the northern route; Japan, on the other hand, to avoid 



Infringement of Soviet neutrality . opposed such a route 
and recommended in its place the utilization of a 
southern route. Because of this difference of opinion, 
and because of a lack of long-range German transport air- 
craft, no such transport flights were carried out. 

In the period 1941-1943 a large volume of two- 
way shipment was carried out oy surface blockade-runner s. 
The cessation of surface blockade running and the sub^ 
sequent loss of French Atlantic coast ports to submarine 
blockade runners greatly restricted interchange of material 
and information during 1944-1345, Although sor,ie submarines 
are known to have successfully made the trip between Surope 
and the Far Kast, the limited cargo space available restrict** 
ed the nv terial sent to Japan to blueprints, plans, small 
prototype equipment and special materials carrying the high- 
est priority; a small number >f technical personnel also were 
transported to the Far East by U-boat* 

f* Jaoan 1 s benefits from the Interchange s 

It must not be overlooked that while the prosecu- 
tion of the war was the primary objective of the exchanges 
to both Germany and Japan, Japan has greatly benefited from 
the exchanges* Her technical knowledge has been consider- 
ably strengthened and she has coincidentally acquired nater** 


ial> technical processes and manufacturing rights which, 
unless appropriate counter-measures are taken, will "be of 
the greatest benefit to her peace-time industry. Particu- 
larly does this apply to the numerous patents and pro** 
cesses granted to Japan by Germany, although in certain 
instances such oatents and propesses may not have been 
Germany* e to give, 

go Technical aid ac quir ed by Japan in Europe 

Cf the information obtained by Japan from Germany, 
emphasis apoears to have been placed on improved defensive 
strategy > applied particularly to the direction of high- 
performance aircraft, warning devices and coast and ground 
defenses o Considered broadly, the information obtained by 
Japan appears to have fallen in the following categories, 
listed according to priority of Japanese interest: 

(i) Aircraft 

(ii) Electronics 

(iii) Naval equipment 

(iv) Land armament and ammunition 
' (v) Optical equipment 

(vl) manufacturing processes 

(vii) Special raw materials, manufactured mater- 
ials and technical literature. 

To assist in the development and production in Japan of 
equipment obtained In Germany, and to supervise Japanese 
production of \iar materiel, there was an interchange of 
technical personnel between the tv/o countries. German 
technical and production experts were shipped to work 
in the Par &ast; Japanese personnel were sent to Germany 
to train in German techniques and production methods and 
in some oases were able to return to the Far Sast after 
completion of such training. 

The body of the study consists of the progress 
and results of Japanese negotiations for German equipment 
and manufacturing techiAques. Information concerning the 
equipment for v&tich negotiations were carried out is 
contained in a series of Tabs attached as appendices to 
the study • 








Japanese jet- and rooKet-propulsion researoh 
Progress of negotiations 
Japanese negotiations with Messerschisitt 
The MK-163 

Liquid rocket chemical fuels 

The tfE-262 

The AR-234 

The HB-162 

The JU-28? 

Turbo-jet units 

Special materials for turbine-blades 

(a) Tinidur and Ohroraadur high-duty steel 
alloy 3. 

(b) Ceramics 
The V-l 



Performance and descriptive data Tor the aircraft, 
pov?er unite, and fuels covered in Section I will be 
found in TAB D* 



The Gamplni engine- driven jet unit 88 
G-erraan Jet technicians destined for the Far East 91 



Captured documents indicate that, as far back 

as 1941 : the Japanese were considering jet-propulsion as 
a means of powered flight, and that by early 1942 they 
had developed the theory of a turbo- Jet power unit, had 
the basic design of such a unit already completed ana 
had evolved the design of an aircraft— of the flying-wing 
type — powered by two turbo-jet units. The non-appearance 
of such aircraft and power units in the Far fiaetem war 
suggests that development from theory to production, was 
retarded by practical difficulties* This ie substantiated 
by a captured Japanese technician 1 8 notebook, dated 
iUarch 44 , which stated that the problems encountered 
with the turbo-jet pov/er unit ware "poor cooling; turbine 
blades fly off". In developing a turbo- jot unit f the 
Japanese apparently encountered the saine problems as 
those yhioh confronted the Germans, namely ^ the pro- 
duction of metaln capable of withstanding the high temper- 
atures involved., and, at the same tiroe. capable of being 


easily machined and worked to the required form for 
turbi n e~bl&de s . 

It Is perhaps natural, therefore, that the 
Japanese should have attempted to profit to the utmost German design and productive and operational ex- 
perience In the field of turbo-Jet aircraft, by obtaining 
blueprints, plans and sample equipment of turbo- Jet units- 
and of aircraft powered by such units— which the Germane 
had developed to a stage of practical production and 

Limitations of altitude performance, together 
with relatively poor radar equipment, undoubtedly made 
the Japanese realize the vulnerability of the Empire to 
high-altitude daylight bombing. A possible answer lay 
in the fast-climbing German tt£~163 rocket-propelled 
interceptor; thus the Japanese developed an acute interest 
in that aircraft. An aircraft using chemical fuel pro- 
bably was a new technique to the Japanese, although they 
earlier had obtained information about German chemically- 
fuelled assisted take-off rockets. 

Jet- and rocket-propeiled aircraft probably 
had one other aspect which stimulated Japanese interest. 
Since the Jet aircraft used diesel~type fuel and the 

rocket aircraft chemical fuel, their large-scale development 
and employment would have offered some relief to a high- 
octane fuel economy which threatened to become serious 
when the Empire was Isolated from the oil-rich southern 

Information available from various sources 
bears considerable evidence of the trend of Japanese 
development in the fieldc of Jet- and rocket-propulsion. 
That evidence suggests that three main lines of develop- 
ment were being pursued: 

U) liquid rocket propulsion, 
(ii) turbo-Jet propulsion, and 

(lii) engine-Jet propulsion. 
In addition, solid rocket propulsion was developed to an 
operational stage , as Is evidenced by the Baka. 

In the fields of turbo-jet propulsion research, 
a captured document reports on the results of experiments 
during the period April 41 - March 42 as carried out at 
the Naval Air Technical Depot, presumably at Xokosuka. 
That document, stated to be the sixth report on the sub- 
ject, includes a theoretical treatment of pressure and 


temperature distribution in & turbo-jet unit together 
with an analysis of the thermodynamics of such a unit. 
The report concludes with a schematic diagram of a turbo- 
jet unit, together with a tailless aircraft powered by 
two such unite, 

• A notebook dated 16 March 44 captured in the 
Philippines contains notes on various experimental jet 
and rocket units. Included in those notes is a very 
elementary diagram of a turbo-Jet unit which was stated 
to be under research at the Air Technical Depot < again 
presumably Yokosuka) and stated that the defects in that 
unit were poor oooling and the fact that the turbine-blades 
flew off • 

Japanese research on engine-driven Jet units 
apparently leaned heavily on Campini f s research and 
development in that field. A document dated 13 January 42, 
captured on Sal pan, is a report on the theoretical and 
experimental data of a Camplni type unit as a power unit 
for aircraft. The document is a discussion of the 
Carapini method of Jet-propuleion and its possible im- 
provement • Although no work with actual installations 
was mentioned, the belief was expressed that, by intro- 
ducing a combustion chamber at the rear of the blower 3 an 


Improvement of thrust could be obtained. The document 
contains detailed calculations and graph® of the propul- 
sion efficiency of a Oampini type unit and suggests that, 
at the time of the report , the Japanese had a metallurgical 
problem in that they apparently haa not developed metals 
able to stand up to the high temperatures of a Jet-propul- 
sion system. The report also includes a sketch of an 
aircraft powered by two Oampini units driven by a common 
2 f 000 hp engine mounted in the fuselage a Those experiments 
also apparently were being carried out at Yokosuka. 

drawings of two Oampini type units. One ? reportedly in- 
vented by a Ltt Gol. Tanegashima, incorporated a combustion 
chamber at the rear of the air blower. The other, powered 
by a low-power internal combustion engine had, according 
to the sketch, no such combustion chamber and was intended 
only as an auxiliary power unit. It was stated in the 
notebook that the unit was to be mounted below the bomb 
bay of a twin-engined bomber when high speed at low altitude 
was required. Yet another captured document refers to a 
Oampini type Jet unit using a 2*000 hp internal combustion 

The notebook captured in the Philippines had 


The evidence suggests that Japanese development 

of Campini type units was directed to the development of 
two type b of unit* Ones powered by a low horsepower 
engine, was to be used as an auxiliary power unit, pro- 
bably for twin-engined aircraft; the other, using a high 
powered engine, was to be used as a straight power unit. 

msnts in the field of liquid- .rocket propulsion • However, 
a P/W who appears to be reliable and very knowledgeable, 
referred in interrogation to li 8hu 3ui % a small piloted 
interceptor, fired from & ramp mounted on a turntable 
and capable of climbing to 10,000 faetere in 3 minutes* 
The P/Vi stated that the propulsion unit of this inter- 
ceptor was not, to his belief, of the solid rocket type 
as used in the Baka and that the interceptor, which has 
a single fin and rudder, was a modified German design* 
The very high rate of climb suggests the use of & 
Xiquid-roelcet propulsion unit, and if, as the P/W suggested, 
it was based on German design, the unit possibly may have 
bean of the Walter type, using hydrogen peroxide for fuel* 

Initial Japanese interest in German jet technique 

w&i5 in respect to assisted take-off rocket a ae used on the 

There is little evidence of Japanese develop- 


JU-88 bomber* In early September 1945, Japanese representa- 
tives In Berlin requested information concerning those 
rocket 0) an& > as of that &ate 5 appeared to be under the 
Impression that the rocketa used a solid powder propellant, 
rather than concentrated hydrogen peroxide and a catalyst. 
In the following November it was intended to dispatch 
specimen rockets to Japan at the earliest opportunity. 
Information on the nature and properties of T~Stoff and 
the catalyst (2-Stoff — potassium permanganate) was obtained 
and negotiations for manufacturing rights, presumably for 
the assisted take-off rockets* were undertaken* 

At the beginning of 1944 f the GaF High Command 
first revealed to the Japanese in Berlin the secret Jet- 
and rocket-* propelled fighters. The Japanese lost no time 
in availing themselves of this willingness on the part of 
the Germans to divulge information on jet and rocket air- 
craft. An official request for information was made by 
Japanese representatives in Berlin^ and, in March 44, 
Hitler and Goring decided that the information should be 
made a^ > '&ilable to Japan. 

According to a letter from Milch to Goring, 
dated 1 April 44, discussion between Japanese and German 
representatives led to the formulation of Japanese requests 


for (i) Messersehmitt Jet technicians to be sent to 
Japan, (li) the training of Japanese technicians In 
Germany, and (ill) the purchase by Japan of manufacturing 
rights for the construction under license of the B 
and ME«262 JW1. In making those requests the Japanese 
were availing themselves of the terms of a Hitler order 
that Japan must be given extensive information concerning 
future German development s, and of the fact that, in the 
preceding January f Goring had expressed agreement in 
principle with the idea of close Japanese- German collabora- 
tion a 8 regards the latest types of German aircraft and 
their manufacture ♦ The Japanese requests were placed 
before Goring for a decision. By the beginning of April 44, 
descriptions! survey sketches and illustrations of the 
MJfi-163 B and ME- 262 A-l already had been turned over to 
Japanese representatives in Germany, although those air- 
craft still were only under test. 

Initially, there appears to have been duplica- 
tion of inquiry by the Japanese Army and Navy. The 
Germans commented on this state of affairs, pointing 
out that they had no intention of making agreements 
separately with the tivo services and that it would seem 
advisable for one service to take oomplete charge of the 


Apparently as a result of discussions It was 

decided that the Navy, which had principally undertaken 
research in Jet propulsion technique and had made con- 
siderable progress, was to assume responsibility for 
negotiations with Germany in relation to techniques, 
securing of production plans, and the training and pro- 
curing of technicians, but it wag proposed that there 
should be joint Army/Navy research. In line with that 
decision j an Array/N&vy agreement was concluded for the 
purpose of coordinating research on rocket aircraft* 

talned direct contact with Germany, particularly on the 
J4&-163* The bulk of technical material, however, was 
collated by Naval personnel or by the Army and Navy 

in various types of jet and rocket propulsion aircraft 
are diffioult to define and the evidence is somewhat 
contradictory. The Navy apparently was primarily 
responsible for developing the general techniques in 
Japan, while both services were to produce the aircraft* 
It is probable that both services were attempting to 
produce both jet- and rocket-propelled aircraft. 

In spite of this understanding, the Army main 

The specific interests of the two services 


Around April 44 negotiations were under way to 
allow the Japanese to purchase manufacturing rights for 
the Walter propulsion unlt ? the ufi-163 fuselage, the 
turbo-jet propulsion unit (presumably the Junkers model > 
although attempts were being made also to obtain the BMW 
type) arid, in addition, two complete mE-165 aircraft; the 
negotiations also were to provide the Japanese with all 
the results of testing and -experience of the German 
manufacturing companies* In May, the Germane agreed to 
release manufacturing rights for the ME«262 fuselage, but 
at that time negotiations were not successfully concluded, 
possibly because considerable modification of the ME-262 
waa necessary as a result of trial flights* Plans for 
the aircraft were to be made available to the Japanese 
in the fall. 

Captured OKL archives indicate that the GAP 
High Command then suffered a change of heart with regard 
to release of plans and detail o of ite jet- and rocket- 
propelled aircraft. Although both Hitler and Goring 
apparently had made verbal decisions early in 1944 that 
the Japanese should be expo Bad to jet and rocket propulelon 
techniques, a letter of mid-June stated that, on orders 
from Goring, no data v/as to leave the appropriate German 

aircraft factories, even if a contra 
rights had been concluded, until receipt of special 
instructions from the German Air Ministry* It was not 
until July that orders were issued :?or tho preparation and 
handing over t^ tho Japanese representatives in Germany 
of sets of blueprints and drawings for the manufacture 
of the aircraft, propulsion units and chemical fuels. 
The sets of blueprints and drawings were to be sent to 
Japan as individual sets on different U-boats* On 22 July, 
G^rin? approved the granting of licensee to Japan for the 
delivery of 1 M£~163 and 1 as "sample aircraft. 

Security considerations still apparently were 
of the greatest concern to the Germans. A 21 August 
letter stated that the release of the sample fclE~163 and 
fti£-26&, although approved, was not to become effective 
until the OKL had taken all necessary safety measures to 
preserve the security of the equipment. Those measure e 
included making certain that, in emergency, the entire 
shipment of parts could be destroyed immediately so that 
none should fail into enemy hands. 

On 28 August the OKL t?as notified once again 
that the Japanese had requested the release of one ME-163 
and one to be transported to the Far East by a U-boat 



already In Germany. Japanese hopee suffered a setback at 
this time, as Hitler refused the release of the aircraft, 
A 16 September letter clarified this refusal^ stating that 
it was only temporary and was made because the aircraft 
were not fully developed from a technical standpoint. At 
the same time, this order authorized the continuance of 
the surrender to Japan of manufacturing rights and the 
necessary plans for the aircraft and their power units . 
By late September* the OKL had decided t'hat in view of 
the limited transport space available, deliveries of 
sample aircraft to Japan would have to be dropped, but 
that necessary plane and sample power units, together with 
some of the individual parts of the power units which were 
especially difficult to manufacture, should be released 
for tr asportation to the Far East, probably during 
October. Hitler reversed his decision early in October 
and ordered that deliveries were to be carried out with- 
out limitation* By this time, however, transportation was 
no longer possible and it seems fairly clear that sample 
equipment of the aircraft and their power units never 
reached the Far East, 

Japanese negotiations with Me sser echini tt regarding Jet-. 

toessersohmitt officials have provided the 
following information on Japanese negotiations with 
respect to that company's Jet- and rocket-propelled air- 

At the beginning of 1944 the Japanese suggested 
the manufacture under license in Japan of the kE-163 and 
MEU262; production in the Far East was to be carried out 
under the supervision of German engineers. In addition, 
Messersohmltt specialists were to go to Japan to super- 
vise development there of Messersohmltt high-speed air- 
craft. In those negotiations the lead was taken by the 
Japanese Navy* 

It became clear during the negotiations that the 
Japanese could not build the M1S-163 and Hfi-262 without 
compulsory modifi cations j they therefore required special- 
ists who would supervise manufacture in accordance with 
those modifications. The modifications were necessary 
because of Japanese ignorance of German production methods, 
because of a lack of skilled workers, and because of a 
lack in Japan of certain special materials, among which 
thin sheet steel was outstanding. That material was used 

for the none of the ME~S62j sine© Japanese sheet steel 
manufacturing processes v/ere ino&pablo.of producing sheet 
steel of the necessary thinness and resilience, the nose 
of the Japanese produced was to be made of duralumin* 

The reaeon for Japanese limitations in the field of thin 
sheet at eel wao not a lac% of raw materials, but ignorance 
of production methods and a lack of skilled supervisory 

Apparently it seemed essential to the Japanese 
that they be independent in the production of every 
component for both aircraft* They therefore bought 
manufacturing licensee not only for the fuselages and 
vilngs of the two aircraft, but also for production of all 
components* In particular did they show an interest in 
the plywood .process involving the strengthening of v7ood 
by the moulding of veneer strips glued v/ith Togo film* 
A license for that process wae acquired and Japanese 
experts received training in the necessary techniques. 

The impressions of the kiesssrsohzaitt officials 
v/ith regard, to the negotiations with Japan can be summarized 
as follows; 

a* It vi fx 3 obvious that the Japanese intended 
production of the ME«268 3 after several major changes 


in construction had been effected; 

jb t Production was intended on a limited scale- 

o. The Japanese apparently did not intend to 
build the MIS~163 ? relevant documents being needed 
for study purposes only; 

&• The intensity with which the Japanese demanded 
a license for the plywood process indicated tha 
importance which they placed on plywood development; 

e* Under the most favorable conditions, the 
earliest date for mass production of the 
must be estimated at l| years after arrival of the 
necessary documents in the Far East, 


Tire ME-16ff: 

Immediately on receipt of information about 
Jet and rocket development in Germany, the Japanese in 
Germany began to show the greatest interest in the ME-163. 
In mid-May Japanese naval representatives in Berlin were 
negotiating for complete production plane for the ME-163 5 
and for the transfer to Japan of technicians fully 
familiar with design and production of the aircraft 
and its propulsion unit* By mid-August a considerable 
amount of detailed material on the M&-163 possibly had 
arrived in Tokyo* 

A captured file of Eleotrochemische Werke^ 
MiSnchen — manufacturers of liquid-rocket chemical fuels- 
contains documents which Indicate a strong probability 
that plans for the Walter HWK 109-509 power unit of the 
ME-1S3 arrived in Japan. Contained in that file is a 
letter of 9 August 1944, from 'Walter's Berlin office, 
which quoted a 13 July order from the German Air Ministry 
to manufacturers of Jet and rocket-aircraft and power 
units that delivery of drawings should take place ? re- 
gardless of the signing of agreements covering manufactur- 
ing rights* Walter 1 a letter continued with the statement 
that the Walter factory at Kiel already had delivered to 

the Japanese In Berlin all drawings, including ten sets 
of plane and a complete plan of the works. It is probable 
that the drawings and plane were handed over to Japanese 
representatives in Berlin on 13 July, the date on which 
those representatives received all drawings In connection 
with the manufacture of liquid rocket chemical fuels* It 
is probable that those plans were shipped from Europe 
during the next month* Since they were in ten-copy, at 
least one set of drawings for the Walter HWK 109-509 must 
have arrived in the Far East by the end of the year* 

Further information was given to the Japanese 
in regard to the use of beech plywood for the main wing 
akin 5 and on thicknesses of the si; in at various points 
along the x^iiig* Information on the adhesj.ves used for 
the wooden parts of the aircraft, and concerning the 
process for manufacturing main wing spare and laminated 
wing surfaces, and the repair of wings also was provided* 
In September-October the Japanese representatives first 
learned some detail of the ME-1S3 0. 

Still further detailed Information on the 
MSU163 and of the handling of its chemical fuels, including 
the base installations necessary, was requested by the 
Japanese in November • Those requests, in conjunction with 

the detailed information already supplied by the Germans, 
suggest that, although not In possession of blueprints, 
Tokyo nevertheless was attempting to build at least an 
experimental copy of the ME-163 on the basis of the 
information available, and anticipated operations by 
MS-163 1 s at some future date* Further evidence of 
anticipated development of the MK-163 in Japan is pro- 
vided by evldenoe of a Japanese request for information 
on ME-163 tactics and German methods of ground control* 

under interrogation, that the first Japanese k£-163 f or 
a copy of that aircraft, had made a powered test-flight 
in December 44. That information, which was quite un- 
expected, was received from the German Ambassador In Tokyo. 

In January 45, Japanese interest appears to 
have been centered on the iiE-163 Co* Strenuous efforts 
were made for dispatch to Japan of the techniques of the 
JU-248, together with sketches of the aircraft showing 
the principal parts and points of difference from earlier 
types. Arrangements were also made for the transfer of 

**Thie aircraft also was referred to as the JU-248, 
JU (MS) -263 and 8-263* 

General Keseler, who was captured en route to 
Tokyo> where he was to become German Air Attach!, stated, 


German technicians to the Par Kast ? first priority being 
given to a Meesersohmitt assembly foreman, with an engineer 
familiar with plane for the JU-248 as second priority. 

It seems clear that Japan appreciated the 
possibilities of the MSU163 as a defensive weapon against 
B-29 attacks ? where its high rate of climb would be of the 
greatest value, 'While its limited endurance was dis- 
advantageous, against this must be weighted the fact that 
many of Japan 1 s primary targets for air attack were in 
coastal areas* With limited radar warning, a fast-climbing 
fighter was essential* Also the use of an aircraft powered 
by chemical fuels would help alleviate a tight aviation 
fuel situation* It is probable, therefore, that strenuous 
efforts were made to reproduce the ME-163 in Japan* Al- 
though no sample aircraft, and probably no complete set of 
blueprints for the aircraft arrived in the Far £ast, the 
information available probably was sufficient to allow 
of attempted construction of the aircraft* Apparently, 
however, the experiments were not successfully completed* 
No positive identification of the MK-163 was reported by 
combat crews operating over Japan, nor were any identified 
on photographic cover* 

A Japanese aircraft technician captured in the 
Philippines made reference to a small, faet-cllmbing 


interceptor to which the name "Shu Sui" had been given by 
the Japanese. He stated that the propulsion unit of that 
aircraft, a specimen of whloh ha had seen at the Xokosuka 
experimental base, was of a rocket type, but not of the 
solid rocket type used In the Baka. The rate of climb which 
he attributed to "Shu Sui a suggested a liquid rocket 
propulsion unit. 

Preliminary reports of Allied occupation of Yoko- 
euka made referenoe to the presenoe there of bat-like flying 
wings. According to U.S. Navy reports of a preliminary 
survey of the Yokosuka Technical Air Arsenal, an unspecified 
number of "Shu Sui" liquid rocket Jet fighters modeled after 
the ME-163 had been found in the flight test stage. 

No discussion of the possibility of successful 
development of the ME-163 in Japan oan, however, be 
divorced from consideration of successful development of 
the associated chemical fuels. It would have benefited 
the Japanese little to reach the production stage with 
the ME-163, if they were unable to master the problems 
of large-scale manufacture, transportation and storage 
* of the chemical fuels. Those problems were ©any and 
complex, as is fully evident from German experience in 
this field. 

, -45- 


The Japanese representatives in Germany apparently 
first became aware of the employment of oonoent rated 
hydrogen peroxide (T«Stoff) in conneotlon with the use by 
the GAF of that material in conjunction with permanganate 
(Z-Stoff) for rocket-assisted take-off. The Japanese pur- 
chased samples of suoh assisted take-off equipment and, 
in conjunction with that purchase, became cognizant of 
T~ and Z-Stoff. 

It was not until the Japanese became exposed to 
the mE-163 that they received information as to the employ- 
ment of concentrated hydrogen peroxide as a fuel for that 
aircraft ♦ There is evidence to suggest, however, that 
production of hydrogen peroxide may already at that time 
have been under way in Japan, although the Japanese are 
thought to have been experiencing difficulties in its 

In the spring of 1944 Japanese representatives 
In Germany entered Into negotiations with the appropriate 
German firms for purchase of manufacturing rights for B- , 
C- and T~8toff . Agreements were not signed until 

♦The nature, characteristics and manufacture of liquid 
rocket chemical fuels are briefly discussed in TAB D, 

14 Deo ember 44. However, at an early stage in the nego- 
tiations, orders were issued by the Oer^an Air Ministry 
to the effect that the handing-over to the Japanese of 
blueprints and plans was not to await the signing of an 
agreement 9 but was to take place forthwith. 

A captured file of Ghemiache Fabric Grsr&thofen 
contains a series of letters and documents which indicate 
that the Japanese representatives in Germany on 13 July 44 
received all the drawings and plans for fi- , 0- and T~8to£f 
manufacturing installations. It presumably was those plans 
which were discussed by Nakai and German scientist 8 cn the 
oooaeion of Nakai'e visit on 24 July to Hollriegelskreuth, 
the German hydrogen peroxide pilot plant • During that 
visit the German scientists showed. to NaKai, and dis- 
cussed with him, the operating peroxide concentration 
plant, discussed the apparatus of the plant stage by 
stage in full detail- -including the materials used in 
construction and special requirements of each individual 
piece of apparatus— and repeatedly went over the manu- 
facturing process and techniques in conjunction with the 
plane supplied to the Japanese. The letter reporting on 
Hakai*G 24 July visit made it clear that Nakai's inspection 
and discussions were only in respect of the concentration 



plant, and did not cover production by the electrolysis 
method of the original 35# hydrogen peroxide from which 
concentration to 80- 85$ peroxide (T- St off) was carried out* 
It should be pointed out, however 9 that available evidence 
indicates that the Japanese already knew how to manufacture 
low~conoentrate peroxide— a standard commercial product— 
and that their main concern wae with the concentration 
process. The Riedel- Sobering electrolysis process for 
manufacture of 30-35$ commercial peroxide was purchased 
by Japanese interests several years before the war. 
Specifically, the captured file contained the following 

(i) A 29 April 44 letter date lined Hollrelgels- 
kreuth which referred to a discussion at the Air 
Ministry between KU/t representatives and representa- 
tives of Messersehmltt, Junkers, BMW 9 Walter and 
JSlektrocheraisohe Werke Munohen, apparently held on 
28 April. The letter referred to a Hitler order 
according to which Japan was to have access to the 
newest OAF developments. Under terms of that order 
all plans for Japan were to be ready by 10 June 44, 
and were to include drawings and descriptions for 
the concentration plants for B- and C~ Stoff manufacture. 


A 31 July 44 letter from Kojima to 
Slefctrochemisohe Werke ttunohen, which made refer- 
ence to Nakai*a visit — presumably that on the 
24th«~and offered thanks for the description a and 
plans* Replying to that letter on 2 August, EWJft 
expressed their hopes that the plans given to 
Nakai- -which were stated to be necessary for 
production — would clarify unspecified questions 
which previously had been raised. 

(Hi) A 20 September 44 latter from Walter, 
Berlin which referred to the negotiations in 
progress with the Japanese* and mentioned 

(a) First discussions were held at the 
Air Ministry on 22 April* 

(b) A letter from the German Mr Ministry 
dated 15 July* which stated that plans were to 
be handed over to the Japanese whether or not 
an agreement had been concluded; 

(c) Copies of appropriate agreements 
were to be handed to Japanese representatives 
in Berlin on 28 August; 

(d) Plans v*ere given to Harke and Nakai 

at the German Air Ministry on 13 July 44. Walter 

held the original receipts for those plans 
and included copies thereof with the 20 
September letter. 

The receipt b referred to under item (d) above, 
are signed by Nakal and dated 13 July. They refer to 
material received in connection with agreements MZ-2 
(with EWM for T- St off) and MZ-3 (with Cheiflisohe Fabrik 
Gersthof en for B- and CUStof f) . In them Nakal acknow- 
ledges reoeipt, in duplicate, of the following: 

(a) Description of the T-Stoff process; 

(b) Description of apparatus for the T-Stoff 
concentration plant; 

(o) A list of drawings for the T-Stoff con- 
centration plant (21 drawings for the B» and G-Stoff 
plants) • 

The file also contains a draft of the agreement 
signed by the Japanese for manufacturing rights for B- 
and C-Stoff, and, as an annex to that agreement, lists 
the material Japan is to receive upon its signing. That 
material includes a description of the process, consisting 
of some 40 pages (apparently from content matter the 
lengthy document which appears at the end of the captured 
file) and, in addition, 21 drawings for B- and G-Stoff 



plants, The description and drawings refer to a plant 
with a capacity of 500 tons per month of B-Stof f and 
corresponding quantities of G~Stoff. It presumably was 
a duplicate set of those 21 drawings which was received 
by Nakai on 13 July* The drawings are as follows: 

1. Layout 

2* Reaction .tower 

3* Sreotion of NHg evaporator 

4. KH3 - extraction column 

5* NH3 ~ rotation evaporator 

8* Reflux cooler for NH3 column 

7. MH3 condenser 

8* NH3 recooler 

9o Evaporator for salt evaporator 
10 • Rotation evaporator for salt evaporator 
11. Salt evaporator pump 
IS. Porcelain funnel 
IS, Fractionation column 

14. Grout) salt evaporator - general drawing 

1 5 * Pr eco no en t rat i on 

16* Schema for preconcentration 

17* Rotation evaporator for preconcentration 

18* Return condenser for preconcentration 


Final concentration 

20 • Scheme for concentration 

21* flotation evaporator for final concentration 

Those document b clearly indicate that by 13 July 
Japanese representatives in Berlin were in possession of 
description a of the manufacturing process and appropriate 
drawings of the plant and various apparatus for the 
manufacture of chemical fuels* If this is so, then it 
ig more than likely that those plana and descriptions 
were shipped from Europe at the earliest opportunity, As 
the material handed to Hakai on 13 July was in duplicate, 
it seems logical to assume that complete sets of the 
material were carried on at least two U-boats* It thus 
appears probable that at least one set of descriptions 
of the manufacturing process and drawings of the necessary 
plant for chemical fuels production arrived in the Par Kast* 

visited a T-Stoff manufacturing plant in Germany and 
obtained detailed information regarding its manufacture. 
During the following month they mads a seven-day personal 
study of the new German B«Stoff plant at Gersthofen and 
obtained information on <i) the plant used at the factory, 
(11) production schedules and (ill) detailed measurements 

In October , Japanese representatives in Germany 


of the apparatus* This information was supplemented by 
study of the apparatus, flow sheets, details of the tanks 
employed in the apparatus, the raw materials needed for 
the process, and details of the method of operation with 
particular reference to pressures and temperatures, and 
investigations of the method of titration and the method 
of production of C«Stoff, the analysis of that material, 
and the number of staff required for production. 

The D-86 catalyst used in connection with T- and 
C-Stoff also was the subject of Japanese investigation 
in August. Investigation covered the weights of the 
various raw materials 'required and its method of pro- 
duction in the stick form in which it was used in Germany* 
A supplementary investigation in September, covered further 
points about the method of manufacturing D~86 which had 
been gathered since the earlier study. The Japanese are 
known to have had contacts with Dr. Deraant, the chemical 
engineer in charge of all rocket experiments under the 
direct control of the German Air Ministry. 

Documentary evidence indicates that plans for 
the German experimental plants were handed to Japanese 
representatives in Germany in July 44, and that, before 
the end of that month, Nakal had visited the German pilot 


plant and had discussed manufacturing techniques and plant 
Installation in soma detail. It seems probable that some 
of those plans and of the Info mat Ion gathered by Nakai 
were Included in the cargoes of one or more of the U-boat e 
which may have left Europe late in the summer of 1944 and 
arrived in the Far East by the end of the year* If such 
be the case, it seems possible that that information may 
have been adequate to enable the Japanese to build and 
operate plants for the large- scale manufacture of liquid 
rocket chemical fuels* 

to liquid roe&et chemical fuels — that of storage and 
transportation* There is ample evidence that much 
experimentation was necessary before those problems 
satisfactorily could be met* Germany eventually arrived 
at the employment of pure aluminum containers for T-Stoff 
and of mild steel containers lined with Oppanol for B- 
and C-Stoff« German experience in this direction was 
made available to the Japanese in Germany • 

One other problem faced the Germans with regard 


It was early in 1944 that Japanese representa- 
tives in Germany apparently first became aware of German 
development of the ME-262* While it appears that the 
Japanese were fully aware of the &&U262, nevertheless, 
their primary interest initially lay in the M&-163. This 
may have been a result of the features of the M&-163 whioh 
made it an aircraft particularly suitable for use in de- 
fense of Japan against air attack * Alternatively > however, 
it may be that Japan believed that success wao imminent 
with its own development of turbo-jet units and of air- 
craft powered by such units. Documentary evidence indi- 
cates that such development had been in progress in the 
Far East since at least 1941* The Japanese representatives 
in Germany, however, continued to obtain information about 
the ME-2S2, and negotiations for manufacturing rights for 
the MS-163 were paralleled by similar negotiations in 
respect to the ME-262 and German turbo-Jet unite. 

The 1 April 44 letter from Milch to Goring, 
referring to Hitler and Goring decisions with regard to 
Germans-Japanese collaboration* indicated close Japanese 
Interest in the tfE-262 A~l„ The letter stated that, in 
accordance with Hitler* s order, descriptions, survey 



sketches and illustrations of the A-l sub- type already- 
had been turned ovor to the Japanese. It is believed 
that those sketches and descriptive material wex»e 
successfully transported to Japan, arriving there by 
the fall of 1944 . 

for the and it© power unit followed a pattern 

identioal with those for the J&E-1S5. In June 44, the 
aircraft and industrial manufacturing rights were released 
to Japan, the delivery, however? being subject to special. 

eentatives visited production centers, where 

Brlngewald—ln charge of k£«262 production in Germany — 
lectured them on the construction and special features of 
the aircraft* According to Bringewald, the Japanese 
showed particular interest in the use of wood for certain 
parts of the MK-262* In mid-July, Messersohmitt was 
ordered to prepare sets of traceable drawings and blue- 
prints to be handed over to the Japanese for transporta- 
tion to the Par East; later in the iconth Goring approved 
the handing over to Japan of a sample ME-262, In late 
August, however, Hitler reversed his original decision 
and refused the release of a sample ME- 262 to Japan* 

Japanese negotiations for manufacturing rights 

orders from Goring* During that month, Japanese repre- 



Meantime j preparation and delivery of necessary blueprints 
and plans proceeded, although delivery to the Japanese 
continued to be subject to orders from Goring* It was 
not until October 44 that Hitler released the MiiU262o 
The necessary contract with Messersohmltt for sale to 
Japan of manufacturing rights finally was signed in 
December 44. 

One of Meseerschmitt 1 s principal planning 
engineers has stated that he and four other Messerschmitt 
employees were the only ones who knew of a plant to 
transmit to Japan complete technical and production plans 
for the M2-262. Plans were delivered^ in October 44, to 
Dr* Thun~head of Messersohmltt 8 s foreign export branch — 
at Jettingen; a Japanese representative was present on 
that occasion. According to German Air Ministry records, 
sample parts and accessories for the mK-262 scheduled for 
delivery to Japan were still held by Messerschmitt in 
mid- September 44; their delivery to the Far East ^ there- 
fore j is very unlikely. This suggests that the only 
drawings to reach Japan concerning the ME- 26 2 v^ere the 
preliminary survey sketches and illustrations of the A~l 
sub- type which may have arrived in the fall of 1944* 

There is evidence that the Japanese Army intended 
to go into large-scale manufacture of the M&«262, Under 


terms of the Array *s contract with Meanerechmitt, the 
principal v/ork of von Ghlingenaperg,, a Messerechmitt 
technician detailed for transfer to Japan, was to be that 
of directing the design of short-range? fighters and long- 
range bombers at Kawasaki; as far as possible, the Anay 
also desired to have him direct the conversion* presumably 
of existing aircraft factories, to the manufacture of the 

the Germans that only the Army was planning production 
of the MK-262 and requested investigation for the Army of 
two production plane for that aircraft, one for 100 air- 
craft a month, the other for 500. Meantime, the Japanese 
were making arrangements for the transfer to Japan of 
Bringewald, a Messerschmltt technician who was to direct 
manufacture of the ME~262 in the Far Eaet. At that time 
it appears that the Army was putting the greatest emphasis 
on the improvement of the ME- 262 fuselage and the Jumo-004 
propulsion unite Nevertheless, first of all, attempts 
were being made rapidly to perfect the ME-163, principally 
as a means of high altitude defense* 

It is evident that Japan received little detailed 
information on the construction of the ME~262* However* 

In late October the Japanese in Berlin advised 

German tactical employment and ground organization of 
ME-262 fighter unite were closely studied by Japanese 
representatives and full information on performance 
characteristics and tactics was obtained. 

8ringewald ? the Messerschmltt civilian technician, 
and Ruf, a Meseersohmltt uxpart on procurement of industrial 
machinery; left for Japan in the U-234 and were captured 
when that U-boat surrendered to Allied forces* They 
carried with them blueprints and plans necessary for the 
eettlng up in Japan of factories adequate for the produc- 
tion of 500 MK-262's a month* They calculated that it 
would take at least 1& years after their arrival before 
the firat ME-262 would come off the production line and 
that it would require 3,000,000 man-hours to get the 
factory ready for production. They further stated that 
two Japanese engineers in Germany had given information 
that the Japanese were working on a turbo-jet unit but 
were meeting with continuous dif fieultles» It was the 
opinion of Bringewald and Ruf that the Japanese were not 
capable of building the MS-262 without receiving complete 
specifications and technical supervision from German 
special! sfc a. They were convinced that the Japanese did 
not have sufficient data and information to build the 


since no parts of the aircraft or its propulsion 
unite had been Bent: to Japan* nor v/as there- in J&par; 
any German specialist who could provide the necessary 
assl stance. 

It seems possible* however, that the Japanese, 
if they had been able to develop a turbo-jet unit to tho 
operational stage, might have built an aircraft which, 
although not a copy of the vms based on that air- 

craft. The success or otherwise of such experiments 
obviously depended on the successful development of a 
turbo- Jet unit* That, in turn, undoubtedly was greatly 
influenoed by the extent of the information available in 
Japan on the design and construction of German turbo-jet 
units, on the difficulties encountered by Germany in their 
development and of the methods by which each difficulties 
were overcome* While only the Jume-004 was used in the 
the BtoYJ-003 basically is of similar design, and 
information available in Japan on either of these turbo- 
jet units w&b a potential source of assistance to the 
Japanese in their own experiments* 


The and KHU163 ; 

There is no evidence that the Japanese entered 
into negotiations for the purchase of manufacturing 
rights for the AR-234 or the HK-162, nor is there any 
indication that plane or blueprints for the aircraft were 
handed to Japanese representatives in Germany • The evidence 
suggests that the Japanese did not contemplate production 
of either of these aircraft* 

The JU-2S7: 

The JU«387 ? a high-speed bomber powered by six 
turbo- Jet units arranged in groups of three under each wing, 
was still in the development stage at the end of the t*ar 
and only brief test flights had been carried out* In a 
5 January 45 letter, the German Air Ministry notified 
Otani that, if eo desired, manufacturing rights for the 
JU-287 could be made available to Japan* There ie no 
evidence to suggest any interest by the Japanese in thie 
high-speed bomber* 




Japanese interest in German turbo-jet units 
developed as part and parcel of the interest in the ME-262. 
As has been noted ataove^ by 1 April 44 the Japanese had, 
in accordance ?/ith an order by Hitler ? received general 
descriptions, survey sketches and Illustrations of the 
MK-163 B and ME-262 A-l. It must be assumed that inoluded 
in the material on the ME-262 was Information concerning 
its turbo-Jet units. In any event, the 1 April letter 
from Milch to Goring included the Jumo-004 B~l among the 
subject matter for cooperation in the field of Jet-propul- 
sion and rocket aircraft development* 

with the Junkers firm for purchase of manufacturing rights 
for the Jumc-004; parallel negotiations were carried on 
for the BMW-003, Those negotiations followed the pattern 
of those for the ME-163 and ME-262, in that they were 
subject to a change of heart on the part of Hitler ? which 
delayed delivery of sample equipment to the Japanese in 
Grermany until October 44* However, in mid-July, BMW 
and Junkers were instructed to prepare drawings and blue- 
prints of their respective turbo- Jet unite, as txvuisporta- 
tion to Japan was expected shortly to be available; one 

The Japanese thereupon entered into negotiations 


set of drawings in each ease was to q^yas^ 
to the Japanese in Berlin by ths middle of July* There 
is no positive evidence that any blueprints of turbojet 
units did arrive in the Far fiast* Agreement a for the 
purchase of manufacturing ri gilts ?;er© not signed until 
December 44. However > it is possible that some blueprints 
were handed over prior to the conclusion of negotiations-- 
as was the ease with the Walter power unit- -and saay have 
been carried to Japan by submarine* 

personnels the Junkers firm apparently was unable to 
supply a skilled technician to supervise production in 
Japan of the Jumo»004, and, presumably, the Bisw~003» It 
was for this reason that Sohomerus--a Moseersohaitt tsohni- 
clan lost on a German submarine early in 1945-~w&s detailed 
to collect information on production of turbo-jet units 
and act in a supervisory capacity in the Far Saafc* 

extensive research in methods of manufacturing turbo-Jet 
units. Among the points discussed by them with BMVK and 
Junkers were large-scale production methods for turbine 
and compressor blades, measures for prevention of damage 
due to vibration of those blades, and German methods of 

Because of a reported shortage of t 


Japanese technicians in Gterra&ny 

y carried on 


cooling turbine-blades. 

It would appear that, without a basic under- 
standing of the principles of turbo-jet propulsion, the 
scant information received by the Japanese would not be 
adequate for the construction of a turbo-jet unit based 
on German designs* However, in assessing the value of 
the information obtained in Germany, it must be remembered 
that as far back as 1941 the Japanese had, at least on 
paper, designed a turbo-Jet unit, had carried out theoreti- 
cal calculations of temperature and pressure distribution 
in such a unit, aad had designed a tailless aircraft to 
be powered by two such units. Furthermore, the captured 
March 44 notebook indicated that Japanese development of 
turbo- Jet units had progressed to the stage where experi- 
mental production was in hando According to that notebook 
the Japanese were encountering considerable difficulties 
in their researches, a fact which is corroborated by 
statements made by Bringewald and Huf, the Messerschmitt 
technicians. It ie possible that the information obtained 
in Germany may have provided sufficient information to 
enable the Japanese to overcome the difficulties en- 
countered in their own development of turbo-jet units* 
U.S* Navy cables report the discovery at the Yokosuka 

Technical Air Arsenal of one coaxial turl 

assembled and ready for test and of many components 

in the machining stage, 

According to the March 1944 notebook^ one of 

the main problems which Japanese development was encount- 
ering was that of the turbine-blades flying off the 
turbine disc; In addition, problems of cooling also had 
been experienced* Gooling and turbine-blades were two 
factors which the Germans also had to overcome in their 
successful development of turbo-jet units* The turbine- 
blade problem was laet by the development by Krupp of two 
special high- duty steel alloys, Tinidur and Ohromadurc 
Japanese representatives In Germany became aware of the 
existence and use of these alloys through their nego- 
tiations for manufacturing rights for the Jumo-004. The 
extent to which information on these alloys arrived in 
Japan appears, therefore, to be of considerable importance 
in determining the ability of Japan successfully to develop 
turbo-jet unite* 

September 44 plans for the Rledel starter, used In turbo-Jet 
unit s , were handed over to Japanese representatives in Germany, 
on ordere of the German Air Ministry* The Japanese had no 
direct contact with the Hiedel firm, transfer of the starter 

plans being made through Junkers* 

According to a German P/W, In the latter half of 

Special materials for turban e^blade,,g : 

a * Tl ntdy .r, and _GhTomQAm\^hi^h^&uty . .steel alloys : 
A file of the firm of Frie&rloh Krupp, Essen, indioatee 
the progress of negotiations between that firm and the 
Japanese Navy for the purchase by the latter of manu- 
facturing rights for two special high duty steel alloys — 
tlnidur and chromadur — and the machining processes nec- 
essary for the production of turbine- blades from such 

Negotiations with Krupp began in said- 1944 Krupp 
initially was extremely reticent to release the required 
data; It was not until 12 February 45 that the necessary 
agreement between Krupp and the Japanese representatives 
finally was signed* In the meantime- however, the 
Japanese had acquired considerable information on the 
composition an<f manufacture of the alloys In question, 
through visits to Krupp, Kssen by Tarutani, of the 
Japanese Navy, and schomerus, a Messerschmitt technician 
who had been selected to gc to Japan to assist in pro- 
duction there of Messersohmltt Jet-propelled aircraft* 
Tarutani and schomerus visited Krupp* Essen in October 44 ? 
Sohomerus being authorized to acquire information on the 
production of tlnidur and ohromadur* Although Tarutani 



and Schomerus were not special! gi a In the field of high- 
duty alloys, they nevertheless apparently were given 
step by- step outlines of the prodactl on procedure* 

The importance of tinidur and ohroraadur in th® 
production of turbine-blades is emphasized over and over 
again in correspondence, between Krupp and the German 
'Government, wherein Krupp is justifying the fee demanded 
by then for the sale of manufacturing rights* In that 
correspondence it ie stated that, without tinldur and 
ehrcmaduiv ths Japanese could expect a 50-100;* loss in 
development stages, 

On 1? Juno 44 j a repreaeni&tive of Junk era 
vi sited Krupp to inform the latter that Junkers was pre 
paring to turn over to the Japanese manufacturing rights 
for the Junkers turbo-jet unit* That unit employed 
tinidur for the contraction of parts taking 11 the jaaziatura 
strain 1 ' and the Junkers representative; stated that it was 
that firm's intention to inform the Japanese not only of 
the basic data for tinidur, but also of its designation 
and oourse of supply*- In reporting thie to the OKW ; Krupp 
stated that they were nefc Interested in passing on to the 
Japanese any further manufacturing methods for steel, They 
had requested Junkers not to go beyond giving to the 

Japanese the basic data for the alloy, so that the 
Japanese would be required to initiate with Krupp 
inquiries and negotiations for manufacturing rights 
and processing techniques. To that the Junkers repre- 
sentative agreed. 

Apparently this was clone and the Japanese 
realised that the production of tlnidur was essential 
to satisfactory development in Japan of the Jumo-004 or 
a turbo-jet unit based on that design* On 4 October, 
Krupp ? Essen, was visited by Schomerus and, on the follow- 
ing day, by Tarutani of the staff of the Japanese Naval 
Attache 'in Berlin* Both those gentlemen visited Krupp 
for the purpose of viewing the manufacture there of 
turbine-blades for the Jumo~C04. The visits apparently 
were somewhat unexpected* Schomerus appeared at Krupp 
without previous announcement, for the avowed purpose of 
meeting there with Tarutani to collect information con- 
cerning manufacture of turbine- blades, including prepara- 
tion of the raw materials. Tarutani appeared at Essen 
on the 5th on an officially authorized visit* 

Schomerus and Tarutani began their visit with 
a conference between those gentlemen and representatives 
of Krupp* According to a report on that conference 

contained in the Krupp file? tob firnrs representatives 
pointed out to Schomerus and Tarutani that all information 
gathered as a result of their visit to Essen must be 
treated with the strictest confidence and passed on to 
the Japanese only upon explicit instructions from the 
German Air Ministry* Moreover, instruction was given 
with the understanding that the entire matter was to be 
settled subsequently by contractual agreement, After 
those facts had been recorded, technical instruction 
was begun. Subsequent correspondence indicates that 
Krupp shortly, after the vi a it f forwarded to schomerus 
materiel memoranda concerning tinidur and chromadur* 

Schomerus and Tarutani both were given a general 
insight into the production of solid and hollow turbine- 
blades* Various phases of the work were discussed in 
detail and the process of manufacture was inspected* 
Schomerus was given a detailed description of the various 
methods of producing the alloys by smelting, but this 
procedure, and discussion thereof y was dispensed with in* 
the case of Tarutani • Both were given the prescribed 
procedure for the machining of solid blades, and discussed 
that procedure with the Krupp representatives; similarly 
both were shown the procedure for rolling tinidur sheet 


metal* Schomerus ? in addition, v?as shown the manufacture 
of solid blades, \?as given opportunity to note down details 
of the process and to sketch tools and equipment, and was 
tfiven sample material at various stages of turbine-blade 
production. Schomerus, furthermore, was authorized to 
take photographs* Tarutani was supplied with materiel 
memoranda for the alloys, together with exact analysis 

In that data the percentage composition of 
tlnidur and chromadur was described as follows: 



0.1 - 0.15 


than 0.12 

311 icon 

0,3 - 0.6 

0.3 - 



0.3 - 0.4 

17.5 - 



14.5 - 15.5 

11.5 - 

12« 5 


29 - 31 




0.6 - 





- 0.23 

Instruction was provided as to the adjustment of the 
proportion of titanium to carbon in order to prevent the 
accumulation of carbide in tinidur* Other data given for 
the two alloys included (i) tensile strength and elastic 
limit at various temperatures,, (ll) creep limit, (iii) 
treatment temperatures for forging, ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^ 


treatment , (iv) coefficient of expansion, and (v) modulus 
of .elasticity* 

An outline of the step-by-step production of 
solid blades of tinidur given to the Japanese covered 
dimensions of the metal at varying stages and temperatures 
of operation, where processing was carried out at other 
than atmospheric temperature* A brief etep-by-etep 
procedure for the manufacture of hollow blades from 
tinidur also was given • 

In late October, Junkers notified Krupp that a 
directive had been issued to place at the disposal of 
the Japanese Government manufacturing rights and data for 
the Jumo-004 B, manufacture of which called for turbine- 
blades of tinidur. Under the terms of the March 1944 
agreement between the German and Japanese Governments, 
it was necessary to make available to the Japanese Navy 
all patents on associated manufacturing materials and 
experiences, which must, therefore, include the tinidur 
turbine-blades. Those experiences must cover compos!- 
tion^ produotion, shaping and use of the blades in question * 
Junkers, therefore, requested Krupp to get in touch with 
the appropriate authorities to legalize the information 
Junkers was required to furnish the Japanese* 

Negotiations proceeded apace during November 
and were handled on the Japanese side by Tarutani and 
Capt. Ik I. The Japanese were anxious that Krupp representa- 
tives should go to Berlin, whereas Krupp regarded it as 
essential that certain specialists should be present at 
the negotiations, a fact which made it necessary for the 
Japanese to visit Essen. 

In early December, Krupp learned that the Japanese 
wished to conclude an agreement for the production of 
turbine-blades not only from tinidur but also from 
ohroma&ur, and, in addition, required agreements cover- 
ing the production of both alloys * That new development 
apparently had arisen as a result of a conference between 
Heioheminister Speer and Ambassador Oehima. In corres- 
pondence on this new development, Krupp stated that they 
were not particularly eager to give to the Japanese the 
required information on chromadur production and machining. 

• The brief instruction on tinidur received by 
Tarut&ni in October was by itself incomplete so long as 
the Japanese had not received precise information concern- 
ing the manufacture of both alloys* the method of rolling, 
the heat treatment , etc. To cover that additional in- 
formation, the Japanese Navy planned to negotiate an 

agreement with Krupp, and Japanese technicians planned 
to visit Essen during the latter part of December or 
early January* 

Although a draft agreement haft been prepared 
21 December 44, correspondence nevertheless reveals 
that Krupp did not view the mattex* with any pleasure and 
insisted that care must be taken that too far-reaching 
obligations as regards manufacture of the turbine-blades 
were not assumed* By late December , however, the Krupp 
plant at Essen had, to quote a Krupp letter, its produc- 
tion and manufacturing shops ^disturbed*, and while Krupp, 
Essen, could take care of theoretical instruction of the 
Japanese, the practical instruction would have to take 
place at some other German firm to whom Krupp had granted 
manufacturing right 

It is evident that Krupp was stalling for time. 
They requested that nothing be done until the draft agree- 
ment was completed and pointed out that, because of idle- 
ness of the. plant at Essen, it would be impossible, as of 
late December 44, to make detailed plans for practical 
instruction of the Japanese at another firm. The corres- 
pondence indicates that Krupp 1 s apprehension was not based 
on the Japanese acquiring knowledge concerning the pro- 
duction of turbine-blades from tinidur, but rather, that 


the release of such information to the Japanese would 
enable them to apply the information obtained from Krupp 
throughout the field of rust-proof steels* That applica- 
tion would gain added weight If supplemented by the release 
of manufacturing rights for chromadurc Krupp stated in 
correspondence that instruction of the Japanese Navy in 
methods of producing tinidur and chromadur and the manu- 
facture of turbine-blades from those alloys was consented 
to "purely for patriotic reasons 

The Japanese continued to press the negotiations 
as a matter of the greatest urgency, whereas Krupp in- 
sisted on regularizing the negotiations by conclusion of 
an agreement and were not anxious to give the Japanese any 
instruction until the contract had been signed* The 
Japanese anxiety probably is explained in a statement 
by Krupp that the two steel alloys were absolutely in- 
dispensable for the manufacture of the Junkers turbo-jet 
unit* There was considerable discussion over the fee 
claimed by Krupp for the release of manufacturing rights 
and in the sequence of installments by which the money 
should be paid. In mid-January 45, the appropriate 
government agency endeavored to speed up the negotiations, 
pointing out that the OKL considered the instruction 


desired by the Japanese as absolutely necessary in the 
interests of joint conduct of the war* 

The agreement finally was signed in Berlin on 
12 February 45* The attitude of the. Japanese is perhape 
best Illustrated by the fact that they desired to make an 
immediate lump sum payment of the necessary fees, rather 
than payment by installment * Immediately on conclusion 
of the agreement, the Japanese requested when and where 
the necessary instructions could be given, pointing out 
that their representatives were available at any time and 
that it was considered important to have the whole matter 
concluded as quickly as possible* Instruction on smelting 
of the alloys was arranged to be given at the Krupp plant 
at Magdeburg and the forging of the turbine-blades at 
Kaeen, after the Japanese representatives had visited 

The developing ground situation in western 
Germany now overtook the negotiations for instruction 
of the Japanese, The visit of the Japanese representa- 
tives was delayed by the transfer of the Japanese Naval 
Commission to Thuringia* Furthermore, the Japanese repre- 
sentatives apparently were extremely reticent to visit 
Essen > probably— since the time was now raid-March 45«~ 

because of the developing situation along the Rhine. It 
was requested therefore, that all the necessary instruct 
tion be given at Magdeburg. The most recent letter in 
the captured file was dated 29 March 45; a a of that date 
it was clear that the Japanese representatives had not 
visited either Essen or Magdeburg but representatives do 
appear to have witnessed a trial smelting of tinidur at 
some time after that date* 

From the available evidence, it appears that 
Japanese knowledge of chromadur is limited to percentage 
composition and physical data only. There is no indica- 
tion that any information on the smelting and processing 
of chromadur ever reached Japan. Thus Japan *s knowledge 
of the Krupp high-duty steels is restricted at best to 
tinidur, the alloy which apparently was only for interim 
duty, pending development of the more suitable chromadur* 
While Japan may have been in possession of details of the 
physical data, general machining techniques and a sample 
smelting process, the extent to which that information 
could be capitalized upon depended on Japan* s possession 
of the necessary equipment and basic raw materials, and 
on the skill of her metallurgists. Tarutani, the Japanese 
representative who visited the Krupp plant, did not return 


to Japan* He reportedly still was in Germany at the end 
of the European war. 

and corrosion resisting steels, and the lack of suitably 
means of cooling common steels, the Germans, during 1945, 
had started research on the development of ceramic blading 
for turbine s. The work, aa of VE-day, vae in the early 
stage© and no satisfactory turbine-blade had been developed* 
The work was greatly retarded by the successful development 
of the gas turbine with hollow water-cooled blade 6 « On 
the basis of available knowledge on German research, the 
Germans had nothing to offer the Japanese on ceramic 

use of ceramics, a field in which they have long experience. 
In view of the limited knowledge which they acquired of 
the special steel alloy s> tinidur and ohromadur, which 
the Germans developed for turbine-blades, and of the 
reported difficulties which the Japanese have encountered 
in satisfactory cooling of metallic turbine-blades, it 
is possible that they may have turned to ceramics as a 
solution of the problem* There is no evidence of the 
passing to the Japanese of information on German experiments 


Ceyamlojs: Because of a lack of temperature 

Nevertheless, the Japanese are skilful in the 

In this field, but it is possible that the Japanese ware 
aware of the experiments and that this awareness may 
have directed their attention along similar lines* It 
may be of interest, therefore, briefly to review German 
progress and trends in the field of ceramics for use in 
turbo-jet units. 

several years ago, but received little official support 
until the final stages of the war, when the simultaneous 
Importance of turbine engines and the lack of suitable 
alloy steels became apparent* The use of ceramics was 
considered largely only as a means to an end, and was 
considered for development only in application to low 
stressed parts* Research was initiated with existing 
commercial ceramic materials, v/hich were developed largely 
for their electrical insulating properties* Those 
materials had poor strength properties and high expan- 
sion qualities under heat; little success was attained 
until more suitable materials were obtained. 

design of a ceramic turbine-blade which would resist heat 
and shock without cracking or breaking. In order to 
permit turbine operation at temperatures, above 1 4 000° C in 

German work on CQramio turbine-blades began 

The greatest difficulty was experienced in the 


the absence of virtually all alloy steels of the chrorae ? 
nickel, molybdenum* tungsten types, a four-stage turbine, 
employing ceramics for all parte in contact with the gases* 
was designed. It was for this project that serious ceramic 
work was initialed. Although retarded by the advent of 
the water-cooled turbine rotor, ceramic turbine research 
was continued,, but only limited progress had been made* 

investigated as methods for forming the bladeso Blades 
were made either solid or hollow ? and were formed either 
by extrusion or, in the case of non-plastic powders, by 
a vibration pacislng method* Tae greater the degree of 
compressing the material, the lower its shrinkage when 
fired* Interesting progress was made in forming blade 
shapes, but the problem of thermal expansion had not been 
successfully overcome* 

attention was given to stress concentration by the absence 
of generous fillets* The blades were mounted on the 
rotor by clamping them between two concentric platee* 
and considerable difficulty was encountered because of 
the different rates of thermal expansion of the blading 
mid the clamping plates* Captured data indicates that 

Moulding, extruding and pressing all had been 

Samples of Q-erman ceramic blades show that little 


ceramic blades Gould be mam* 
temperatures not exceeding 700° ? but apparently only 
static teats had been carried out at the higher tempera- 
tures at which the blades would be required to operate in 
a turbo-jet unite Blades also wore tested under centri- 
fugal force at speeds up to 20*000 revolutions per minute, 
but without the application of heat* 

Many commercial ceramics were tested for eult~ 
ability in turblne-blading; the raost promising ceramic 
was a mixture of powdered iron and aluminum oxide, which 
permitted operating at higher etreases because of the 
plasticity of the iron at high temperatures* No eer&mxo 
engineers apparently were employed on the development v/ork, 
and all materials development was left to commercial firms, 
who had little time for such work* 

No work was done on ceramic coating of metals 
as a protection against the effects of corroelon and 
high temperatures. 

According to a German Air Ministry official, 
who was charged with the responsibility of all investiga- 
tions into the theory and practice of Jet- and rocket- 
propulsion, it wae hoped by the end of 1945 to use ■ ceramics 
for stator blades in turbo-jet compressors and turbines* 


The U3e of such blades would enable operating temperatures 
to be increased to 1,000° - 1,200° 0, with a corresponding 
increase of efficiency , The results achieved up to the 
end of the European war were not regarded as good enough 
to v/arrant the inclusion of ceramic blades in operating 
turbo-jet unite* 



In August 44^ the Japanese in Berlin received 
from the German Air Ministry part of the explanatory 
documents on the V-l and apparent ly were to be given an 
explanation of the weapon shortly thereafter. It is 
possible that the explanatory documents on the V«l con- 
sisted of the printed official German. secret handbook on 
that weapon* A copy of that handbook— which is in several 
parts and very detailed as to operational techniques and 
constructional data— was on board the U~234* 

purchase manufacturing rights for the ¥-1 and ten samples 
of the remote piloting apparatus* In January 45 they 
obtained detailed particulars of dimensions of the leaf 
springs of the intake valve and of the composition of the 
alloy used in making the springs* In addition, information 
was acquired concerning the thrust of the power unit at 
various speeds and altitudes, certain details of the entire 
power unit and the location of the spark plug* 

endeavoring to procure and transport to Japan by German 
submarine a number of iterae 5 including drawings of the V~l 
and V-2e Japanese Army authorities in Germany about that 

In October the Japanese began negotiations to 

Also in January 45 the Japanese in Berlin were 

time secured manufacturing rights for the Argus power plant 
of the V~l and plans obtained by the Army were being pre- 
pared for shipment to Japan by submarine * Captured OKL 
archives contain an 8 January 45 letter from the OKL to 
the Argus Company stating that the OKL had agreed to a 
Japanese request for purchase of the manufacturing rights 
for the Argus propulsion unit. The Japanese were requested 
to specify the important parts of the unit, the manufacturing 
righte for which they apparently previously had made request 
in general terms* The Argus Company had been notified 
immediately to prepare the necessary drawings • 

In February an inspection was made of the V-l 
propulsion unit at the Argus Company and considerable 
detail was obtained on construction, trial operation, 
type of fuel used and the theoretical fitting of Argus 
units to ordinary aircraft* At this time the Japanese 
showed great interest in the possibility of putting a 
pilot in the V-l. 

Bringewald and Ruf {Messersohmltt technicians 
who surrendered with the U-234 while en route' to Japan) 
stated that the V«l, in its standard form, would have been 
useless as a regular aircraft, since it did not have any 
control surfaces, nor did the overall aerodynamic form 


comply with conventional piloted aircraft specifications* 


They were of the opinion that it would not have been 
difficult to make certain changes in the basic form of 
the V-l in order to use it as a conventional aircraft; 
the necessary changes would have had to include the 
installation of control surfaces, strengthening of the 
wings, and complete rebuilding to enable speed regulation * 

Such a modified V-l, however, unless completely 
rebuilt, would have been impossible to maneuver or pull 
out of a dive and could have been used only in suicide 
flight s* The only maneuvers which the pilot could have 
made would have been small changes of course* To the 
best of their belief, it would have been quite possible 
to launch a V-l from a naval type aircraft catapult, with, 
if necessary, take-off rockets for additional speed* 

Hieechllng (also captured on the LU234) had 
heard from Tomonaga (one of the two Japanese technicians 
on the U-boat) that the Germans had given the plans for 
the V-l to the Japanese shortly after the weapon was first 
put into operational use* Kieschling believed that the 
Japanese already had started, or were about to start, 
production of the V-l. Shoji (the other Japanese technician 
on the U-boat) during the trip asked several members of th® 


German party what they thought about using suicide pilots 
in the V-l. Niesohling believed that the Japanese already 
had planned to do this and that Shoji was Just fishing 
for reaotion. It was brought up that the V-l oould be 
built much more quickly and cheaply than the aircraft 
which the Japanese currently were using for suicide attacks* 
In further interrogation, Nieschling stated that it was his 
belief that the Japanese had all the information on the 
V-l and had had for some time, and that they planned to 
use the weapon in connection with their suicide pilots. 
It should be remembered, however, that Nlesohling was not 
a technician 5 nor v/as he in a position to be well versed 
in German- Japanese technical liaison* 

Bringewald and Huf also stated that they were 
convinced that the Japanese received information on the 
V~l, in which missile they constantly showed great inter- 
est* One of the technicians reported that he had over- 
heard a conversation between Otani and another Japanese 
who stated that plans for the V-l were supposed to have 
been sent to Japan by submarine , However, the German 
technicians did not believe that the Japanese possessed 
enough information concerning the V-l to produce it. 

The same sub-assembly and main assembly plants 
that produced Baka should have been in a position to 




maimfacture comparable parts for a piloted version of the 
V~l* The impulee«duot jet unit should not have presented 
Insuperable production problems* 

Again a Japanese P/\i p believed kmnvledgeable 
and reliable,, stated that a jet-unit, based on German 
designs, and of which he drew a sketch, was in production 
In Japan as of early this year, and that it was to be 
used for suicide weapons* Kis sketch, together with his 
comments on the operation of the Jet«unlt, leave little 
doubt that the unit in question was the Argus propulsion- 
tube, or a Japanese modi fi cation thereofc In view of 
the possible Japanese development of an aircraft powered 
by one or more Argue tubes, it is of interest to note that 
Messerschmitt 1 s experiments with such an aircraft— the 
MiS-328-~were known to the Japanese, 

1?he Messersohmitt Company several years ago 
experimented with an aircraft powered by two Argus pro- 
pulsion units slung under the wings* That aircraft — a 
fighter or fighter- bomber — was to have a maximum speed 
of S75 mph at sea level and a cruising range of 250 miles 
with a one-ton bomb load* At the time of the experiments, 
the power unit had not been perfected and as a result the 
aircraft did not reach the teat -flight stage* The Argus 

'■'WQWSSWrr.> in any case suffered from the fact that its fuel 
consumption was three times that of the turbo-Jet unit, 
that vibration was great and the durability of the power 
unit doubtful* The Argus tube, however, was to be in- 
vestigated as a possible power unit for aircraft* 

According to information obtained in Germany, 
it was proved that the vibration and noise in the long 
run became unbearable to the pilot* The project, which 
envisaged an aircraft with wooden wings and a sheet steel 
fuselage, was abandoned, partly because of its unsuitability 
and partly because of the successful development of P and 
concentration of effort on> turbo-jet units* On the other 
hand, the Germans, in the closing stages of the war, pro- 
duced a version of the V-l modified to accommodate a pilot. 
Although the piloted V~l was never identified in operational 
use, the number built — more than 500 were found in Germany— 
together with the discovery of a -two-seater version* pre- 
sumably for training f suggest that the Germans had 
developed the piloted V-l to a stage where operational 
use was imminent* The German modification of the V-l to 
accommodate a pilot did not require an unusually large 
amount, of change, 

... WHMKD 

On 30 November 1941 a Caproni-Camplni Jet-propelled 
'aircraft flew from Milan to Rome; the aircraft, Known as 
the CC«2j used the Campinl Jet-propulsion system, in which 
a nozzle duct ran the entire length of the fuselage. In 
the forward portion of that duct an engine-driven axial 
compressor raised the pressure of the air entering at the 
nose and created a flow towards the aft portion of the 
duct* The re silt ant air stream first absorbed heat in 
cooling the engine and was then joined by the engine 
exhaust gases which further increased its thermal value 
The expansion towards the exit was intensified by the 
addition of liquid fuel injected and ignited in the vicinity 
of the discharge nozzle. 

Japanese representatives in Italy and in Berlin 
evidenced considerable interest in the Campinl system of 
aircraft propulsion and efforts had been made prior to 
April 44 to buy plane for the Campinl power unite A 
twin-engined aircraft was being projected on the basis of 
results obtained with single-englned types (presumably 
like the CC~2) c Although plans for the twin-engined air- 
craft had not been completed as of April 44, it was ex- 
pected that the twin-engined type under design would 
achieve a maximum speed In excess of 500 mph* 



Negotiations with the Oampini firm apparently 

progressed favorably and rapidly, einoe, in i*iay 44* a 
contract to purchase the Oampini power unit was concluded 
and preliminary arrangements were made to acquire the 

(i) Designs and production sketches for a twin- 
unit aircraft (using two DB-605 engines) designed 
for a top speed of 530 raph at an altitude of more 
than 26,000 ft. 

(ii) Designs and sketches of the Oampini 
propulsion mechanism as fitted to the usual twin 
motored aircraft, 

(lii) Design and sketches of aircraft. 

(iv) All Oampini research material on 
Oampini power units. 

£v) Manufacturing rights for the Oampini 
power unit for fighter aircraft utilizing aircraft 
engines in present use. 

It appears that the Japanese had arranged with 
Oampini for the latter to design aircraft based on Japanese 

airfield in Japan revealed the presence of four unusual 


Early July 45 photographic coverage of Himeji 


aircraft ? two of which were still under assembly * Those 
aircraft had a wing span of 47 ft, a length of 41 ft and 
each had two nacelles 15 ft long* The length of the 
nacelles suggest the possibility that each housed a power 
unit based on Gampini design. 

ments indicate that the Japanese had under development 
a Oamplni type Jet unit using a low powered internal 
combustion engine to drive the compressor. U*3. Navy 
reports of a preliminary survey of the Yokosuka experi- 
mental base state that approximately 20 assembled Oampini 
type power unite were found there. The power unit used 
a compressor driven by a light engine copied from the 
British Cirrus 4«eylinder, air-cooled engine taken from 
trainers and remodeled for the new application* This 
power unit, which carried a naraeplate "Hateukaze Model 11" 
was intended for installation in a new version of the Baka, 
the Baka 22, of which more than 40 sample fuselages were 

As has been previously noted, captured docu- 

m jmtmm 

Germ an Tr 1e t teoh QlQian^ destined for the Far Ifias^ : 

In his April 44 letter to Goring on the subject 
of release to the Japanese of Information on the ME-163 
and MS-262j Milch suggested that German asal stance to the 
Japanese in that field should consist of providing all 
necessary blueprints and plans, sample aircraft, and technic 
oians to assist in the manufacture of the aircraft in the 
Far East. That offer of technicians apparently met with 
the immediate approval of the Japanese and efforts were 
made to arrange for transportation to Japan, In a 
Japanese submarine scheduled to leave Europe shortly 
thereafter^ of Messerschmltt design engineers. 

The Japanese requested designers for both 
fuselage and propulsion unit of the Messersohmitt rocket 
plane and indicated that the technicians would be required 
to stay in Japan for about a year--a period based on a 
Japanese estimate of how long it would take to complete 
the first aircraft* It appears that the Havy s s interest 
was in technicians for the MK-163, while the Army's inter- 
est was with respect to the MJsU262* While the Navy re- 
quired technicians for one year only, the Army stipulated 
a two-year period* 

On 15 June Array representatives in Berlin indicated 
that they would like to have Chllngensperg— a Messersohmitt 

technician — visit Japan for a period of two years. His 
principal work would be that of designing short-range 
fighters and long-r*ange bombers at the Kawasaki plant and, 
in addition, directing conversion to the manufacture of 
the The negotiations indicate that the principal 

aim of the Army and Navy was not merely that of getting 
materials for study, but also that of getting technical 
help ? in order that plans for the speedy development of 
Jet and rooket aircraft could be realised. Appropriate 
technicians were given first priority for transfer to 

Apparently, however, negotiations for the 
services of technicians did not proceed too smoothly* 
The plan was to send to Japan three rocket technicians, 
one of whom would be concerned with launching, one with 
plans and the third with construction* Trouble, however, 
was being experienced in obtaining German agreement to 
the proposals* It was proposed, therefore, if German 
technicians were not available, to train three Japanese 
technicians in Germany and have them return to Japan as 
soon as possible* The Japanese technicians specified 
were Suematsu, Tarutani, and Kawakita. 


In September, Army representatives In Berlin) 

as a result of conferences with the aesserschmitt Company ? 
were ready to come to an agreement for the services of 
three Messerschmitt technicians — Ghllngensperg, Schomerus 
and Bringewald. The first two of these were to direct 
designing of short-range fighters and long-range bombers, 
while Bringewald would have the chief task of directing 
manufacture of the ME«262. In addition, the technicians 
were to carry with them from Germany preparatory materials 
and data and were to be employed in Japan for a period of 
tv/o years. Among those materials and data were to be 
important design data on short-range fighters and long- 
range bombers, such as the ME~&)9, ME-509 and m£~264— the 
direction of designing of ^hich presumably was to be the 
responsibility of Chlingensperg and Schomerus-- and refer- 
ence material on twin-engined fighters (such as the mE-410) 
and new large type gliders (such as the « Bringewald 

was to give the necessary cooperation in designing and 
construction of rocket aircraft, such as the ttfi-165 and 
M£-262. The financial arrangements had been agreed upon 
with Messerschmitt. 

The Japanese Army contract with the Messerschmitt 
firm was not signed until 8 November 44. Under the terms 

of the contract, Cesser sohmitt was to dispatch a number 
of technicians to Japan, The contract provided for the 
services of Chlingensperg, Schoraerus, Brlngewald, Caspar 
(for whom Huf later was substituted) and other, at the 
time undesignated, auxiliary help.- The first two special- 
ists were to have the task in Japan of supervision of 
development and instruction of fighters and long-range 
bombers; Bringewald and Caspar (Huf) supervision of mass 
production in Japan of the ME-163 and 

For their duties in the Par Kast the technicians 
were to carry with them appropriate documents. Among the 
documents specified in the contract were those covering 
the MEU209, &E~309 ? MS-264, HB-163, ME-262, ME- 410 and 
ME-323. The documents were to be returned with the technic 
clans j Chllngensperg and Schomerue were scheduled for a 
stay of two years in Japan, Bringewald and Caspar (Huf) 
for one year* Their duties in the Far East were to he 
carried out under supervision of the Japanese War Ministry. 

Bringewald was particularly qualified to assist 
the Japanese in that he had been associated with mass pro- 
duction of aircraft at the Kenschel Company, with design 
of the HS-130 high altitude aircraft and f from 1938, as 
assistant to Willi Messersohmitt had been associated with 



design and mass production of the ME-110, M£;~410^ M&-109 
and M£«323c He had made preparations for mass production 
of the MI£«262 and was responsible for supervision of Its 
mass production in the entire German aircraft industry c 

Plans for the transportation to the Far East of 
both German and German-trained Japanese jet technicians 
proceeded apace in late 1944, but the lack of transporta- 
tion negatived the preparations* 

Chllngensperg and Schomerus were on the U-864 
which left Norway in early February 45 and was sunk the 
same month* Toaaonaga, Shoji, BringewsXd and Huf were on 
the U-234 which left Kiel in March and surrendered on the 
high seas on 13 May# One other U-boat was destined to 
leave Kiel in late January, or early February, but was 
bombed out in the Baltic and paid off* It thus appears 
that plans for the transfer of technicians to the Par 
East were completely disorganized* There is no evidenoe 
to assume that any qualified Jet technician* either German 
or Japanese* ever arrived in the Far East* 




Conventional aircraft 
Internal combustion engines 
Aircraft armament 
Aircraft equipment 


Mote i Performance and descriptive data for the aircraft, 
engines and armament covered in Section 11 will be found 
ae follows; 

Conventional aircraft TAB £ 

Internal combustion aircraft engines TAB P 

Aircraft armament TAB G 


During the period prior to the signing of the 
Economic Agreement between the German and Japanese 
Government 8 3 Japanese representatives in Berlin purchased 
sample aircraft of a number of German conventional types. 
When, however, after April 43, it was no longer possible 
to run surface vessels through the blockade* deliveries 
of sample aircraft to Japan ceased* In only a few in- 
stances did the Japanese representatives in Germany enter 
into negotiations for the purchase of manufacturing rights 
for conventional German aircraft. Outside of Jet- and 
rocket-propelled types, Japan f s interest appeared 
primarily to be direoted towards individual items of 
equipment, the manufacture of which In the Par East would 
improve the combat efficiency of Japanese designed and 
built aircraft. 

00-217 : 

In March 1942 the Military Attache in Berlin 
initiated negotiations for the immediate purchase from 
the GAF of two or three £0-217*8* This aircraft, originally 
designed as a twin-engined bomber, later was modified by 

the GAP for reconnaissance and night-fighter duties. It 
never was, however, a particular success in any field* 
Captured German Air Ministry records list equipment in- 
tended for shipment to Japan but which was left behind 
in the Bordeaux area and returned to German units. 
Included in that list are two PO-217 K's. The contract 
for purchase of the tv/o aircraft was signed In December 
1942 and the aircraft were handed over to the Japanese 
in Germany during the following month; such were the 
delays involved that, because of a lack of shipping 
space, delivery to Japan never was accomplished* The 
Air Ministry records also state that construction details 
of the DO-217 were handed over to Japanese representatives 
in Germany by the Dornler firm on 11 September 42. Accor&« 
ing to Dornler officials, the sale of the two £0-217*8 
included a blanket license to manufacture • 

this standard German sea-reoonnai seance fighter ever 
reached Japan ? although two sample aircraft were handed 
over to the Japanese in Germany in December 43. One or 

There is no evidence that prototype aircraft of 

more of these aircraft was carried on each of the German 


surface raiders which operated in the Indian Ocean; it is 
possible that some of those aircraft passed Into Japanese hands* 


gliders v?aa given during the latter half of 1942; two of 
those gliders were listed as being left behind at Bordeaux. 
There is no evidence of the third glider, nor of any data 
concerning this glider type, having been sent to the Far 
East. A descriptive booklet on the DFS~S30 was found 
among papers left behind in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin* 

reached the operational stage at the olo3e of the war* 
It was, nevertheless, an aircraft with very high performance 
capabilities and was the subject of Investigation by the 
Japanese in Berlin. There is no evidence of Japanese 
negotiations for manufacturing rights for this aircraft. 
In view of the complicated structure of this aircraft, 
using ae it does both pusher and tractor airscrews and 
engines, it is fairly certain that such information as 
obtained by the Japanese was totally inadequate for any 
attempt to copy the aircraft in Japan* 

Even before the 1)0-335 was operational, the OAF 
conceived the idea of an aircraft comprising two DG-335 

Clearance for Japanese purchase of three DFS-230 


This unconventional German aircraft had not 



fueelages--eaoh with two engines and airsorews~-Jolned 
by a common wing center section, This composite aircraft 
was known as the JX)-635o Release of manufacturing right e 
for the DQ-635 was given on 8 January 45, if the Japanese 
desired those rights* An unconfirmed prisoner of war 
report states that data and general drawings for the DO -6 35 
were gent to Kiel at the beginning of 1945 for shipment 
to Japan by submarine. In any event those data and general 
drawings almost certainly did not reach the Far East* 

aircraft apparently were purchased by the Japanese in 
early 1941 and drawings obtain ed* In addition, one sample 
aircraft was transported to the Far East early in the 
following year. In June 1942 it appears that the Japanese 
decided not to procede with production of the aircraft as 
they were already making an aircraft similar to it« 

Field in the Philippines a high wing monoplane described 
as almost a small replica of the FI-156, 

During late 1944 and early 1945 Japanese repre- 
sentatives in Germany exhibited a keen interest in this 


Plane for the FI-156 army cooperation and liaison 

It is reported that Allied Forces found on Clark 



aircraft^ an improved version^df^ FW~190, In November 
1944 f the Japanese in Berlin were preparing to forward 
material on the TA-152 to Tokyo * By January 46, the 
Japanese Army representatives in Berlin had acquired an 
outline of the construction* general plans s a list of 
materials used in construction, and a list of equipment 
to be used with the TA-152. 

The contract for purchase of manufacturing 
rights for this aircraft was not signed until 25 March 45 f 
although release was granted in January* A captured 
German Air Ministry letter, dated 3 January 45, author- 
ises the fulfillment of a Japanese request for rights to 
copy the TA-152 and H« The necessary drawings were to 
be prepared without delay — at least general drawings if 
time did not permit the preparation of full blueprint So 
Those drawings were to be handed over independently of 
the signing of the appropriate contract* The plans and 
blueprints were forwarded to Kiel for shipment, but did 
not arrive there before 15 March. Transportation to 
Japan, therefore, is very unlikely. 


This all-wood twin-engined aircraft is believed 
to have been based on the British Mosquito., It was intended 




but development in ^ ( 

ao a twin-engined night-fighter but ^develapmeni 
Germany reportedly ran Into overwhelming trouble be- 
cause of a failure to produce adheelvee suitable for 
the laminated wood structure. There is no evidence 
that this aircraft ever became operational in Germany » 
However, in keeping with Japan's interest in aircraft 
using wooden construction, general details of the air- 
craft were studied. In November 44, Japanese Army repre- 
sentatives in Berlin examined details of the aircraft's 
performance, capabilities, radar equipment and any other 
special features relative to night- fighting* There is no 
evidence of negotiations for acquisition of manufacturing 

FW-I9Q ; 

During the period 1942«44 Japanese representa- 
tives in Germany collected and forwarded to Tokyo very 
detailed data on the capabilities and potentialities of 
this standard German single-engined fighter. In early 
July 42, Japanese representatives in Germany visited the 
Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen to study the FW-19Q. Fooke-Wulf 
files captured on the U-234 listed two shipments to Japan 
in June 1941 of parts for the FW-190. In addition, two 



sample aircraft were purchased In late 1942 or early 
1943. Captured German Air Ministry files indicate that 
those two FW~190*8 were left behind at Bordeaux and re- 
turned to the GAF* There is some evidence that a further 
two FW«190 t s were purchased by Japan* Although there is 
no evidence of delivery to the Far East of these additional 
two aircraft, it appears that at least one may have arx*ived 
in Japan. Captured documents indicate that one set of 
fourteen manuals for the FW-190 accompanied each sample 
aircraft; at least one set of those manuals may, there- 
fore, have arrived in Japan. 

apparently were considering the Joint design of a super- 
bomber based on the FY*«200o At the time of the suggestion, 
however, no approach had been made to Foeke-Wulf, and in 
any case some opposition to the idea appears to have been 
expected from the GAF, v/ho might object to the sale to 
Japan of manufacturing rights for the FVf~200o However, 
by March 1943 disouselone were proceeding on the subject 
of purchase of manufacturing rights for both the transport 
and long-range reconnaissance versions of this aircraft. 

FW-200 : 

In July 1941 , Japanese representatives in Berlin 


In addition, the Japanese purchase of several specimen 
aircraft was proposed* including an improved version of 
this aircraft* In July 42* Japanese representatives 
visited Focke-Wulf , Kottbus, to study the FW«200 C 

Japanese purchased five sample aircraft but that delivery 
to Japan was never effected* In March 1943, the GAP took 
the position that delivery of the five aircraft was no 
longer Justifiable in view of the U-boat war situation. 
The question of delivery of the aircraft was to be sub- 
mitted shortly thereafter to Goring; there is no indica- 
tion that the sample aircraft ever were handed over to 
Japanese representatives in Germany* 

GO-242 and GO- 244: 

specifications for the GO-242 glider were turned over to the 
Japanese on 3 November 42* The Japanese decided shortly there- 

and the appropriate specifications were handed over to Japanese 
representatives in Germany on 3 November 42, Transportation 
difficulties, however, became so great that the purchase of 
manufacturing rights was considered instead of sample gliders* 

A similar pattern was followed in the purchase of 
manufacturing rights for the GO-244, a version of the GO- 242 
powered by two radial engines. The last available information 

Captured Air Ministry files indicate that the 

Captured German Air Ministry files indicate that 

after to purchase two specimen gliders* At least one glider 

concerning the glider and its powered version indicate that 
negotiations for purchase of manufacturing rights still 
were in progress in February 44* 

various German long-range bombers Including both those which 
had reached the operational stage and those which were re- 
stricted to experimental versions only* Despite the limited 
operational successes of the the Japanese, according 

to General Kessler, had a special interest in thle aircraft 
and intended to purchase three sample aircraft; two aircraft 
were on order in January 46» The three HK-17? f s were to be 
flown to Japan via Russia. There is, however, no evidence 
that any of the three aircraft ever left Germany, nor that 
Japan ever contemplated the purchase of manufacturing rights 
for this aircraft c 

were encountered in Germany because of difficulties with the 
double engines used to power the aircraft. In an attempt to 
overcome the po?/er unit problem^ Germany developed a four- 
engined variation of the HS-177, designated the HJS-277. A 
prisoner of war of limited reliability stated that two 
H£-2?7*b were given to Japan* There is no evidence that 
either or both of these aircraft ever left Germany. 


The Japanese showed considerable interest in 

Unexpected delays in the production of the HE-177 



In July 44, following an inspection of the 
Japanese Mavy officials in Germany procured a 
detailed description together with performance data, but 
there has been no evidence of a request to the Germans 
for plans or manufacturing right s* It is possible that 
the Japanese may have been informed of German experiments 
with the fitting of an auxiliary turbo-jet unit under the 
fuselage of the HK-219. This form of auxiliary boost, 
according to captured documents, has been under study 
in Japan since early 1944. 

Despite Germany 1 s very limited success with the 
twin-engined HS-129 ground-attack aircraft, Japan purchased 
two sample aircraft in early 1943 « According to captured 
German Air Ministry files release of the two sample air- 
craft was held up. The evidence indicates that delivery 
was not made until March 44, too late to allow of trans- 
portation of the sample aircraft to the Far East. 

As early as 1941 the Japanese had inspected this 
twin-engined high-altitude aircraft fitted with pressurized 


cabin. In 1943 they requested delivery during that year 
of one sample aircraft. Ao there was little chance of 
being able to purchase a sample KS-150, the proposal was 
made that drawings for the pressurized cabin should be 
sent to Japan by special naval means, presumably by U-boat. 
Those drawings are thought to have been loaded on a sub- 
marine sailing for the Fax* East. Apparently, however, 
the plans were incomplete since components and plans for 
the jJreeaurlzed cabin again were proposed for shipment 
to Japan In the spring and summer of 1944. In July 44, 
manufacturing rights for the Heneehel pressurized cabin 
were purchased by the Japanese Navy. Plans and parts for 
the pressurized cabin of the HS-130 were being transported 
to Japan on the 11-234/ 


There is no evidence of any Japanese interest 
during the war in the JU-87 dive bomber* However, members 
of the Junkers Company stated that two sample JU-87'a 
were shipped to Japan during 1937-38; this is substantiated 
by documents found in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin* No 
Japanese aircraft showing evidence of JU~8? design ever 
has been encountered. 

According to members of the Junkers firm and 
captured document s f one JU-88 A-5 and corresponding blue- 
prints and drawings were supplied by Junkers to the 
Japanese Navy in 1940-1941. The Junkers personnel also . 
stated that three JU-88 A-4 ! 8 and corresponding drawings 
wars purchased by the Japanese in 1942* Three JU-88 l 3 
v/ith spare part 3 were left behind at Bordeaux and handed 
back to the GAP in 1944; it is believed that these were 
the three JU~83's purchased by the Japanese in 1942. 
Construction and operation Instructions, details of arma- 
ment installations and maintenance manuals were handed 
over to the Japanese during the latter half of 1942, as 
were instructional films on servicing, flighlr operations 
and one-englned flight* Some or all of this material 
may have reached the Far East* There le no evidence that 
a contract for manufacturing rights ever was concluded. 


In late 1943, Junkers and Japanese Army repre- 
sentatives entered into discussions aiming at technical 
cooperation on a broad basis for the benefit of the 
Japanese Air Forces* During those discussions Junkers 


proposed that Japan 1 s aircraft production should be 
improved both quantitatively and qualitatively by adoption 
of recent Junkers aircraft and engines, as well as the 
latest Junkers production methods* To that end a start 
should be made with an aircraft type being manufactured 
in Germany on a large scale and the JU-188 was suggested 
as a suitable type* In its favor it was. stated that it- 
would gave the Japanese the necessity of developing a 
new type aircraft of their own design and would, in addi- 
tion, pave the way for production in Japan of the JU-388 
and JU-488* There is no indication^ however, that this 
proposal was accepted by the Japanese nor is there any 
evidence of Japanese Interest in the JU-188* 

appear to have had preliminary discussions with the German 
Air Force for the purpose of obtaining working plans and 
special parts for the Jt/~386. Two years later, the 
Japanese requested that manufacturing plans and samples 
of special parte for the JU-388 be supplied to allow of 
study of this aircraft which the Germans intended to use 
as a bomber, reconnai seance or night-fighter aircraft • 

In July 42, military representatives in Berlin 




Considerable information on the JU-388 was supplied to 
Japanese representatives by the Germans and. in response 
to a Japanese request, manufacturing rights were released 
on 8 January 45* Aocording to members of the Junkers 
firm, drawings for the L-l and K-3 subtypes were handed 
over to the Japanese in Germany either during that sonth 
or February 45 In any event, the drawings were supplied 
at a date too late to allow of transportation to the Far 

JU-488 : 

Apparently it was not until late 1944 that the 
Japanese representatives in Germany learned of the four- 
en gined JU-48S, an aircraft which had not progressed 
beyond the experimental at age 8 at the close of the 
European war* The Japanese requested manufacturing right b> 
clearance for which was granted on 8 January 45. Accord- 
ing to members of the Junkers firm, general drawings and 
some data for the JU-488 were handed over to the Japanese 
in Germany in January 45 t too late for transportation to 
the Far East, 

Had German plans materialised, at least one JU-29G 
would have been flown to the Far Kast, there presumably to 




be handed over to the Japanese* It was interidfa'R^fl 
eetablish liaison by air between Europe and Japan by- 
using the JU-290, Differences of opinion between the 
Germans and Japanese as to whether a northern or a 
southern route should be used resulted in failure to 
establish an air link* 

general details of performance, dimensions and am am en t 
of the JU~290. There is, however, no evidence of any 
particular interest by the Japanese to acquire this air- 

In October 43, the military staff in Berlin 

procured descriptive data on the six-englned JU-390 and 
in the following July requested that manufacturing plane 
and samples of special parts be made available to Japan 
for study of performance and construction. Clearance of 
release of manufacturing rights was granted on 8 January 45 * 
According to Junkers employees, drawings of the JU-390 
were prepared in February 45 for supply to the Japanese, 
but never left the Junkers firm. 

By late 43, the Japanese In Berlin hs.d obtained 



It Is possible that manufacturing rights for 
the mE-109 single-engined fighter were acquired by Japan 
in late 1942. In the following year the Japanese Army 
purchased several model e of the E and G types (with DB 
601A and DB 805 engines respectively) ; at least one 
AUS-109 P-4 with spare parte was among the alroraft left 
behind at Bordeaux in 1944 and returned to the GAF* Two 
prototype aircraft were delivered to the Japanese in 
Germany in January 43. According to Bringewald and Ruf* 
Messerechmltt technicians captured on the U-234, one 
ME-109 successfully was transported to Japan In 1942 or 
1943. It is probable that tnis aircraft, believed to be 
a CU4 subtype, went to Japan with Stohr> a former Meseer- 
schmltt pilot who Joined the staff of the German Air 
Attache in Tokyo in 1943. In October 44 Japanese repre- 
sentatives investigated the Henschel aircraft production 
methods as applied to wings for the ME- 10 9* 

MK-209 and MS-50C ; 

These two single-engined fighters were proposed 
at varying times by the Germans as replacements for the 
&U2-109. Neither* however, ever reached the operational 


stage* In late 1943 > Germany apparently had no objection 
to manuf active in Japan of the ME-5Q9 meet Japan's 
then pressing need for a fight or aircraft* Although 
study of the ME-309 temporarily had been halted* Messer- 
echmitt was continuing to manufacture trial aircraft and 
had reached the stage of test flying. 

Captured documents show that both the Japanese 
Army and Japanese Navy made contimial inquiries concerning 
the aircraft themselves, Messersohmitt variable pitch 
propeilors and reproduction rights* In December 43, the 
Japanese military representatives in Berlin had obtained 
permission to purchase a sample M&-SG9 and manufacturing 
plan So Late in the following February f they were in 
negotiation with the Messerschmitt firm and the German 
Air Ministry, and the contract for purchase of manufactur- 
ing right 8 having been completed, drawings are thought to 
have been available for shipment to Japan as early as 
May 44. There is no evidence as to whether or not those 
drawings actually were shipped to the Far East. 

The first examination of the ME-209 by the 
Japanese in Berlin was in February 44. There is evidence 
that manufacturing rights for the M&-2G9 were purchased 
by the Japanese Army some time after July 44, and drawings 


and special parts are believed to have been obtained. 
Plans for the »E-309 and iiE-509 are believed to have 
been carried en tha U-864; von Chlingensperg, a Meseer- 
sohmitt teohnioian who was a passenger on that submarine* 
waa to eapevvlee manufacture of the two fighters in 

Sonaany of five sample MK-210*8 and appropriate aircraft 
assembly drawings was granted during the latter half of 
l&42o prototype aircraft were delivered to Japanese 
representatives in Germany in January 45. At least two 
e&siplo teiUSlO's purchased by the Japanese representatives 
ir* iJermany were among the equipment left behind at 
Bordeaux and returned to the GaF However , one sample 
ME-21G is believed to have been shipped to Japan by surface 
blockade runner in 1943; captured files indicate that a 
second sample aircraft was delivered during that year* 
Im July 44, the Japanese endeavored to procure and send 
to Japan drawings and special parts for the &&~210 ? 
together with a technician qualified to supervise its 
construction in the Par East* This suggests that the 

Japan * 

Clearance for delivery to the Japanese in 


extent of realisation of theee plana Is not clear* It 
is possible, however > that the Japanese may have planned 
to introduce a twin-engined aircraft based on this German 

According to Meesersohmitt officials, the first 
negotiations between that firm and the Japanese took place 
in 1942, in response to a desire by the Japanese to utilize 
Meesersohmitt design techniques and experience to Improve 
the quality of Japanese combat aircraft* Original plana 
visualized She employment at Measerechmitt, Augsburg^ of 
a number of Japanese technicians; operating under the 
personal supervision of Professor Meesereohaittj they 
were to develop a vary long-range twin-engined fight er^ 
based on ? and an improvement of ? the ME-210. Negotiations 
to that end were fruitless* 


In February 44* the Japanese Army obtained 
information oonoerning the ME-410, including performance 
data, together v*ith armament details and information as 
to how this aircraft differed from the M&~21G* Possibly 
because of the similarity between the M&-21G and M£~410 



fuselage, manufacturing drawings 

the Japanese* However, ' plans for the MJS~410 reportedly 
were carried on the U-884 by von Ohlingeneperg and 

vestlgated Henechel mass-production methods as applied 
to center wing spars for the Ml£~410. 

t&~264 : 

four-englned bomber which the Germans never developed to 
the operational stage* Array Investigation in 1945-1944 
oovered detailed outlines of its capabilities together 
with information on construction and performance* The 
aircraft was at one time suggested for use in flights 
between Europe and Asia, and there was a suggestion that, 
if required by Germany, all possible Imperial Army personnel 
and aid would be given to its development* Subsequently 
Japanese Interest wained, probably since the Messerechmitt 
firm was compelled to slow down its development of the 
ME-264 because of requirements in satisfying the GAF 1 e 
needs for other Messerachmitt aircraft types* There is 
no evidence that drawings or parts ever were shipped to 
the Par East* 

In inid-Ootober 44 the Japanese in Germany ln- 

The Japanese showed great interest in this 




In. 1942, Gemany offered to Japan five samples 
of the eix-englned ME-323 transport aircraft, but as 
shipment to Japan was impossible* the Japanese desired 
to purchase manufacturing rights instead* Subsequently 
the decision to buy rights n&B rescinded but operational 
data was obtained and study of performance and construc- 
tion arranged* There ie no evidence that manufacturing 
rights for the aircraft ever were purchased by Japan; 
however* drawings and descriptions of the construction 
of the were on board the U~234 c 

Mist S3,: 

In ml d- 1944 , the Japanese in Germany obtained 
several detailed descriptions of the structure and 
operations of the Mlstel alroraft — an explosive JU-88 
carried underhand released from-, an i&£~109. It is 
thought that drawings of the most important parts of the 
aircraft and of the explosive equipment were loaded for 
shipment to Japan during the second half of 1944 D Plans 
also were in hand to have one representative each from 
the Japanese Army and Navy trained in Its use in Germany * 


Internal Qombustion Aircraft Engines 

Available evidence indicates that prior to 
1944^ the Japanese were allowed to purchase sample 
equipment and plans only for German aircraft engines 
which had reached the production stage* 

Japanese negotiations with reference to experi- 
mental engineo, such as the Jumo-222 ? Jumo-223 apparently 
did not develop until mid or late 1944. Samples of the 
cider aircraft engines were purchased in time to allow 
of shipment to the Par East by surface vessels? it ia 
probable t therefore, that at least some of those engines 
arrived in the Far East. In the later stages, however, 
when only U-boats were available for blockade running, 
the Japanese had to restz^iot their interests to negotia- 
tions for purchase of manufacturing rights and the nec- 
essary blueprints and plans* 

Information on this Argus medium horsepower 
liquid-cooled engine apparently was obtained at an e^rly 
date P ami the Japanese are believed to have been manufactur- 
ing an engine similar to the Argus prior to June 42* 



However, aocor&ing to German Air Ministry records, clear- 
ance for delivery to the Japanese of two AS-41l , s was 
granted in late 1942, Delivery of those two engine 6 
to Japanese representatives in Germany waa m&de in 
July 43. 

In May 1942, Japanese Wavy representatives in 
Berlin opened negotiations to purchase three prototype 
HiAW-801 14«cyllnder two-row radial engines; manufacturing 
rights were not requested* In mid-August 42, Japanese 
representatives visited the BMW plant at Munich to accept 
delivery of the three engines; the following month 
engine handbooks were handed over to the Japanese. During 
the latter half of 1942, approval was given to the German 
Air Ministry for sale to the Japanese of four s ample ; Bta\v~ 801 * s< 
Three of the engines had been shipped to the Far East by 
July 43 j only one is known to have been sunk en route* 
There is later evidence that the Japanese possibly were 
making use of the BMW -601. 

In November 42, Japanese representatives in 
Germany visited the BMW plant at Munich to study this 


18-cyiinder two-row radial engine „ though It appears that 
manufacturing rights for the BMW-803 were not acquirable. 
In late 1943 the Japanese Army was anxious to purchase 
three Bmw-BOC^b; that engine, however, progressed in 
Germany only to the experimental stage. 

DB-601 : 

In late November 36, a license for manufacture 
of the DB-600 wae sold to the Alohl firm; according to 
Daimler-Benz officials, Alohl used the lloense only for 
development and study purposes, not for series production. 
On ? June 39, Alohl and Kawasaki were given a license for 
manufacture of the DB-601 A/B; representatives of those 
Japanese firms visited Daimler-Benz to study production 
methods for the DB-601. One sample DB-601 12-oylinder 
llquld-oooled engine Is believed to have reached Japan 
prior to July 43* The engine was under construction In 
Japan; the Kawasaki llquld-oooled engine used in the Tony 
single- englned fighter reportedly Is a copy of the DB-601. 


During visits to Daimler-Benz to study DB-601 
production, Japanese representatives first became aware 
of the DB-603, In which they showed great Interest. In 



May 41, the Japanese Army applied to purchase, for use. 
as study material, five DB-603 12-oylinder llqui&«oooled 
engines and were prepared, should the necessity ari£e 5 to 

of the five prototype engines was repeated in June 42; 
at this point ? however, manufacturing rights were not 
wanted* German Air Minletry clearance for delivery to 
the Japanese of four D£M503's was granted during the latter 
half of 1942 . Pour engines were delivered to the Japanese 
in Qermany in January 43 ^ two for the Japanese Army* two 
for the Japanese Navy; two of those four engines may 
have reached Japan by the following July, In June 44 ? 
four more engines were handed over by the Germane, and 
in July Japan requested manufacturing right g. 

in Japan was granted to the Japanese in March 45; Daimler- 
Bens officials stated that in November 44 Japanese repre- 
sentatives in Germany were given plans for that engine^ 
the plane being packed in sealed containers ready for 
shipment. Transfer of those plans to the Far East, how- 
ever., is considered unlikely. Japanese representatives 
in Germany were scheduled to visit a Daimler- Bens faotory 
to study DB-80S S production in November 44; according to 

purchase manufacturing right e. The desire for purchase 

A license covering manufacture of the DB~603 E 


Daimler-Benz officials* that visit was postponed several 
time 8 and never took place* 

subtype was directed mainly toward the two-stage mechanical 
supercharger with which it was fitted; negotiations were 
to be initiated with respect to this supercharger* In 
November 44, the Japanese Array was said to be planning to 
put into production in Japan the DB-6G3 as it stood. The 
good features of the engine—presumably the supercharger 
and, possibly, the water-injection boost system—wers to 
be incorporated in engines already being trial manufactured 
by Kawasaki* Those engines, referred to as the KA-140 and 
HA-240, presumably were developments of the HA-40, the 
Tony engine, which reportedly is a copy of the DS«60Xc 

engine was obtained in early 1942* It is possible that 
prototype engines arrived in Japan prior to July 43. 
Clearance for delivery to Japan of five DEUeGS's was 
granted in late 1942; in July of that year Japanese 
representatives began a one-month visit to the Daimler- 
Benz plant to study the DB-606 . 

Apparently, however, Japan 1 s interest in this 

Information on this 12-cy Under liquid-cooled 

The DSU606 was the firBt "twin" engine produced 
by Daimler-Benz; It consisted of two DB-601's mounted 
8ide by side and geared to a oomiaon crankshaft. Accord- 
ing to Daimler-Benz officials, Japanese representatives In 
Germany in early 1942 were given manufacturing drawings of 
the DB-606 twin-motor gear drive; no other manufacturing 
plans for, nor any teohnioal advice on, the engine sub- 
sequently were given to the Japanese. 

Juno- 205 s 

According to employees of the Junkers firm, 
two samples of the Jumo-205 six-cylinder dies el -type 
liquid-cooled engine were delivered to Japanese repre- 
sentatives In Germany. Although there Is no available 
record of their arrival in Japan, they were handed over 
at an early date, when transportation was available. 

In July 42, Japanese representatives visited 
the Junker 8 plant at Magdeburg to study the B- subtype of 
this superoharged six-cylinder dlesel-type engine; during 
1942, two sample engines were delivered to the Japanese, 
but are believed to have been sunk en route to the Far 



East, In 1944 the German Air Force revealed details of 
the Improved and D subtypes, each of which Is fitted 
with a turbo- supercharger* In January 45^ the Japanese 
Army ordered two Jumo~207 engines and fuel injection 
pumps; manufacturing plans were to be obtainable in 
July 45, 

The Japanese Army was interested in March 42 in 
the acquisition of manufacturing rights for this twelve- 
cylinder liquid-cooled engine c Four prototype engines— 
of the J-eubtype — ten fuel injection pumps, one instruc- 
tional film and engine handbooks (for the F and J-subtypes) 
were handed over to the Japanese in Germany during the 
latter half of 1942 c Information regarding transfer to - 
Japan is available only in respect of two of the engines f 
one of which was sunk en route; the other may have arrived 

In March 45 «, the Germans offered the Japanese 
Army manufacturing righto for the Juao-SlS* Two samples 
of this 12~oylinder liquid-cooled engine were supplied by 
Junkers to Japanese representatives in Germany in December 43 ? 




and a further three in the following February c There is 
no record of shipment of the engines to Japan* Evidence 
suggests, however, that production of the engine in Japan 
was under con si de rati on 5 the Japanese appeared anxious to 
have sent to Japan an engineer skilled in its production . 

Jump ~2%2i 

In early April 45 ? the Japanese military repre- 
aentatlves in Berlin obtained considerable data on the 
24~cylinder liquid-cooled Jurno~222« It was not, however, 
until almost eighteen months later— in November 44~~th&t 
negotiations wez*e begun for purchase of manufacturing 
rights for the Jumo~222. as study material in high-powered 

In late November 44 f the German Air Ministry 
authorized the sale by the Junkers tlm of manufacturing 
rights for the A/B-3 syb types of the Jumo~222; in early 
January 45, approval also was given for the release to 
Japan of sample important parts of the engine and of 
manufacturing rights for the E/F subtypes. According to 
Junkers officials, negotiations with the Japanese Army* 
covering manufacturing rights and all necessary papers 
and plans for the A/B-3 and E/F- subtypes began in 



during the negotiations. 

Beceraber 44. The Japanese, during the negotiations, 
insisted on qui ok delivery of the plane; two set 6 of those 
plane were sent from Jun&ere to Kiel for transportation to 
Japan, the first set being delivered on 12 January 45, the 
second set the following March. In view of date of delivery, 
it appears unlikely that either set of plana arrived in the 
Far 8aet« The Japanese also were anxious to have sent to 
Japan German technicians familiar with the Jumo-222* 

In March 44, Japanese Army officers in Berlin 
acquired technical data on the Jurao-223, a 24~cylinder 
engine, made up of four Jumo-207 dleaels arranged in box- 
form and fitted with a turbo« supercharger. Only two experi- 
mental engines had been built and production in Germany 
apparently was not to be start ed* The Japanese Navy, 
nevertheless, was negotiating for purchase of one of two 
experimental engines. In late October, however, the Navy 
began negotiations for manufacturing right s, in order to 
obtain plans for the engine, rather than purchase a pro- 
totype engine. A German Air Ministry letter of 7 December 44 
informed the Junkers firm that the Japanese Naval Attache 
had requested delivery of t\to complete sets of drawings 
for the Jumo«225„ The letter also stated that a Japanese 


party had vi sited Junkers early the previous October, 
and had there inspected the plans. 

On 1? January 45, the German Air Ministry In- 
formed the Japanese Naval Attach^ that the Junkers firm 
had been authorized to sell manufacturing rights for the 
engine and had been instructed immediately to prepare two 
sets of drawings capable of being blueprinted* According 
to Junkers employees, those drawings were handed over to 
the Japanese Naval representatives* The drawings were 
received, however 9 at a date which made transportation 
to Japan unlikely. One set of the draivings was captured 
In Germany in the possession of the GAF officer designated 
to be adjutant to General Kessler in Tokyo * 

Xn November 43 ? Japanese Army representatives 
learned that the DB-603 engine apparently was being 
remodelled, and that the resultant modified engine would 
be known as the DB-627, One month later they requested 
drawings for the two- stage supercharger fitted to the 
PB-627; in August 44 a request was made for a sample 
supercharger • There Is no Indication of shipping to the 
Far JSast of either drawings or sample equipment. 


In conn set ion with negotiations for the newer 
types of (xeman aircraft engines, the Japanese became 
a^are of. and greatly inhere steel in : German mat hods :>f 
increasing the pcrsrer output of aircraft engines by in- 
jection of boosting materials* Two boast methods in 
particular were considered— nit toub oxide (GM-1) and 
liquid cxygen in j action— and f in December 44, m investi- 
gation of German 'boost ay stem 8 had beert carried out by 
£zw and Navy repr© sen talsive e * 

The Japanese learned from those in?/ a £?t:l gat on o 
that because of the problem of trait abi^ containers* in- 
^ eat ion of liquid oxygen was difficult; as a result nit roue' 
oxlae~~obtainable in large quantities :from the atmosphere— 
v?aB being us eft in Germany and had golsnsd the oxygen-injection 
problems* The Japanese ? therefore*, concentrated, on the 
s-ruay of nitrous oxide injection. 

On o January 4ft. the German air Ministry authorised 
release to the Japanese of rights for production of the 
in epilation, complete with tank and valve* • Ab the matter 
vt\s on® of urgency, a set of drawings capable of being 
blue -printed was immediately to be prepared for acceptance 
by Japanese representatives: if eu it able drawings could not 


— UK6tA88tFtfcO 

be prepared within a short time* at least general-viev? 
drawings were to be completed as quickly as possible* 
According to a German P/W, technical manuals and pamphlets 
on the QM-1 installation were handed over to the Japanese 
in Germany in December 44; on the other hand, another P/W 
places the date of handing over of GM-l information as 
being in April 45 ♦ Whether the date be December 44 or 
April 45, it is extremely unlikely that any tangible 
information on OM-1 arrived in the Far East, 

Aircraft Armament 

MG-15 and &G-17 (7.92 mm) : 

The Japanese Type 98, 7«92 mra machine gun is a 
facsimile of the German MG-15 flexible gun« The gun, which 
has been found in a number of Japanese light and medium 
bomber alroraft, was made experimentally at Xokosu&a, and 
produced at the Nagoya Arsenal and one other unidentified 
arsenal* It is believed that manufacturing rights for the 
MG-15 were acquired prior to the war; according to German 
Air Ministry records, licenses for both the MG-15 and MG-17 
were granted at some date prior to June 43* Manuals for 
the MG-17-- fixed 7*92 mm gun for use in fighter aircraft— 
were handed over to Japanese representatives in Germany on 
1 August 42, and for the 140-15 early in the following 
month. Rhelnmetall-Borsig files show that fifty~seven 
UGUlS's and one hundred and ninety-nine MG~17 f s, together 
with descriptive data, were delivered to Japanese repre- 
sentatives in Germany before 31 December 1942* 

subject of investigation by the Japanese in March 42. 
The MG-81 was superior to the MG-15, and shortly was to 

(7 y 9g m )j 

This improved flexible machine gun was the 

replace that gun In operational Geraa 
of manufacturing rights was necessary as, without such 
purchase^ the Japanese would not be able to negotiate 
for delivery of a small number of sample guns* On 9 
September 42, the MQw.81 weapons manual was handed over to 
the Japanese in Germany; this was followed in November 
by other relevant documentary material* By June 43, 
sample MG-Sl's had been released to the Japanese* It 
is not known which of this material arrived in the Far 
East; it is probable that at least the documentary material 
was shipped* 

Manuals on, and samples of, the "Bola-812 1 ' also 
were handed over in late 1942 or early 1943; that installa- 
tion is the twin MG-81 gun mount fitted in the ventral 
position on German twin-engined bombers. Some or all of 
this equipment probably was shipped to the Far Easto 

In late October 41, the Japanese Army first 
obtained information in Germany on this 13 mm machine gun* 
designed for \ise as a fixed gun on fighters and as a 
flexible gun— either hand-operated or in a power turret-- 
on bomber s. At that time it was not possible to obtain 


"sample equipment j the Germans, however, ware anxious to 
sell the manufacturing rights to the Japanese • 

visited Rhelnaetall-Borslg— the manufacturer— to study 
the M&-131; that vleit was followed by one in October 
to the Helnkel plant to study gun-mounts for the MG~131 C 
The 440-131 weapons manual was turned over to the Japanese 
In Germany on 13 August 42c Five MG--131 machine gune— with 
ammunition— and three mountings were listed in Hheinmetall- 
Boreig deliveries to Japanese representatives In Gterm&ny 
which took place by 31 December 1942c 

independent negotiations for the MG-131. According to 
German Air Ministry records, a license— presumably for 
manufacture—for the hand-operated MGU131, together with 
sample guns had been released to the Japanese by June 43* 
The evidence suggests that the Japanese Army was the re- 
cipient: In early June 44 5 Kaval representatives in Berlin 
also had received plane, and appear to have obtained a 
large quantity of MG-lSl's and ammunition which had been 
purchased and stored in Germany* but delivery of which 
was proving difficult because of the increasing needs of 
the GAP. In August* the Japanese Navy was planning to 

In early August 42 ? Japanese representatives 

Apparently the Japanose Army and Navy pursued 


Bhip plane for the flexible M&-151 to Japan but it Is 
doubtful whether those plans ever reached the Far East* 

In the meantime, the Army apparently had decided 
not to acquire manufacturing rights for the MGk-131. The 
Navy, however, completed an agreement with Rhelnmetall- 
Borsig on 24 August 44 for manufacturing rights for the 
M&-131 and ammunition* The Japanese Navy Type 2 13 -mm gun 
reportedly is derived from the German MG--131. 

The also was used as a remote- controller 1 

gun on the MBU210o That armament installation was of 
great interest to the Japanese Army* By late March 42, 
Army representatives in Berlin apparently wore hoping for 
the successful completion of negotiations for sample guns 
and ammunition, and, probably , also manufacturing rights. 
In July 42, arrangements had been completed for purohase 
of three sample remote- controlled guns as used in the 
ME~21G, together with sample tracer, armor-piercing and 
exploeive~inoendiary ammunition. It is probable that at 
leaet one set of sample equipment arrived safely in the 
Far Sast; installation drawings also presumably reached 
Japan o 

In connection with the MG>~131, the Japanese 
Navy, in September 44, concluded an agreement covering 


manufacturing rights for the steel oartrfage belli and 
feed-block for the MGkl31, Also In September 44, a 
contract was eigned for the supply to Japan of tools 
for the manufacture of steel sheila for the MO.131. 
There is no evidence of the shipment to Japan of plans 
or tools as provided for in the above agreements or 
contract ♦ 

made inquiries as to the possibility of acquisition of 
manufacturing rights for the 15 mm Mauser MG-151/15. 
Sample guns and ammunition also were under negotiation* 
Delivery of the guns and ammunition, it was anticipated, 
would take six months* Five sample guns and 25,000 rounds 
of ammunition^ together with weapons manuals, were handed 
over to the Japanese in Germany during the latter half 
of 1942, Those samples and manuals are believed to have 
reached the Par East during 1943. 

interest in the 20 mm Mauser MGU151/20* The Japanese 
Navy requested three sample guns in February 42* During 

In March 42* Army representatives in Berlin 

The Japanese Army and Navy showed the greatest 


the following month, the Array acquired details of the cost 
of sample guns and ammunition and of manufacturing right s . 
In April, Army representatives in Berlin studied the use 
of the 1*0-151/20 in German airoraft, while three months 
later they had arranged that the Japanese Army was to be 
supplied with 2,000 guns at the rate of 400 per month, 
German Air Ministry records show that during the latter 
half of 1942 clearance was given for the supply to Japan 
of 2,000 guns and more than two million rounds of ammuni- 
tion. Of those quantities, five guns and 55,000 rounds 
of ammunition were delivered to the Japanese In Germany 
before the end of 1942 o 

that the 2,000 guns— of whicn 100 already had been ac- 
quired—and one million rounds of ammunition were to be 
shipped in the near future « Althou^i transportation 
was scheduled for January 45, it was not until April 
that 800 guns and 400,000 rounds of ammunition were loaded 
on a blockade runner, which successfully reached the Far 
£ast. Some of the sample MGwi5i/20 f s have been found 
installed in the Tony single-englned fighter; they were 
supplied only with mechanically detonated German ammunition. 
As of mid- Sept ember 44, two million rounds of ammunition — 

In December of that year the Army had arranged 



an additional order made at the beginning of 1944 — were 
at a German Army depot awaiting shipmont to Japan. Their 
delivery to the Par East, therefore, is very unlikely* 

Japanese Army to place any more large scale orders for 
guns and ammunition, and acquisition of manufacturing 

to acquire right b* 

Apparently beoause of the previously reported 
difficulty of acquiring further guns and ammunition* the 
Japanese Army in February 44 again considered the purchase 
of manufacturing rlghte for the 20 mm ammunition in order 
to become self-sufficient, now that large imports from 
Germany no longer were possible* In the following June, 
information regarding German methods of manufacturing 
the ammunition was obtained together with drawings and 
other data* Some of those drawings and data may have been 
shipped during the summer of 1944 D There is no indica- 
tion of conclusion of an agreement for the necessary 
manufacturing rights* According to a .German P/W, Japanese 
representatives, in October 44, inspected the manufacture 
of 20 mm aimnunition at a factory in Posen, Bud paid 

At the end of March 43, because of the growing 

needs of the GAF, it was becoming difficult for the 

rights was considered; in mid-April it was decided not 


particular Interest to the machine tools used in the 

In the spring of 1943 the Japanese Army began 
negotiations for purchase of manufacturing rights for 
electric detonating caps for 15 mm and 20 mm ammunition. 
In June, the German Air Ministry gave Rheinmetall-Borsig 
approval for the negotiations, pointing out to the company 
that, in accordance with direction of the High Command, 
manufacturing data was to be delivered prior to the con- 
clusion of an agreement* The following month approval 
was given for the sale to Japan, for shipment by mid-August, 
of 1,000 sample detonating caps* Although by September 43 
it was reported that the Japanese Naval representatives 
in Berlin also were anxious to acquire manufacturing 
right s t and although the Navy continued to show interest 
in the process, there is no evidence that the Navy ever 
concluded an agreement. 

large numbers of sample caps* In late September 43 r 
the German Air Ministry authorized the sale to Japan 
of eight million caps* providing that German needB were 

The Army also entered into negotiations for 



rently was delayed* 

not thereby impaired* Shipment apparently was delayec 
In March 44, the Japanese requested delivery of as large 
a proportion aa possible of the 50,000 cape which had been 
released. In the following May, authority was given for 
shipment of 28,100 caps* Those caps were still held by 
the manufacturer in mid- September 44; shipment to Japan 
probably was not made* The Japanese received only a very 
small fraction of the eight million oaps on order « German 
Air Ministry records show that one shipment of 10^000 
samples was lost in transit in 1944« 

In the aaeantime, manufacturing techniques were 
under discussion* Army representatives in Berlin in 
mid-October 43 planned to forward details of detonating- 
cap manufacture, but, because of security reasons* the 
German Air Ministry would not grant the necessary per- 
mission; Navy and Army technicians in November 43 visited 
a number of German plants in order to determine the 
possibility and expense of manufacturing in Japan* The 
signing of an agreement and She forwarding of detailed 
plans was delayed until mid«1944. The plans may have been 
shipped in the summer of 1944* 

In June 44 f the German Air Ministry released 
to the Japanese chemicals necessary for the manufacture 


of primers for 50,000 detonating caps* According to 
German Air Ministry records, material for 50,000 caps, 
presumably the chemicals in question, were still at the 
manufacturers in raid-September 44; in January 45, the 
Army repeated their request for the necessary chemical e c 
Although release was granted, in view of the date, it 
ie unlikely that the chemicals were shipped to the Far 

MG FF (go m ji 

This Oerlikon 20 mm gun was superseded in the 
GAF by the MG-151/20. By June 43, however, the Japanese 
had been granted a license for its manufacture. There 
ie no evidence of Japanese negotiations for, and shipment 
of, sample guns. 

The Type 99 20 ram gun used in Japanese naval 
aircraft, however, reportedly is derived from the 
Oerlikon gun. The Japanese, like the Germans, used the 
Swiss design and were in production with this Swiss 
design by 1940. 

Mfr4Q9 and (30 m) : 

In March 43, Army officials in Berlin were 
negotiating for one MK-103 30 mm gun and in late May, 
they hoped to purchase five MK-108 and 10,000 rounds of 



ammunition* In micUJuly, the Japanese had renewed --an '■; 
urgent request for delivery of at least one .sample 
evsa though danrn^eeL As of December 43, however, neither 
an intact nor a damaged specimen could be released, ^inee 
tha gun ?ias not yet ready tor use in combat * A German 
Air Ministry letter of 20 July 43 stated that five 

and ten 5aK«108 5 together with 10,000 rounds of 
ammunition for the latter, ware. on order; the latter 
addad^ however, that delivery was to bo put off s as far 
as possible, until the winter* 

gift, t^o MK-X08 5 b and sample ammunition to the Japanese 
Navy e Thereafter both Army and Navy became active in 
negotiations for further guns and ammunition, and in 
June 44 the Army and Navy Jointly were negotiating with 
tha OAF for purchase of two MK-105" s and soma 2 f 00C rounds 
of ammunition* Four sample MK-1C5 * e and two MK-X08* a 
wart) handed over to Japanese representatives in Germany 
In July 44; one fr!K«108 and 23 casee of ammunition \m:?® 
captured on the U~234 The other eample MK-108 ami the 
four MK-103 1 s may have been sunk en route to Japan* In 
mi d-aept ember 44, two MK-108 5 s and four MK«103 s s war*) at 
the Maval Stores at WiXhelm shaven awaiting shipment, Orders 

In the spring of 1944 , the GaF preaentad* as a 

for a further four &K-103*s and two kK~X08*s were not 
fulfilled by the Oerman Air Ministry until January 45* 

on negotiation for manufacturing right s* In September 43, 
they requested shipment to Japan of drawings for the 
MK-103 and MK-108* together with prototype guns and 
ammunition. Manufacturing methods previously had been 
learned in early June, As of December 43, negotiations 
were being delayed because the guns had not reached the 
operational stage. In July 44 P the Japanese formally 
decided to purchase manufacturing rights for the MK-108* 
Although there is no evidence of conclusion of an agree- 
ment for manufacturing rights,, drawings for the MK-108 
were on board the U~234 a 

ammunition had not been attained in Japan by July 44, the 
Army began negotiations for production techniques and 
machinery o It is believed that sufficient descriptive 
information possibly reached Japan to provide a basis for 
improvement of Japanese production, even though manufactur- 
ing drawings were not received* Sample ammunition for the 
MK-108 may have reached Japan early in 1944* Other 
ammunition was available for shipment in the summer of 

Japanese Army representatives meantime carried 

Because a high level of mass production of 30 mm 


that year; some of that ammunition was on the U~234 ? 
while some was still in storage at Kiel ae of April 45« 
It seems doubtful that Japan received any ammunition 
further to that which may have arrived in early 1944. 

Early in 1942 the Japanese requested ten 37 mm 
guns; one year later representatives in Berlin obtained 
information on methods of manufacture of that gun* a 
converted Flak 18 mounted in the nose of the JU-87 D 
for ground-attaok operations. In September 43, Japan 
was considering purchasing a sample of, or manufacturing 
rights for, the 37 mm gun c There is no indication^ how- 
ever, of negotiations for manufacturing rights* Samples 
of 37 mm ammunition were purchased by Japan; they may, 
however, have been for antiaircraft purpose s* 

BK-M&Q npn)» 

In late February 42, Army representatives in 

Berlin received specifications for this weapon, an antitank 

gun which the Germans had converted for mounting in the 

nose of the M2-410. The gun was further described to 

both Army and Navy representatives at the end of May 44 

in an official explanation by the German Air Ministry* Two 


weeks later the Army had placed an order for a sample 
gun, while the Navy apparently wished to await the results 
of OAF experimentation and trial manufacture before 
placing an order* In December 44, Army and Navy repre- 
sentatives visited the GAF station at Poeen and inspected 
the fitting of a 50 mm gun in the ME-410 and its construc- 
tion and mechanism* There is no evidence that the Army 
ever received the sample gun; nor is there any Indication 
that the Japanese knew of the MK-214 A, a new 50 mm gun 
developed from the BK~5. 

Information on the 50 mm gun in the MK-410, they also 
learned of an experimental antitank gun under development 
Iqr the GAF. That gun was made up of the barrel of a 75 mm 
gun with the addition of a loading mechanism of the type 
used with the 40 mm gun* The experimental gun, mounted 
in the HS«129 f was claimed to have achieved good result s* 
Plans and samples of the ground 75 mm Model 41 antitank 
gun reached Japan in July 43* 

Mrgraft ftTOfimettf from yfrfty: 

In late 1943, Japan beoame greatly interested in 
certain guns which the Ansaldo Company was producing for 

75 m Antfttflfft smi: 

In early 1942, when the Japanese Navy obtained 

mounting in alroraft. Negotiations were begun for p\*rohase 
of sample equipment and plans* Difficulties were encount- 
ered and it was not until late October 44 that negotiations 
finally were completed. However, in March 45, arrangements 
were in hand to make photographic copies of the plans and 
documents received from the Ansaldo Company • It is unlikely 
that either plans, documents or sample equipment ever were 
shipped to Japan. The weapons for which contracts were 
negotiated were the 4? mm, 102 mm, and 152 ram aircraft- 
mounted guns. 

&* 47 mm gun ; First available evidence of 
Japanese awareness of this gun— used for ground-attack 
operations — dates from late 1943. Following examination 
of a descriptive outline of the 4? mm gun and its 
characteristics, procurement of plans find sample equip- 
ment was decided. A contract with Ansaldo, signed in 
October 44, provided for delivery to the Japanese of a 
sample gun and equipment, plans and descriptive material. 
While this material probably reached Berlin In late 1944, 
it had not been shipped to Japan as of early March 45; 
delivery to the Par East, therefore, is very unlikely. 

jb* jL02 mm and 15% mm -guns : Negotiations for 
these two guns closely paralleled those for the 4? mm gu*u 


A contract with Ansaldo, signed in October 44, provided 
for delivery of sample guns, ammunition, plana and de- 
scriptive material; it is unlikely that this material 
was shipped to the Par East* 

Gun mount g f remote control gear and gunsights: 

shipped to Japan, samples of the fixed mount for the 
MGkibl/20, as used on the FW«190; in December 42, photo- 
graphs of that gun mount were obtained* According to 
captured German Air Ministry records, by 1 June 43, actual 
delivery of- -or the necessary clearance for delivery — had 
been made for a number of fixed and flexible gun mounts 
for the MG-17, MG-131, MG-151 and MG-FF* 

used in the ME-210 reached Japan by surface vessel in 
early 1943* In July 44, however, the Army began nego- 
tiations for the acquisition of parts, plans and specifi- 
cations of a new model remote-control mount, and was study- 
ing its manufacture* This may have been the type *QA* 
13 mm mount, modification Wk~131« There is no evidence 
that drawings for the new- type mount ever reached Japan; 
however, certain technicians had studied the mount and 

In 1942-43, the Japanese Army purchased, and 

Models of the 13 mm remote- control gun mounts 


are believed to have returned to Japan, 

About September 44 the Navy collected informa- 
tion on a number of German remote-control gun mounts, gun 
turrets and gun sights. Ap par at a covered ware the ai(r~lbl 
dorsal and ventral gun mounts of the H&-177, the MUL.131 
tail gun of the used in oon junction with the 

PVE~ll perlsoopio sight and the FA- 15 oil pressure remote- 
oontrol device manufactured by Junkers for use with tail 
gun mounts* 

for sample JU-388 gun mounts, ten tail guns, four dorsal 
and four ventral mounts; orders were placed at the same 
time for 10 sample F/U15 remote«eontrol equipment and 
negotiations opened for purchase Of manufacturing rights* 
Samples and drawings for the PV£~11 perlsoopio sight 
also were requestedc By ml d~ January 45 5 Army represen- 
tatives in Berlin had obtained samples of , and manufactur- 
ing rights for, the JU-388 tail-gun mount (FHL 131-Z) and 
FiU15 remote-oontrol equipment. Three FHL 131-Z and three 
sets of the FA-15 equipment are said to have been shipped 
and sunk; manufacturing drawings also may have been shipped 
and sunk. There is no information as to delivery of drawings 
for the PV£U1! perlsoopio sight* 

In October 44 the Japanese Army placed orders 


There Is little available evidence of Japanese 
interest In German optical gunsights* In late October 41, 
Army representatives were in a position to obtain a sample 
Revi-12 C gunsight within a month. It is possible that 
the sample arrived in the Far East* 

Rocket armament : 

The Japanese have shown a certain Bkill in 
individual development of solid rocket propellante* 
Rocket-firing fighters also reportedly have been encount- 
ered over Japan* The extent of knowledge^ and samples* 
of German rocket armament acquired by Japan is, therefore, 
of some interest* 

a. 21 cm rocket : This rocket, used by the 
Germane as an anti-bomber weapon, was an adaptation of 
the 21 cm rocket mortar* About April 44 the GAP presented 
the Japanese Navy with certain equipment, Including a 
complete set of 21 cm rocket projectiles and wing launch- 
ing equipment* That material was to be shipped to Japan 
at the first opportunity. The rockets were said to have 
been shipped and sunk before reaching Japan in the summer 
of 1944* Navy representatives in Berlin obtained con- 
siderable detail on the 21 cm rocket in April 44 . 

b t P^frerschreck; This 88 mm rocket projectile 
was a German adaptation for aircraft use of the 88 mm 
antitank rocket, and was designed for low«level attacks 
on armored vehicles* The land armament version of the 
Panzersohreck was the subject of an agreement for the 
purchase of manufacturing rights in February 45* At 
least one sample was on board the U~234 There Is no 
available evidence that the Japanese had any interest in 
the aircraft -launched version. However-, in early 1945 
the Japanese Array reportedly was using an aircraft- 
launched 87 mm rocket which is reminiscent of the Panzer- 
schreck; two rockets were carried under each wing. 

o. Pfmzey blit fi : The airborne version of the 
Panzerechreek was replaced, in the GAP, by the lighter 
8 cm Panzerblltzj an FW-190 could carry twelve Panzerblitz 
as opposed to only six Panzer echreoko In March 45 9 Naval 
representatives in Berlin obtained information on the GaK*s 
use of the Panserblitz, There is no further evidence 
regarding Japanese knowledge of the weapon* 

Bomb- torpedo ; 

In October 44, the GAP gave to Japanese Army 
and Wavy representatives information on the bomb-torpedo, 



Released from the attacking fighter-type aircraft like 
a bomb f the weapon was to produce an underwater explo- 
sion in the manner of a torpedo* Detailed information 
was obtained on the weapon- -of which there are four 
sizes weighing respectively 440* 380, 1540 and 2860 lbs*, 
Drawings of the bomb-torpedo were requested; in early 
February > an explanatory document already had been micro- 
filmed and sent by submarine. According to captured 
German personnel, Japanese representatives were instructed 
in techniques of bomb- torpedo attack using the TSA bomb- 
sight, and were given written material* The personnel 
expressed the opinion that copying of the bomb- torpedo 
was within Japanese capabilities. 

(folder bpmbs ^d i ^Hl r cl gd n _nilsei.les i 

a. The first available evidence of 

Japanese knowledge of the HS-293 radio-controlled rocket- 
propelled glider bomb for attacking light naval vessels 
an,d merchant ships is contained in a captured file > which 
contains a 24 February 44 report from Vice Admiral Abe 
to Tokyo o That report described a conference with the 
Chief of the German Air Staff, at which films of tho 



Hg-293 and FX bombs were shown to m 

representatives* Abe's report gave outlines of construc- 
tion and specifications, but contained no detailed infcrna*- 
tion. In late June 44 ^ tfaval representatives an Berlin 
were given data on the K 3-293 A. The weapon apparently 
greatly interested the Japanese who wished to obtain pro--, 
emotion sketches^ manufacturing rights and technicians* 
In September, Japanese Army and Navy representatives 
visited Garz/Uaedom to attend a demonstration of the 
HS~293. There is no evidence that prototypes- drawing b 
or manufacturing rights ever were acquired by the Japanese 
representative e in Germany c 

b* FX boiribg On the occasion of the September 44 
visit to £k*rz/Ue~dom f the Japanese; repre sent ativ ea were 
allowed to inspect the FX-1400 rocket-propelled bomb for 
attacks on major naval units, and which was used to sink 
the Italian battleship "Soma** The Garz/Ueedom visit 
produced details of weights, dimensions, construction, 
bomb release and control in flight for the* FX; the repre- 
sentatives apparently also saw films of a trial release* 
Additional information' on the FX wis obtained in October 44* 
There ia no evidence that any drawings of the FX ever 
arrived in the Far East, 


o. HS-294, HS->295 : Available information on 

Japanese knowledge on these larger versions of the HS-293 
is very scanty. The Japanese were informed about December 44 
of the existence of both weapons* According to Dr* Wagner, 
inventor of these weapons and of the HS-393, it was intended 
that he should hold discussions on the H3-294 with Japanese 
representatives in December 44* The discussions were 
postponed and never took place. There is no evidence 
that any other information on the HS-294 and HS-295 was 
sent to Japan • 

of information on the newer German guided missiles having 
been sent to Japan, In fact, it appears that the Japanese 
were kept in the dark as to the existence of those missiles. 

the equipment presented by the GAP to the Japanese Mavy 
in April 44; at that time the weapon had not been used 
operationally* Plans, an experimental report and descrip- 
tive text for the glider-bomb were shipped and probably 

BP-20 (Matter) : 

Personnel of the manufacturing firm stated that 
they were ordered to give complete details of the BP-20 to 

d. Guided mlpsl}es : There is little evidence 

e. BV-246 : This glider-bomb was included in 


Japanese representatives In Germany* Although, because 
of transport difficulties, the Japanese never received 
those details, the caanufaoturing personnel stated that 
the Japanese had a general knowledge of the interceptor 
and Ite purpose, and showed considerable interest in the 
project* It is possible, therefore, that some information 
on the BP-20 was sent to Japan; it is extremely ualikely 
that any plans or samples were shipped to the far East. 

Bombs : 

In 1941-42 Japanese Army and Navy representa- 
tives in Germany purchased, and shipped to Japan, samples 
of a wide variety of German bombs, including samples of 
the 1,000, 1,400 and 1,700 kg bombs. The Navy also was 
to purchase samples of the 2 kg ground-attack bombs; 
according to German Air Ministry records, 500 samples 
of the 2 kg bomb were released for delivery to Japan 
during the latter half of 1942c During that period, the 
GAF offered to Japan, for inanediate delivery, 600 or more 
sample bombs; by late March 45 a large number of sample 
bombs had been purchased and loaded for shipment. A 
further shipment of bombs — including incendiary and 
normal and thin-oase high- explosive types — and fusee 


was purchased from Rhelnmet alffsffiRF5¥^<fl iJ^fHV^B^^ it\ j 
August 43. It 1 8 probable that most or all of the bombs 
and fusee shipped to the Par East &r:<?3»ved safely in 


Aerial cameras and lenses: 

As early as 1941 the Japanese were purchasing 
samples of aerial cameras in use by the GAF; purchases 
were continued through the subsequent years* Up to the 
spring of 1943, when the Germans apparently standardised 
their out-put to produoe only cameras of 50 cm aperture f 
cameras with aperture of 20 cms and 75 cms respectively 
had been purchased and a total of 100 samples sent to 
Japan* By the late summer of 1943 the Germans had failed 
to produce cameras with 50 cm aperture for the Japanese; 
presumably for that reason Japanese purchases continued 
to be of the earlier type camera. Special lenses, and 
parts and accessories for cameras! all were negotiated 
for concurrently with the cameras themselves* During 
the more recent negotiations there was an apparent ten- 
dency to purchase and ship lenses* rather than complete 
cameras* Presumably because of a reported shortage of 
optical glass in Japan, manufacturing rights for few 
aerial cameras were purchased* The only known cases of 
purchase of manufacturing rights were Italian-made aerial 
cameras. Drawings of those cameras were shipped and sunk* 


As early as February 42, ??hen Gtermany offered 
the rights for the Hensohel pressurized cabin, the 
Japanese Army and Navy became interested in high altitude 
flying equipment . The Japanese Navy 1b known to have 
acquired rights to manufacture a pressurized cockpit — which 
may have been an early Hensohel model— within three months 
of the German offer. Drawings for the Ha- 150 pressurized 
cabin were dispatched to Japan. Apparently, however, the 
drawings were not complete enough to allow of reproduc- 
tion in Japan; parts and plans again were shipped in the 
spring of 1944, probably on two U-boats, both of which 
are thought to have been sunk before reaching Japan, In 
August 44, the Japanese Navy again requested the shipping 
of parts and drawings fo2* a pressurized cabin. Those 
parts and drawings may have been shipped sometime during 
the summer of 1944* In July 44 7 the Japanese Navy ac- 
quired manufacturing rights for a Hensohel pressurised 
cabin, probably a later model than that for which righto 
were acquired in 1942* According to U« 9. Navy reports, 
experimental high-altitude pressurised cabin cells have 
been found among equipment at the Yokosuka Naval Air 
Experimental Station „ 


By mid~1941 the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company is 

believed to have acquired patent rights for the Askania 
automatic pilot; the agreement provided for two Japanese 
technicians to work at the Askania factory. In early 1942 
the Japanese apparently v/ere negotiating for a Siemens 
automatic pilot and required data necessary for its 
large-scale construction in Japan* By the end of March 42 
attempts also were being made to obtain manufacturing 
rights for the Pat in automatic pilot. 

for manufacturing rights apparently continued throughout 
1942* It appears that the Patin tri axial automatic pilot 
was selected as being the beet instrument « It was not, 
however, until late October 1944 that manufacturing rights 
for, and ten samples of, the Patin automatic pilot were 
request ed* Negotiations were concluded early in November 44 
and steps for immediate purchase of several sample equip- 
ments were put in hand* Aocordlng to German Air Ministry 
records, manufacturing plans for the K-I2 automatic pilot 
were still in the hands of the manufacturer as of mid- 
September 44; there is no evidence of their shipment to 
the Far £ast« 

Negotiations with the three German companies 



During 1940-41 tm Japanese negotiated tai* 

puroh&ss of manufacturing righto for the 73-5 variable 
pit oh propeller manufactured by ohe Junkers Company* 
Japanese technicians arrive*! in Berlin in mid-1941 to 
conclude negotiations with respect to that propellers 
On arrival, it v^aa found that an Improved design, the 
already ms In procluotion and that $h® earlier 
model xm% obsolete* Mtf&otiations, therefore, were switched 
to the new tvp© propeller ? and atv>smpts mQdB to buy atopic,,, 
plans and machinery and arrange for their immediate ship- 
ment to the Far East,, By the end of 3.941 } fiianufaotariag 
r ight & were being acquired; arrangements : rara in hand by 
April 42 for shipment of plans* list a of <r aerials, and 
ohg complete propeller, Thl.8 material undoubtedly arrived 
In the Far E&frfc* An agroojaent v/aa aleo concludes for 
manufacturing righto for Sohv/art^ propellers, drawings 
and prototype*?. Production of the Junkers and Solr*&rta 
propellers in the Far i2£,8t apparently was to be under- 
taken by Nihon Gfikki. m^naf act ur^r£ of wooden alrsorews. 

to obtain plans for the fclesseroohmltS MP -6 propeller? ami 
negotiations apparent 1/ were in hand. Thor^ i« no 

In early 1944, the Army was rlso very anxious 


available evidence as to the result e of those negotiations* 

A&rorafi?,,. etfplt; 

German Air Ministry records indicate that the 
Japanese representatives in Germany purchased, probably 
in 1943, one sample dram-type aircraft catapult, type 
KL-12* As of August 44, that sample was still at the 
manufacturing firm, although ready for ehipment. At that 
tlrae there was no possibility of transporting the catapult, 
which was Intended for the Japanese Navy. The equipment, 
therefore, was to be placed in storage: it is very unlikely 
that it was shipped at any later date* Manufacturing 
rights were purchased in July 44; plans had been received 
the previous month, and were scheduled for shipment to 
the Far East in September* It is unlikely that they ever 
reached Japan. 

AB6lB*ga tafte-off equipment: 

of the assisted take-off apparatus as used on the JU~86. 
According to German Air Ministry records, assisted take-off 
apparatus, including containers and transportation boxes, 
was shipped on 30 September from Germany to Bordeaux for 
onward transportation to the Par East* There is no 

In 1943 the Japanese Army purchased five sets 



evidence of shipment of the equipment to the Par. East; 
it is possible, however/ that such transportation may 
have been carried, out. 

From 1941 on* the Japanese made continual in- 
quiries concerning Lotfe bomb sights, learned the details 
of German production methods and obtained many samples. 
They triad for a time to manufacture their own sights in 
Japan but after a short while gave up that idea and began 
placing new orders with firms in Germany. 

German recommendations for the Lotfe bomb sight 
(subtype not specified) began in 1941, and on 29 October 
of that year Japan was informed that a Lotfe 70 was avails 
able for delivery* Japanese military representatives 
purchased a sample bomb sight (the 70) in March 42 ? but 
delivery was held up. 

, In March 1943 > Army representatives obtained 
information on the Lotfe ?D« Clearance for delivery of 
500 Lotfe 7C*s to the Japanese had been given during the 
latter half of 1942, Prototypes and blueprint a for the 
Lotfe 71) are known to have reached Japan in 1943c, Both 
Army and Bavy Attaches decided that, from an engineering 


standpoint, the ?D could not be manufactured in Japan. 

During 1944 the Lotfe 7H was investigated. 
Japanese Army and Navy representatives made a tour of 
inspection through the Zeiss factory at Saalfeld* 

approved delivery to Japan of 50 Lotfe ?D*s per month; 
another document granted permission to Karl Zeiss for 
the sale of 300 type 7D*8* By June 1944, Japan had 
decided that manufacturing rights were unnecessary* 
Either production was found impossible, or because of 
difficulties lnvolved f it was decided to continue order- 
ing from German manufacturers* Reordering from Germany 
began late in 1944 tout was not entirely satisfactory ; 
German Air Ministry records ehov? that of 300 type 7D 
bombsights ordered in June 1944, none had been delivered 
as of the following December* German Air Ministry records 
also show that 300 7D f 3 were to be available for delivery 
In January 1945 and thirteen 7H sights were awaiting ship- 
ment at Kiel* Several 7D's had been left behind at 
Bordeaux early in 1944 * 

<UV9 bpipb gftgfot: 

In July 44 Japanese Army representatives requested 
that Germany release manufacturing rights for a dive-bomb 


A German Air Ministry document dated 13 April 44 


Eiatooatxt3 Bight device* Apparently the T£JA~3 and 
types were investigated and oorudde^ed; In November Army 
x»spr e a en t at Ive e in Berlin negotiated to purchase the 
manufacturing rights for the TSfc~2 type but stated that 
the BZiUiC typo was not needed* By th© end of December 44* 
the manufacturing rights for the e P8A«2 hacl been acquired; 
possibly for uae with the bomb- torpedo* Manufacturing 
rights ware released to the Japanesa Army by the (r-artuan 
Air Ministry during January 45. aaoordia^ to a note in 
KobayasM ? b notebook, C. lilies &nd Oo. listed Msong 
deliveries in preparation in 194o, license right e fer* 
the Zeiss bomb eight and five s&nple T3A-»2's» 

rights and production specification^ there is some doubt 
that they could have copied and need the Accord- 
ing to £oiss ? chief bomb sight engineer, that firm* on 
instruct J one from higher authority : gave to Japanese 
representatives in Germany a sample of tho TSA computer, 
which t after* tko altitvxle- air speed, uiva-angle. and 

computer and solves the slant-rang^ problem* She oomput^r 
never ^?ae us ad in combat by the Germans, 

Although the Japanese possess manufacturing 

In early 1945, Naval representatives in Germany 

learned details of new German high-speed parachutes. 
Negotiations for purchase of several sample parachutes 
and of manufacturing rights were to be initiated within 
the near future* There is no evidence to indicate con- 
clusion of the negotiations; in any event, in view of the 
date, shipment to Japan of any samples or plans is oon~ 
sidered very unlikely » 

Parachute brake : 

By late July 43, purchase of a sample of the 
parachute tall-brake, as used on the JU«88, was being 
negotiated. Although a German Air Ministry document, 
dated August 43, stated that special importance was 
attached to release of the JU-88 type parachute brake, 
e**mple equipment still was at Kiel awaiting shipment in 
April 45. It 1b believed that there had not been any 
previous shipment of sample equipment. 

B^et-proof fuel tfarfeg: 

In March 42, Army representatives in Berlin 
inspected the German bullet-proof fuel tank; the German 
Air Ministry was being requested to authorise transfer 

to Japan of sample tanks to allow of their use with the 
IX)«21? and ME-21C, There is no evidence to indicate that 
sample tanks were obtained* German aircraft fuel tanks 
were the subject of further inquiry in December 43, which 
suggests that the earlier negotiations had not been 

Fug], frn,l9<rt?.Qn pip»: 

In August 42 ? the Germans offered to the Japanese, 
for immediate delivery,, two sample fuel injection pumps as 
used in the tttw~801» Those pumps were shipped by the end 
of July 43, as also were two sample fuel injection pumps 
for the Jumo-211; one of the latter was sunk en route* 
The only other German fuel injection pump in which the 
Japanese showed interest was a pump designed by Henschel 
for the BMW-003 turbo-jet unit, which, because of its 
small size and simple construction, reportedly was suit- 
able not only for turbo-jet units but also as a high- 
pressure pump for all types of equipment* 

In late 1941 , the Army was in a position to 
procure three Kerubin type oxygen masks; by April 42 
these had been purchased and arrangements for their shipment 




were in hand* The masks may have reaohed t|i© ^Sast * 
In early 1942 negotiations were etarted for purchase of 
three sample oxygen masks of the Auer type; these were 
oleared for release to Japan during the latter half of 
1942 but are believed to have been sunk en route to the 
Far East* 




Introduction 166 

Radar - Ground and ehlpborne 170 

Airborne radar and I.P.F. 174 

Radio altimeters, navigational aids, 176 

blind-bombing devices 

Communications equipment 180 

Jamming, anti» jamming and oountermeasures 182 

Search receivers 183 

Allied radar . 183 

Miscellaneous electronic equipment 184 

Infra-red 186 

Vacumm tubes 189 

Insulation materials 196 

Radar test equipment 198 

Note: Brief descriptions of the equipment discussed 
In Section III are contained in TAB H. 


"™ (inclasshqi 



Introduction : 

Japan's interest In acquiring technical assis- 
tance from Gersaany in respect to radar and radio equipment 
was exceeded only by her Interest in German aircraft* 

nical assistance In electronic development but were not as 
interested In acquiring manufacturing plans and drawings as 
was the case In other directions. A possible explanation 
of this may have been that She Japanese were planning ad- 
option of radar and radio equipment on independent lines 
and proposed embodying German and Allied features rather 
than the complete adoption of German techniques. 

The development of electronics in Japan was in 
the hands of Array and Navy experimental establishments, 
universities, and the industries and this diversity of 
research does not appear to have operated smoothly. 

Military Technical Laboratory, and other laboratories at 
Okayama, Ikuta, Kawasaki, Mitalta, Teuka i: *uchi and Sendai 
while Fuji Denki K.K., Kihon Musen Denshin K.K. and Mltau~ 
bishi Denkl K.K. featured as major producers of electronic 

The Japanese looked to Germany for general tech- 

Technical development centered at the Tama 


Research and development apparently was not 
guided by any central authority and, In general, Japanese 
technical skill did not develop to the state where Inde- 
pendent research produced original electronic equipments 
In fact, at the beginning of the war, Japan was far be- 
hind the Allies and Germany in the production of electronic 
equipment and was forced to rely on Germany-- to an extent 
not evident in other categories of war material— for ass~ 
istance In acquiring German and Allied material for deve- 
lopment of her own apparatus c 

The Germane provided technical help by deliver- 
ing prototypes of their ov/n equipment and tubes to the 
Japanese but did so— at least up to the final stages of 
the war— only for material known to be in Allied hands. 
Captured specimens of Allied equipment also were obtained 
by the Japanese in Germany. 

Various Japanese radar and radio technicians 
were permitted to study German equipment and are known 
to have visited the German -Radar and Infra-red Experimental 
and Testing Station at Heiligensee, where they obtained 
blueprints of German electronic installations » 

A German. P/W states that blueprints definitely 


were handed over to the Japanese during the period frora 
1942 to 1944 for; 

Wttrzburg C 1942 

Wfirzburg D 1942 

Wiirzburg Riese 1943 

Mannheim 41 T 1943 

Dreh-Freya 1943 

Fahr g t uhl-Fr e ya 1943 

Mraberg 1944 

W&rslaus 1944 

Taunus 1944 

Wlsmar 1944 

In 1943, German technicians, Marine Obering. 
Stalker and a G-ema radar engineer— probably Br Inker who 
is believed to have arrived In the Far East In July/ 
August 43— were sent to Japan. They carried with them 
complete plans for the Wftraberg Riese* a radar intercept 
receiver l, Athoa w in the 9-3 cm wave band and plans for 
German submarines* Those technicians are reported to have 
had little success in improving Japanese electronics 

Another technician; Helnrich Coders of Telefunken, 
who arrived in Japan in the late summer of 1943 for the 
purpose of studying Japanese radar equipment and Improving 
it with German production techniques, in October 44 ad- 
versely reported on the Japanese radar industry, particularly 
on deficiencies in tube production, laboratory test apparatus* 
and ultra high-frequency insulation materials. Fcders stated 


— mussm 

... : r*£p33^^ 

parties, that the principal wave lengths of Japanese radar 
wer: A e above 80 cms, except for tv/o experimental sets of 20-25 
cms, and that only one model— a naval shipborne set— had 
reached the stage of mass production. 

Other technicians connected with radar development 
were on the way to Japan at the end of the European war. 
At that late, stage, Japanese anxiety to obtain technical 
assistance from Germany is proof of the difficulties they 
were meeting in producing adequate electronics equipment* 

Towards the end of the war, the Germans were more 
willing to divulge complete information on radar develop- 
ments, According to Capt. Se3iuler, German electronics 
director, the Japanese were familiar with all ground search 
radar employed by the Germans. They were also acquainted 
with British 3 cm equipment* Generally, it may be assumed 
that Japanese technicians in Germany had been fully inform-* 
ed on all recent German research in the high frequency field* 

The German technicians with whom the Japanese 
officials worked have expressed the opinion that, provided 
information collected in Germany reached Japan— which kn 
many instances is very doubtful— the Japanese obtained, 
through Germal liaison, a very thorough grounding in 



i or the negotiations 

electronic research and production^ 

listed below are details ITf the" negdtl 
between Japan and Germany for purchase of electronic 

Radar— Ground and ehipborne ; 

Wtoburp : Initial Interest in German Wiirzburg 
dates from October 42 rAen blueprints of the A* C and D 
models are believed to have been obtained in Germany 
and sent to Japan, Drawings for the Wiirzburg-D are thought 
to have reached Japan by June 45 at the latest. Copies 
of blueprints for Wiirzburg Riese were said to have been 
taken to Japan by Engineers Brinker and Steiker, who re* 
portedly arrived in the Far East in August 43. 

As early as February 43 three mobile Wiirzburg D f e 
had been acquired by the Army and may have been immediately 
shipped from Europe by surface blockade runner* After 
initial 6tudy, the Japanese applied, in May 43, for release 
of 100 Wiirzburg D, of which 50 were for the Army and 50 for 
the Navy; the Germans agreed to deliver 15 sets monthly? be- 
ginning January 44. In addition to the 100 complete sets 
required, the Japanese requested supply of 200 sets of com« 
ponents, though this demand was later reduced to 100 sets 
of component s. 



German agreement to the release of equipment did 

not, of necessity, mean delivery to Tokyo: it Is believed 
that various sets actually loaded for shipment to Japan 
were lost* However* it ie probable that a few sets of 
Wtirzfcurg D reached Japan in 1945 and several may have 
arrived in 1944, 

Japan AB grids, Michael, £Idechse 5 and Goldamraer com- 
ponents; release of AB grids and Michael subsequently 
was approved* 

faeturing rights for Wtirzburg JD, Details of the negotiations 
are not available but on 6 July 44 those rights were ac- 
quired by the Havy. It is improbable that full blueprints 
ever reached Japan* A letter from the *«avy to "Telefunken, 
and captured on the U~234, states that ail, manufacturing 
drawings for Wl&raburg D had been received* Receipt by the 
Navy representatives in Germany probably is implied* In 
October 44, Fodera reported that mass production of the 
German v/ttrzburg D had not begun at that time and generally 
implied that Japanese efforts to develop radar manufacture 
were very disappoint ing. According to Foders* report; the 
Japanese were handicapped by a shortage of trained engineers 

Initially, the Germans refused to release to 

About August 43, Japan decided to purchases manu- 



and special mechanics, laboratory teat apparatus and high 
grade insulating materials for ultra high frequency* 

facturing rights for Siemens searchlight control gear for 
use with Wttrzburg were acquired in September 44* The 
equipment concerned is believed to have been a trl~axial 
control apparatus, wodel G150 D. It is thought that blue- 
prints and models never reached Japan. 

lease of Freya and appropriate manufacturing data to the 
Japanese %vy. That material was to be taken to Japan by 
Brinker, who was to aet up plants in Japan for the manu- 
facture of radar equipemnt for the Navy. However, limited 
submarine space prevented loading of the Freya apparatus 
and there is definite evidence that two sets of Freya v/ere 
still in the hands of the German manufacturers in January 45. 
Plans for Freya (Dreh Freya, Fahrstuhl Freya and Freya hZ) 
were delivered to the Japanese representatives in Germany 
in 1944, and may possibly have reached Japan. 

Riese Ger&t, 2 receivers, 2 visual indicators and 2 synchro- 
nizing seta—also were released but probably not shipped* 

Siemens ^searchlight cont rol ^ eq uipme nt: l 


Freya ; In March 43, the Germans authorized the re- 

Freya components — 2 amplifier generators for 


uammut and Mammut The Japanese received de- 

scriptive data on &amarat and fiiaminut Q 9 but there is no 
evidence of any desire to obtain prototypes or plans. 

Seeta kt (MO 1> FuM* 4QQ) T Manufacturing rights 
for the $ema Company* s Seetakt were acquired by the Japanese 
Navy in July 44. The U-234, when captured, carried copies 
cf the agreement between the Navy and Sema for manufacture 
of Seetakt* It is not believed that prototypes or drawings 
have reached Japan* 

Hohentwiel S (FuMO 63, Fug 200) : The U-234 carried 
a contract between the Navy and lilies and Co. for a set of 
parts for FuMO 63 • In March 44 the Japanese Army received 
descriptive data on the FuQ- 200, which set is adaptable to 
either air or shiphorn use* 

FuMO Anlage 51 (Refer FuG 200 Hohe n tw iel) : The se 

sets were purchased through naval channels and ^ere probably 
intended for use by the Japanese Navy either as air, surface 
vessel or submarine search reaeivers. It is not believed 
that models reached Japan. 

FuG 41T or Fu SE 64 Mannheim ; Captured personnel 
from Heiligeneee have stated that the Japanese obtained blue- 

prints of Mannheim in 1943; hor/ever. there Is no evidence 
that they reached Japan. 

Airborne radar and I» F« fr. : 

FuG 200 Hohentwlel (See ground and shlpborn e 
radar) : In April 44 the Genaans agreed to release one 
set of Hohentwiel to the Japanese to replace FuG 213 , 
which had gone out of production. Later the Germans 
agreed to supply three sets monthly, against an initial 
request of five. Photographs, plans and explanatory data 
were also requested by Japan, but it is not known whether 
they were delivered. 

FuG 202 (FuHO 71) Lichtensteln ; The first order 
for FuG 202 w&s made in April 43; in l&ay 44, following German 
agreement to release that apparatus, the Japanese Army Air 
Force requested delivery of 30 sets. FuG- 202 was offered 
in place of FuG- 212 which previously had been r equested. 
Delivery to the Japanese in Germany of 30 sets of FuG 202 
had been effected by October 44, but these probably were 
never shipped. 

FuG 213 (Llchtensteln S) ; In June 43 the Japanese 
made application for two sets of FuG 213; release was 
granted immediately. In September, the Japanese Army 
and Navy asked for 53 FuG 213 consisting of: 



55 instrument sets 

53 installation sets 

53 cables and material for assembly 

Delivery of that equipment could not be, undertaken by the 

Germans for sis months • A renewed application was made in 

January 44 for 30 sets, with an urgent request for delivery 

of three sets* Those three sets were released immediately. 

The Japanese were then informed that production of FuG 213 

had ceased; FuG 200 was offered to them instead* 

FuG 216A (Neptun V) I The only information re- 
garding Japanese interest in this apparatus was its re- 
lease to them in August 43. No information is available 
regarding shipment to the Far East* 

FuG 224 Panorama (Berlin) : Two sets of FuG 224A 
(Berlin, a 9.1 cm set) were purchased by Japanese repre~ 
sentatives, but never left Europe* This set was copied 
by the Germans from Allied equipment. 

FuG 25 and 25A(IFF) : Clearance of three FuG 25 
was requested in June 43 for the Japanese Army; immediate 
delivery was approved. In July, the Japanese were advised 
that the set had been declared obsolete but purchase of 
five sets was completed and delivery made by June 44* It 
Is believed that those sets were never shipped to Japan* 

In October 44 , two sets of PuG 25A were acquired 
by the Japanese Army, but at a date probably too late for 
shipment to Japan ♦ 

FuG 136; Descriptive data on this set is thought 
to hare been given to Japanese representatives in Germany 
it is believed, however, that no data arrived In Japan. 

Radio altimeters » n avigational aids, blind bombing devleea : 

FuG 101 (F Ge r&t) : In December 43, one set of 
the FuG 101 radio altimeter was released to the Japanese 
Navy for Immediate shipment; detail of actual shipment is 
not on record* Subsequently, in June 44, a further ten sets 
apparently were made available. 

The U-234 carried a contract between the Japanese 
Navy and LFG Hakenfeld covering supply of five FuG 101 and 
one test apparatus FuP 1Q1. Five seta of FuG 101 were still 
at Kiel in April 45, awaiting shipment to Japan. 

FuG 102 (Pulse type) : In July 43, the Japanese 
In Berlin requested and obtained permission for realease 
of two sets FuG 102, but were informed that supply could 
not oe arranged until early 1944, Subsequently the order 
appears to have been increased to ten sets, of which five 


PuS 105: At least one set of Fu& 103 Is known 
to have been purchased by Japanese representatives in 

Di rection finder .jTelefunken) S^-4 and : 
In January 42/ plans were made to transfer to Japan by 
the following August one hundred sets of the 
direction finder for short-range fighters, long-range 
fighters, night-fighters, reconnaissance and dive bombers. 
Plans were revised in April 43, and, although tl,e Germans 
would not agree to delivery before July 44, £Z~6 was sub- 
stituted for EZ-4. Tha Japanese Navy in Berlin endeavored 
to obtain plans for the EZ-*Q in November 43, and, by the end 
of 1944, were negotiating for a total of 500 sets of 
Deliveries certainly did not proceed according to plan, al- 
though it is possible that a few. .sets— probably EZ-4 — did 
arrive in Jaoan. 

In November 43, the Japanese Navy endeavored to 
secure manufacturing rights for EX~6; it is not known 
whether they were successful, nor whether plans ever 
reached Tokyo* 


PeG I V and VI (D/ff Homing) ; Twenty- four 

Telefunicen Fell IV D/F sets were sold to Japan Air 
Transport for shipment early in 1943; that delivery 
probably was for commercial transport purposes. In 
August 43— and following an order for 40 sets previously 
released—the Navy requested delivery from Telefunken 
of eighty additional PeG- IV although delivery of the 
eighty sets was not to be undertaken prior to January 
44. Further negotiations appear to have followed for 
purchase of 2,580 units; although delivery of 60 units 
per month was agreed upon, that order was cancelled in 
October 43. 

but delivery was not possible at that time. Manshu Air 
Transport Company endeavored to buy 29 PeG VI in April 
44; that request was followed in the same month by a 
Japanese Army demand for 3,000 PeG- VI and 135 PeG- IV sets. 

Delivery never met demand and there is no avail- 
able information as to shipment. 

Radio beacons ; The Japanese in Berlin investigated 

German employment of radio beacons and though release of 
the equipment was granted, shipment was not made of the 
complete installations. Because of difficulty of shipment, 

Release of PeG VI was arranged in October 43 


only descriptive data of the aerial were procured. 

ffufr 5Qg (Schw an-See) : Release of txvo sets was 
agreed for November 43, but delivery was delayed at least 
until 1944. It is unlikely that specimens of this 
apparatus ever reached Japan. 

Y Gter&t : Descriptive information on the Y-Ger&t 
was obtained in November 43; two seta of air-ground 
equipment were released in i/lay 44. Thirty more sets were 
required but not supplied because of prior German demand. 
Due to transport problems it is doubtful whether any 
apparatus v:as shipped. 

Fu Bl» 2F: The Japanese applied for 100 Lorenz 
Fu Bl, 2F in December 43 but the Germans were unable to 
agree to supply more than 8-10 at that time. No further 
information is available on those negotiations* 

X Ger&t : Although there is evidence of Japanese 
special interest in this equipment, the Germans objected 
to its release on grounds of security. 

Ado oo k assemblies i In June 43, the Germans agreed 
to supply two KZW (short-wave) and LO-W (long- wave) Adcook 

Installations; mobile type delivery was to be made three 
to four months later, and stationary type immediately* 

Subsequently (November 43} ten sets of the A70b 
Adcoek Installation* wave range 2900-11,000 fees, were 
released at a rate of 2-3 units per month. There Is no 
information as to shipment to Japan* 

Communications equipment s 
Airborne radio seta: 

FuG 2 : Two sets of FuG 2 were available for de- 
livery in January 45, probably too late for shipment to 
Japan* There is no indication of previous purchases or 

FuG 5a ; Two sets of this equipment, with g 502 
receiver, were purchased by the Japanese Army from Tele- 
funken in December 44, but were never shipped* 

FuG 7a: In January 42, Telegunken offered to 
supply the Jaoanese with 130 FuG ?a sets (wave length 80- 
120 meters) but it is not known whether the Japanese were 
interested in purchasing this equipemnt. 

FuG 10 : In November 43, two sets of FuG 10 

for shipment the following month* "In July 44, the 
Army requested live sets of the ir pulse wave type and 
five sets of the modulation type, plus photographs, plans 
and explanatory data* One set of the equipment was found 
on the U~234» 

FuCr 15 ; In April 43, both branches of the 
Japanese armed forces requested several models of FuG- 15. 
In September 43, it was decided by the German military 
authorities that this equipment could not be released 
until the second half of 1944 , since development only 
recently had been completed. Ten sets were again re- 
quested in oeptember 44, but none are thought to have 
been sent to Japan* 

FuG 16 i Three sets were purchased by the Kavy 
and v/ere available for shipment in August 44, but there 
is no indication of shipment* 

Bolind er receivi ng^ set s r from Sweden; 

In 1944, the Japanese Army acquired manu~ 
faoturing rights for Bolinder type wireless receivers* 
The wireless receivers were described as "equally adapted 


for use on aircraft 9 on ships, and on the ground, their 
special feature teeing: a receiving capacity of 400 words 
per minute* {? 

Jamming, _aiiti~ jamming and eountermeasures ; 

Captured German documents and personnel in- 
dioate that the Japanese in Germany received lnfor~ 
mat ion on Gema radar anti-jamming equipment in the 
form of blueprints for Wiitrglaus, Tauhus, Mrnberg and 
Wisroar, Stendahl* Aphrodite and Thetis also were de- 
scribed to them, There is further information that in 
luarch 43 Germany released to the Japanese two sets of 
V/ismar equipment, which were to be taken to Japan by 
Brinker; but evidence is not available ae to *#hen the sets 
actually reached their destination. By February 45* the 
Japanese had bought manufacturing data for Wismar but the 
plans were lost in transit. 

"window" against their own radar for test purposes in 
connection with experiments to ascertain the best type 
of ^window for Japanese use, there is little evidence 
of ant i« jamming training of Japanese radar operators. 
Instances of Allied jamming of Japanese radar have re- 

While the Japanese are known to have employed 


suited in the Japanese closing down their nets. In 
general, evidence points to serious deficiencies in 
Japanese ant i~ Jamming techniques. 

Search re pel vera: 

The Japanese are known to have purchased models 
of the following German search receivers In 1944, hut 
little information ie available on their shipment to 
the Far Easts 

Allied radar ; 

The Japanese gained from the Germans consider- 
able information on various types of Allied electronic 
equipments. The Germans were in a good position to an- 
alyze Allied material and adapt it for their own use; 
such information was usually passed on to the Japanese. 
In some dases, samples of the equipment itself were given 
to the Japanese; such was the case with British and 
American radar identification equipment (IFF)* samples 
of which the Japanese Army received in 1943* The 
British model was designated R~3002; the American model 

FuMB 10 (Borkum) 
FuMB 26 (Tunis) 
FuG 3o0 (Naxos) 

FuMB Ant .3 (Rundipol) 
FuMB 9 (Wanz Anlage) 

Sadir R 87E and Sadlr R 87H* 


was B064? A. 

Great Interest was evidenced by the Japanese in 
Allied blind. -bombing equipment— American "Meddo" (H2X) 
and Sritish "Rotterdam" (H2S) . In 1944, considerable 
descriptive detail was passed on to the Japanese and 
models and drawings of Rotterdam and Ueddo were purchased* 
It Is not believed that prototypes or drawings either of 
Rotterdam or Kleddo ever reached Japan from Germany* How- 
ever, in January 45 7 the Japanese captured a Rotterdam 
instrument from a downed American B~29. That equipment, 
together with German descriptions and German trained 
technicians— particularly S&take~« should have been of 
great assistance to the Japanese in constructing similar 

In Uareh 44 the Japanese Army also became 
interested in Rosendahl, the German designation for 
captured British "Monica* 1 (tall-warning radar) equipment* 
Models and explanatory data were purchased, but it is 
not known whether this equipment reached Japan. 

Miscellaneous electronic equipm ent ; 

German p/W f 6 and captured documents— notably 
German Air Ministry records— made reference to a variety 


of miscellaneous electronic equipment , re lat 

Japanese inquiries for German equipment. Little detail 

is available regarding such equipment, particularly in 

respect of transfer to Japan of either prototypes, • 

drawings or manufacturing rights* 

Listed hereunder are the principal It erne which 

at one time or another have been discussed between the 

G-ermabs and Japanese, but regarding which the status of 

negotiations is very obscure. This list is included to 

indicate in what directions t other than those noted in 

the foregoing sections, the Japanese have attempted to 

fill their electronic requirements from Gterznan sources? 

FuG 217 (Heptun RII) 

FuG- 218 (Heptun RIIX) 

PuMG 404 (Jagdsehloss) 

V/ a ss e nnan (Chi nmey ) 

Wasserman H 

Adier radio-telephone 

DiviG 4K and 5K decimeter communication 

equipment (Michael) 
OitlGr 3G decimeter communication equipment 

AS 59 200 watt transmitter 
Powerline TAK 1107 rectifier set 220 V 
Power set EL; IV (FW 3000 A) motor generator 
T 36 40 teletype machine 
lo5 Kw. communications transmitter 
P 53 N Telefunken D/P receiver 
Fu PNG current tester 
Rehbock artificial target testing 

device for Wttrzburg 



Ultrashort wzfve coKwnlQ^Xon gets f or armore? 
units The Japanese were advised in way 41 of the Bosch 
communications fthort-wave unit developed by the Germans 
for use in armored vehicles and were informed that patent 
rights could be acquired* 

Mo information in respect of purchase of rights 
or (shipment of prototypes is available* It is possible 
that this type of set was never adopted as standard 
equipment in Germany; certainly no set fitting the some- 
what loose description has been found on G-erman armored 



A significant effort on the part of the Japanese 
was in the field of infra-red ray searching and sighting 
equipment » For the most part, their interest was in 
connection with location and interception of aircraft, 
presumably because of the slow progress of radar develop* 
ment in Japan, Since infra-red equipment is relatively 
simple in so far as construction is concerned, it is only , 
natural that the Japanese should have explored this field* 

The Japanese Army first made Inquiry in Germany 
for infra -red equipment in 1941, and again in 1943 5 but 


the Germans were not yet reScl^ klT ^a1T 1511?te t*o pass on 
their knowledge to their ally* By June 44, the Army 
had succeeded in placing an order for 50 "Spanner" 
infra-red sets, which were scheduled to bfe delivered by 
the end of the year* A captured document from the 
German Air Idinistry files indicates that in November 44 
two infra-red apparatus "Spanner II A" were to be 
delivered to the Japanese Army Air Force 3.' However > in 
January 45 the order was cancelled and the equipment 
was never delivered* Thus, it would appear that no samples 
of German infra-red equipment ever reached Japan; any 
delivery was made only to Japanese representatives in 

In the spring of 1945, the Japanese made a 
.seriou.3 attempt to Import raw materials and technical 
assistance from Germany In order to develop an infra- 
red program in Japan. One of the passengers on the U-234, 
which surrendered to the Allies in ^ay, was a Dr. Schlicke, 
an infra-red expert who was scheduled to assist the Japanese 
in this field. Included in the cargo of this submarine 
were 100 kgs of thallium, presumably for use in manu- 
facturing infra-red equipment* Dx\ Schlicice stated that 
the following documents also were on the U-234S 


1* Papers describing the exact details &nc. 
operation of Evaporografie* 

2. Complete details of "L.lnse". 

3. Complete details of tt Gross Blldwandier" • 
The Japanese in Germany also were instructed 

briefly on the following types of equipment in lata 1944 
and early 1945* 

tt Seehun& III" or "Palter 11 - a device employing 
an image converter tube for detection of aircraft, 

tt Adler tt ~ a large ground- based equipment with 
longer range capability* 

"Flamingo" - a thallium sulphide detector for 
use on naval craft, 

"Kiel" - an airborne interception equipment 
for night fighters, 

' 9 Garu6n&auu' ! and M Zattenzaun w ~ infra-red 
absorbent paints for use on submarines and other naval 
naval vessels. Samples of the paint v;are also 

In November 44, the Japanese received a de~ 
acription of the process for manufacturing the cathode 
and phosphorescent screen of image converter tubes. 
Although the data presented was unusually detailed, it 


is believed that the absence of drawings, of specifi- 
cations for parts and materials, and of trained tech- 
nicians would make actual reproduction of the tube in 
Japan impossible. However, such data might be useful 
in improving the quality of tufeee already in production 
in Japan . 

Vacumm tubes: 

Dire ct purchases: Tae Japanese Army and Navy 

began negotiations for German vacumm tubes as early as 

1941 ♦ In 1942, the Japanese Army is known to have pur- 

chased small quantities of the following tubes, some of 

which undoubtedly reached Japan in 1942 or 1943; 



MS~50«X4 R magnetrons 
Unspecified types of Wvirsburg vacuum tubes and 
drawings were purchased by the Japanese Army in 1943 
along with samples of Wurzburg sets. The Wurzburg tubes 
are thought to have reached Japan in early 1944, but 
were damaged in transit and were probably of no great 

In addition to the tubee listed above, a 
captured Japanese document indicates that other German 

'£€2,® funk en .tubes had reached Japan gonetimo before 20 

November 45 and had been tested in the Tama Military 

Technical Laboratory near Tokyo, and In the* Xkuta, Okaysma, 

Kawasaki, Mitaka, Teukaguohi and Sendai laboratories* 

Those tube 8 included the following: 















IlD-4 Ma Magnetrons 
Many NP-2 tubes made by Telefunken in Germany have been 
recovered in Japanese equipment and in supply depot 
indicating that Telefunken at some time" supplied a con- 
siderable number of those tubes to Japan, although no 
rotford of the negotiations is available* 

In the summer and fall of 1944 the Japanese 
Ai?ny was negotiating for the following types of tubes, 
but there is no evidence that the oontracts were ever 

£• Braun (cathode ray) tubes for use in 
the Wilrsfturg. 


b* Special type vacuum tubes, such aa 
Klystron induction power tubes. 

o. Latest short- wave decimeter tubes and 
complete instructions for use. 

ch Tubes for receiving decimeter wares* 

As regards Japanese Navy purchase es in Germany, 
little information is available on types of vacuum tubes 
acquired. In October 43, negotiations were being carried 
on by the Japanese N aval representatives in Berlin for a 
large number of LGr-10 type vacuum tubes, which were aaid 
to be a substitute for selenium rectifiers; it is not 
known whether any samples reached Japan* In November 43, 
the Japanese Navy received permission from the German 
military authorities to purchase five L&-1 and five 
receiver tubes from Telefunlien. Those tubes were scheduled 
for delivery and shipment in December 43. and although 
there is no evidence of shipment s may have reached Japan 
early in 1944 * 

&B£Sj^Mon^ In addi- 

tion to purchasing samples of vacuum tubes, the Japanese 
Army and Navy also carried on negotiationa to obtain manu- 
facturing rights for various types of German tubes. 
Negotiations to obtain the manufacturing rights for 

Telefunken vacuum tubes were begun by the Japanese Army 
in February 42. The following typea were desired at that 

Those used with 92 decimeter waves 
• LD-l 

In the spring of 1944, Japanese Army end Naval 

authorities in Tokyo requested manufacturing plans for 

seven types of Telefunken tubes. It ia not known whether 

the original list of thirteen tubes was out down to seven 

or whether the second list covers only high priority items; 



LB-1 Braun tubes 
The Japanese intended to use these tubes in Wurzburg equip- 
ments At the same time Japan also requested the following 
data and materials in connection with the manufacturing 



drawings for the above tubes: 

a* Toole used in assembly, 

b. Welding process and welding material 
used for assembling the electrodes as well as 
manufacturing machinery. 

Cc Metals for plating the surface of the 
anode and technique for the process* 

cu The production process and information 
on materials in connection with manufacturing the 

e* Stem manufacturing machinery. 

f* Composition of the metals which are fused 
into the stem glass* 

It is thought that drawings for L8-1SO, LS~50> 
LG~2, LD~2, and LV-1 tubes— and possibly for U>~5 and 
LB~1 tube ts— reached Japan during 1944, A contract for 
manufacturing rights for the tubes listed above was never 
concluded by the Japanese Army and Navy with Telefunken ? 
because of failure to agree as to whom the rights should 
be transferred* For some time contracts had existed 
between Telefunken and Nippon Musen Denshln K.K« (Japanese 
Wireless and Telegraph Company) and between Telefunken 
and Mitsubishi Denkl K.K, (Mitsubishi Electric Company), 


under the terms of which Telefunken 
those Japanese firms the right to manufacture and sell 
Telefunken products in the Far East.* It was reported 
in June 44 that, if thosa contracts were renewed, Tele- 
funken also would agree to transfer to those companies 
rights to manufacture all Telefunken vacuum tubes* In 
March 45, it had still not been deolded whether manu- 
facturing right 8 were to be transferred to the above two 
firms, other Japanese firms, or to the Japanese Army and 
Navy* Germany then proposed that each type of vacuum 
tube should be made the 3ubject of a separate contract* 
It is not thought that these points of contention had 
been resolved by the time Germany surrendered* 

Negotiations with the Gema Company were more 
successful* In July 44 the Japanese Navy acquired from 
Gema manufacturing rights for the following search re- 
ceiver tubes: 


*Three of the five types of tubes Nippon Musen is 
known to have produced were copies of Telefunken types* 
One LS-66 tube which was recovered in the Far East bears 
the Nippon Musen trademark and the legend "made in 
Germany n * 


The Japanese Navy In May 44 requested information 
from Germany regarding methods of manufacturing magnetron 8 
and requested samples of the finished products, machinery t 
drawings and technicians* By 15 February 45, it had been 
decided, in order for the Japanese to investigate the 
details of magnetrons > thsy would have to purchase the 
manufacturing rights of t*ro types: IMS 100 (transmitter 
use) and RD~2 Ma (receiver use). It is not believed that 
the oontraot was concluded or that this material tjae ever 
shipped to Japan. 

Technical d ata and, technicians: In addition 

to the acquisition of prototypes and manufacturing rights 

for vacuum tubes, the Japanese Army and Navy also requested 

and received from the Germane a considerable amount of 

technical information regarding the following: 

LS-130 vacuum tubes 

Raytheon 7 25 A (an American tube) 

LD-20 tubes 

*LB~9-N cathode ray tube 
LB- 3 cathode ray tube 

Methods of manufacturing tungsten filaments 

2he following German radar technicians ha,ve been 

sent to Japan and have given the Japanese technical aid 

in manufacturing vacuum tubes: 

Heinrich Foders, Telefunken engineers-arrived Far 
East August/ September 45. 


BrinKer, Gtema Company engineer — arrived Par East 
July/ August 43* 

The following Japanese radar technicians re- 
ceived training in Germany and returned to the Par East; 

Matsui—arrivod July 44 

Sat ake~~ arrived August/ September 43. 
One Janapese vacuum tube technician* scheduled to arrive 
in Germany in the summer of 1944 to study mioro-v/ave 
vacuum tixbes^ was said to have been lost en route. 

to obtain from Germany nsore technicians skilled in the 
latest techniques* The results were not successful* 

in radar development was her failure to keep pace with 
the improved insulation needed for high frequency cables* 
In l l aat s & German radar technician, who, at the time of 
Gei'-many's surrender, was en route to Japan to assist the 
Japanese in their radar and infra-red program, stated 
that the Japanese possessed no high grade insulating 
material for use in radar construction. 

Japanese began negotiations for the manufacturing rights 

The Japanese Army negotiated throughout 1944 

An important factor in Japanese backwardness 

nsulator^.: As early as 1942 the 


for Hescho ceramic insulation material* In June 44, th© 
•Japanese Navy wao pressing for the conclusion of a contract 
for the same firm's high frequency condenser, for which 
some plane apparently already bad been received* It is 
not believed that the contract with Hesoho was ever con- 
cluded and it is thought that the Japanese never acquired 
complete data on ceramic insulation material* Over 400 
high frequency condensers were found in the cargo of the 

In January 45 f a Japanese technician from Fuji 
Electric Company vms receiving practical training at the 
Hescho factory on porcelain insulation for high frequency 
work and v?as thought to have made good px^ogress in acquiring 
the practical technique needed in Japan, A plan by which 
the Navy hoped, in the autumn of 1944,, to send several 
Japanese to Germany for that purpose was abandoned be- 
cause of the difficulty of getting them to Europe* 

Plastic Insulators: Japanese Interest in the 
development of plastic insulators was of much more recent 
date than was the case with ceramic types* It was in the 
autumn of 1944 that the Army began inquiries in Germany 
on the methods used by both Germany and Great Britain 
to polymerize certain hydro-carbon compounds into their 

ultra-ultra short wave insulation for radar. 

In February 45 ? the Japanese hoped to avoid 
having to buy manufacturing rights for plastic insulation 
materials by obtaining the information from I»ti*Farben 
under the Hydrogenation contract ; it is not believed that 
they ever acquired very detailed information or blueprints 
for the process* 

In September 44 the Japanese Aaray requested 
models and drawings of a number of unidentified items 
of ultra-high frequency measuring equipment; it is thought 
that none of the items v/as shipped to Japan* 

According to Feelers * October 44 report on 
Japan* s electronics position^ the. Japanese wore in a 
difficult position with regard to radar tent equipment* 



Small arms 200 
Anti«ai.i*oraft weapons 802 
Guns* howitzers and rocket weapons 205 
Ammunition and explosives 210 
Vehicles 215 

Note: Brief descriptions of the equipment discussed 
in Section IV are contained in TAB J. 





Small arms : 

7,92 mm MG-54: Early in 1943 the Japanese 
Army attempted to aecure manufacturing rights for this 
weapon from Hheimnetail-Boraigt but the German High 
Command opposed the transfer* There ie no evidence 
that prototypes were shipped to Japan., 

7»92 mm M&-42; The Japanese Army was anxious 
to secure the manufacturing rights for this weapon early 
in 1943 and the German Army was willing to grant per- 
miasicn; there is no evidence* however t that a contract 
was over signed* In Juno 43* Army representatives in 
Berlin procured a general outline of Oerman methods of 
manufacturing the and it would seem that at that 

time manufacture of the gun in Japan was contemplated* 

7+9 m M,? Ar 43: Drawings for the 43 pistol 
and ammunition were shipped from Europe in mid-1943 
and may have reached Japan ♦ 

7»9 mm M«P» 44: In September 44 Japanese 
Army representatives in Berlin proposed purchase of the 
manufacturing rights for this pistol. Drawings on film 
were said to have been sent to Japan in 1943* Apparently 

because of the complexity of the equipment and tho 
difficulty of using it on a large scale, ' it eventu^ll* 
was decided that manufacturing rights should not be 

9 mm M«P. 40 : In Karon 43, the German Army 
offered the Japanese Axwy She manufacturing rights for 
thia pistol. It is not known whether a contract for 
manufacturing rights was concluded but. in mid-1943 
drawings for the 40 type pistol and 08 type ammunition 
were shipped from Europe and may have reached Japan by 
the end of the year, 

Breda pistole : The Japanese Army carried on 
extensive negotiations for 20,000 Breda automatic 
pistolst 7.65 and 9 ram, but there is no evidence of 
shipment or acquisition of drawings and manufacturing 
rights* It seems probable that pistols and sub-machine 
guns were Involved but evidence is not definite on 
this point » 

Accessories : Drawings of a German 1942 type 
machine gun mount were shipped to Japan in mid~1943. 

In November 41, the Japanese received considerable 
detail on the Mauser Company method of manufacturing 
rifle stocks from laminated materials* 



4 I 

Anti-aircraft weapon 

SS mm Plain Models of the W tyo;. £B ^::n AA r?m 

were purchased by the Japanese Army x/i Germany in 1942 
and probably shipped to Japan, One '$? type* together 
with ammunition? was shipped from Europe by the end of 
1943 and is also thought to have reached the Empire. 
By July 43* one 58 type AA gun also had been purchased 
and possibly shipped* while negotiations were in progress 
for the type 41* The last mentioned model probably was 
acquired too late for shipment by surface blockade runner. 

typo AA gun specifically excluded rights of reproduction 
in Japan * although Krupp did state that the necessary 
arrangements to this end could be made if Japan so 
desired, Purchase of the gun included data transmission 
apparatus (on carriage equipment) for height* aairouth* 
and semi-automatic fuee setter auxiliary equipment* plus 
specimens of HE ammunition with oO- second time fuse and 
armor piercing HK ammunition with base fuses * 

type 99 80 mm dual purpose' gun is reported by ?/W ! s to 
be based directly on the German 36 and 37 type 88 mm Flak 
and the Japanese version is believed to be a close copy 

The Japanese contract vrith Krupp for the 

It should be noted that the Japanese Army 


of the German models. 

One 88 mm Flak. 3? and ammunition destined for 
Japan was reallocated to the OAF in 1943 when trans- 
portation space was no longer available for shipment to 

IPS mm Flak ? In March 43* rights to 
manufacture the 40/2 type 105 mm anti~airor&ft gun 
were offered to the Japanese Army but there is no 
indication that the contract ever wa$ concluded. By 
that date* however* one 33 type 105 mm anti-aircraft gun, 
together with ammunition* . had been purchased and 
shipped* and a contract for the 39 model had been 
signed* It is known that a 39 model and 43 boxes of 
ammunition purchased by Japan later srere turned back 
to the GAP when shipment to the Far East could not be 

Quick loading apparatus for 10 cm AA gun : 
In January 45* the Navy was negotiating for drawings 
for a quick loading apparatus for a 10 cm Rheinmetall" 
Boreic AA gun to be Bent to Japan by submarine. It is 
not believed that a contract was concluded before the 
end of the European war* 

Anti-aircraft fire control equipesmt; The 

Japanese appear to have been given every opportunity to 
study German anti-aircraft Strategy and taotice and 
Japanese personnel in Germany made a full study of 
German defenses* A microfilm on German AA defense systems* 
scheduled to be sent to Japan in April 45* was nearer 
loaded for shipment* 

Navy and Army were believed to be far behind those of 
Germany, V/hile the Japanese undoubtedly were producing 
efficient AA weapons* they were deficient in the production 
and employment of warning D/F and AA predictor devices * 

to study AA techniques. There ia no evidence that such 
individuals arrived in Europe* Arrangements were made 
in 1944 to have two German AA expert s-^Sandrarfc and 
Schumann- -go to Japan with the general object of 
improving Japanese AA defenses* Sandrart was captured on 
board the U-234; Schumann was captured in Europe after the 
collapse g 

was revealed that the Japanese in 1942 acquired a sample 
of the German Kommandogeiilt 40 and shipped that director 
apparatus by submarine* The Japanese then claimed that 

Japanese. AA defenses and tactics in both the 

Japan planned to eend technicians to Germany 

During interrogation of General Keseler it 


this apparatus was lost in transit and requested that 
a replacement should be provided. The Germans were 
said to have acceded to this request though they were 
doubtful that the Japanese report was correct* General 
Kessler asserted that the Japanese have reproduced the 
KoranandogerSt 40, 

Miscellaneous; In addition to the foregoing, 

Japanese representatives in Germany » in May 44„ reoeived 
descriptive data on the following: 

20 mm {fountain Flak 38 

50 mm Flak 41 
128 mm Flak 40 
128 mm Flak 40 (twin) 

Flak sight 38 
200 cm 40 A Flak searchlight 

20 mm Antitank gun; In March 43, the Germane 

agreed to transfer to Japan manufacturing rights for 
the 28 mm antitank gun, The outcome of that offer is 
not known. 

Z^L SL-S22^£*..SiHB : * n March 43» manufacturing 

rights far thin rocket gun ^ere offered to the Japanese; 
there is no evidence as to Japanese reaction to that offer. 

75 mm Recol ll esa gun (75 ram LG-40) ; Drawi ngs 

for this gun and for 38 type hollo?/ charge and armor 

Guns* howitzers and rocket weapons: 


piercing ammunition were at 

75 mm Aiit lfeank^gun 40; In March 43 * Germany > 
If the Japanese so desired, wae vailing to transfer the 
manufacturing rights for this weapon to Japan* There is 
no information as to tyhether the rights ever were acquired, 
but in mid-1943 drawings of a 75 mm antitank. gun> type 
unspecified* and 1939 and 1940 type armor-piercing 
ammunition were shipped from Europe * 

75 mm Antitank gun 41: In July 43 it was 
reported that the Japanese Army was about to begin 
manufacture of the 75 mm antitank gun 41 and the 
Military Attache wished to reach an agreement with the 
Germans on patent rights* A model of this gun and it& 
breech block— together with samples of 1938 and 1939 
type hollow charge amraunition — and manufacturing plans 
had been presented by the German Amy to the Japanese 
Army in January' 43, This material may well have 
arrived in Japan by the middle of 1945 

Antl tank rifle 41 ; (This weapon cannot be 
clearly indent! fled but it is believed to be the HPS 
B41 taper bore 28/20 Gerlieh weapon*) 

Drawings for a heavy 1941 type antitank rifle* 
parts and 1941 type armor^plercing and explosive 


ammunition were dispatched to Japan* where they may have 
arrived about December 43* 

1 50 nan Howitzer (?SFH 18) ; Manufacturing 
rights for the 150 mm howitzer were offered to the 
Japanese in March 43; there is no indication that a 
contract was signed* The Japanese may have purchased 
a Krupp model in 1942, 

210 mm Krupp SK-58 : One model with ammunition 
was shipped from Germany by March 43. In February 43, 
negotiations were in progress in Berlin for manufac- 
turing rights for a Skoda 210 mm gun, which may have been 
the Krupp model of the Skoda type. There is no evi- 
dence that rights were aoquired by Japan, 

240 mm Howitzer (type not determined, possibly 
S koda) : The German Army offered the Japanese the rights 
to oopy this weapon in February 42, One model and 
ammunition are thought to have been purchased and shipped 
to Japan at that time, 

380 mm Turret gun : In June 44, the Japanese 
Navy was negotiating with Krupp in respect of a Krupp 
380 mm turret gun. At that time plans already had been 
supplied to the Navy, but no contract had eventuated 
because of a disagreement overprice. Captured 



document s imply that a license agreement i'or fchia weapon 

""*' 'i -? v 

may have boon contracted toward, the end of &uly -44 * * 

The Japanese ilrmy and Navy both have shown considerable 
interact In these weapons and the manufacturing right e 
for the Panserfauat v&m presented to the Japanese Army 
in November 44 as a gift from Hitler outside the 
Manufacturing Rights Agreement; manufacturing rights 
for both weapons ware acquired by the Hairy from Hugo 
Schneider by December 44* representatives in 

Germany* by November 44 f also acquired one hundred 
Panaerfaust and two Pansorachreck with manufacturing 
drawings . It is believed that none of this material 
reached Japan* Twenty-four Pan&erfaust and one 
Pans erschreck were found in the car-go of the U-234 vshen 
that submarine surrendered • 

M^lMili" Xn March 45* data on the 
Panzerblits web obtained by Naval representatives in 
Berlin,, There is no further evidence as to Japanese 
acquisition of prototypes or plana of this rocket 

_, jjQ^.elTOrf eg .41 ; As early as March 45 
the German krmj waa willing to transfer manufacturing 



rights for their 41 type 150 ran rocket gun to the 

Japanese Army* but it ia not known whether a contract 

ever was signed. Drawings for the 41 type 150 mm rocket 

gun and ammunition are known to have been shipped from 

Europe in the summer of 1943. In February 45, the 

Japanese Military Attache In Berlin obtained move. 

details on the 150 mm Nsbelwerfer 41 and its ammunition; 

this material was to "be sent by the next submarine to 

leave Europe. There is no indication of shipment. 

Other models of rocket launchers ; It ie 

reported that in February 45, the Japanese Military 

Attache in Berlin was preparing a detailed report on 

German rocket guns and their ammunition for trana- 

mission to Japan by submarine. The weapons in question 

are believed to be the following: 

(i) 210 mm, 280 ram, and 300 mm Kebelwerfer; 

(li) Portable rocket launching rack - 1940 and 1941; 

(iii) Rocket launcher mounted on a truck - 1940; 

(iv) 150 mm rocket launcher mounted on an 
armored car - 1942; and 

(v) Rocket launcher for projectile containing 
propaganda leaflets - 1941. 

Long-range rocket projectile A-4, (V-2) : There 

Is no evidence of official release to the Japanese of 



information concerning the A~4 long-range rocket, In 
fact, the only evidence on the subject indicates that 
Hitler refused to divulge details to the Japanese; any 
knowledge they may have acquired on the weapon can 
only be of a moat general hearsay nature* 

Ammunition and explosives ; 

12,7 mm ammunition : A technical report on. 
and plans for» the methods of producing 12,7 mm ammuni- 
tion used by Deutsche Waffen Maschinen Fabrik, sent to 
Japan in 1943. reportedly were lost en route. Another 
set of the report and plans is believed to have been 
shipped in 1944, and may have reached Tokyo, 

Two million rounds of Breda ammunition were 
purchased from Italy and shipped to Japan in 1943, 

Fuses ; a, Rhelnmetall electric fuse ; The 
Japanese Array first became interested in this fuse in 
June 41, at which time the purchase of manufacturing 
rights was considered; subsequently it was decided 
instead to purchase sample fuses. About July 43, however, 
manufacturing drawings for the Rhelnmetall electric 
fuses had been dispatched and lost en route to Japan, 
implying that rights had been acquired before that 
date. There is no evidence that duplicate documents 


were shipped to* or reached* Japan, 

i> Tavar o Company time fuse ; In 
March 42, Japan cs a Naval representatives in Berlin 
acquired information on the time fuse manufactured 
by the Sv/ias Tavaro Company, Major Kobayashl was said 
to have investigated this fuse and its manufacture in 
1941 and found that, in addition to its use on 
anti-aircraft guns» it was adaptable for bomb use. 
In March 42 Naval representatives in Berlin were 
planning to send a catalogue describing the fuse to 
Tokyo by the next surface blockade runner. There is 
no subsequent information concerning this transaction 
nor of the shipment of drawings or samples, 

o, Thiel time fuse J In May 1942 » the 
Japanese Navy requested detailed information regarding 
the Thiel time fuse. Particulars of machinery, testing 
and mass production were requested; manufacture in 
Japan apparently was contemplated. On 7 May 43» the 
OAF presented free of charge to the Japanese Navy 
manufacturing rights for the Thiel 3/30 time fuse and 
ordered that data required for manufacture* immediately 
be turned over to the Japanese Government, There is no 
information Indicating whether or not manufacturing 



drawings reached Japan, 

&, Proximity fuses : It is not 
believed that the Japanese Army or Navy requested* or 
received* any information from Germany on proximity 
fuses. However* Dr. Otto Scherzer, of the University 
of Llunich and Scientific Chief of the Central High 
Frequency Research Station in Germany, stated that copies 
of all reports which he held had been transmitted to 
the Japanese, These reports were said to have included 
detailed information on "Fox" and all other types of 
German proximity fuses. On the other hand» Professor 
Wagner of Henschel stated that the Japanese had no 
information about proximity fuses. General Kessler, 
when interrogated* stated that samples of proximity 
fusee were on the U-234; examination of the cargo proves 
that this was not true. It is unlikely that Japan had 
any infonnationt other than of a very general nature* 
on German proximity fuses. 

Grenade and mortar shells* 38 and 59 types : 
Drawings and samples of 3d and 39 type grenade, and 
mortar shells were shipped from Europe early in 1943 and 
probably reached Japan by the end of the year. 

Steel shell and cartridge cases : In 1942 the 


Japanese Array acquired the Folte Arniatutfif 

Company's process for manufacturing steel shell and 

cartridge cases. This process t as offered* apparently 
covered 7^9 inn ballt 37 mm antitank and 88 mm high-angle 
field gun ammunition* but* upon Japan 1 a request* German 
50 mm antitank gun ammunition was substituted for the 
37 mm ammunition* It is believed that Japanese 
technicians were trained in the process at the Polte 
Company* but It is net known whether these technicians 
returned to Japan* The necessary blueprints for the 
Polte process and samples of the eases are believed to 
have reached Japan » 

processes for special steels to be used in manufacturing 
cartridge cases — such as the Krupp Company Open Hearth 
process and the Perrital process (see Section VI)* 
In November 43, trial manufacture of steel for 
Japanese cartridge cases was begun at the Krupt> plant 
in Essen* 

for manufacturing steel cases, the Japanese* in July 43# 

proposed purchase of complete equipment for the manufacture 
of 12*7 mm and 20 mm brass oases* It is not known how 

There also have been negotiations for several 

Brass shell cases: In addition to the process 


"■* HMMMD 


far negotiations progressed* 

Steel core bullet a ; In August 43*; the Japanese 
were considering the purchase of the I,G> Farben process 
for manufacturing steel alloy for steel core bullets. 
It is not known whether details of the process or righto 
were acquired, 

Hexogen or RDX explosive ; In the autumn of 
1943, the Japanese were anxious to obtain details of the 
method of manufacturing hexogen* used as an explosive 
in bombs and ammunition. A detailed report is believed 
to have been sent to Japan at that time and a Japanese 
technician inspected a German factory making this product* 

Dl ethylene glycol di nit rate; This material 
is used as an explosive and a propellant. Information 
describing the technique of manufacture is believed to 
have been forwarded to Tokyo, 

Liquid air ; In June 44, the Japanese Navy 
was extremely anxious to obtain the German technique 
for producing a special liquid air explosive used in 
rocket shells. No further details are available. 

Nitroglycerine ; Japanese Army officials 
in Berlin examined in September 44 the Meiesner process 
for manufacturing nitroglycerine and apparently were 



proposing that Japan import technicians from Genn^ny ^ r 
and purchase the ore cess. It appears that Japan h^* 
no interest in the process as no further action appears 
to have been taken * 

Poison gas? The Japanese Army made several 
requests for information on German pel eon gas techniques* 
but no information was supplied* In October 44* there 
was a suggestion that technicians be exchanged between 
the two countries for study of poison gas; nothing ever 
came of the proposal * Two light gas masks were shipped 
from Europe by submarine in June 44, 


PzKw III i In Kay 41. details of this tank 
were obtained by Japanese Army representatives in 
Berlin* Subsequently Hitler authorized the sale of 
two model s f one xvlth a long 50 mm and the other with 
a short 75 mm gun. These were shipped from Europe 
by March 43 and may have reached Japan* ■ Manufacturing 
rights are believed to have been acqyired by the 
Japanese Army* but* as of May 44, there was evidence 
that the Japanese were not planning to proceed with 

PzKw IV : Two specimens of PzKw IV/P2 tank* 


mounting a 40 type 75 antitank gun* Were purchase d 
and shipped to Japan by March 43. Manufacturing rights 
are thought to have been procured* but as of May 44 » 
the Japanese apparently had decided not to put this 
tank into production, 

P aXw V (Pant her) j A model of the Panther tank 
was purchased in September 43 — too late for shipment to 
Japan* Japanese officers attached to the German Army 
received instruction in its employment. There is 
evidence that the Panther tank (or a close copy) was 
being made in Japan* although there is no indication of 
Japanese purchase of appropriate manufacturing rights 
or drawings. 

PgKw VI (Tiger) t A model of the Ti^er tank 
also was purchased In September 43* Interrogation of 
Kurt Arnholdt* chief tank test engineer for Henschel & 
Sohn, revealed that » about September 43, four Japanese 
officers visited Arnholdt at a tank testing and proving 
ground. They were especially interested in Tiger tanks 
which had been modified to penult for&inc streams up to 
five meters in depth, Arnholdt believed that the German 
High Command already had furnished the Japanese with 
microfilms of the Tiger I and II tanks • and possibly 



with blueprint s* 

Armored oars: In February 42* one BShmlseh- 
K&rische Maschinen Fabrik armored combat oar was offered 
to the Japanese* with rights to copy if required. There 
is no indication that models o~ drawings ever reached 
Japan • 

Arthur Tlx* President of Ffenomog AG* Hanover* 
stated that in 1943 hie company had been instructed to 
send full drawings of their 3-ton half track armored car 
to Japan via the Japanese Embassy* It is not known 
whether those drawings actually reached Japan* 

A captured letter froni the files of Demag A 8 G« 
states that* on 13 April 43# the Japanese Army signed 
a contract with Demag for the purchase of four one- ton 
armored troop carrying vehlolest type D 7 P (special 
motor vehicle 250) ♦ The contract was for a straight 
purchase and did not involve manufacturing rights or 
rights to copy f or in any way reproduce* the vehicles 
in Japan* 

Motor vehicles : In November 43 the Henschel 
Company proposed the establishment of a Joint German- 
Japanese enterprise to manufacture motor vehlclds in 
Japan* Very little detail is available but apparently 



l;iie plan envisaged a monthly production" of 1*000'- 1,500 
4th ton tvuoks by collaboration between Hensehel and 
sorae unnamed Japanese industrialist,* The Japanese 
appear to have been interested in the proposal and 
Inquired as to the general attitude of the German 
Government on this question and the possibility of 
Joint German-Japanese production of military materiel 
apart from vehicles. 

Charcoal burning automobiles : Resulting 
apparently from dissatisfaction with their own equip- 
ment, the Japanese requested details and drawings of 
German gas producers* No detail is available as to the 
outcome of the negotiations* 







Optical glass * 

The Japanese have had close association with 
Germany on optloal glass for many years ♦ Carl Zeiss has 
an, agency in Tokyo, and apart from large imports by this firm, 
the Japanese also have bought from other German firms* 
notably Schott and Lelts. 

slve purchases were made through ordinary commercial 
channels; concurrently, the Army was buying and shipping 
for specific military uses during 1942-43, With the 
end of surface blockade running in the spring of 1943, 
the familiar pattern of Japanese purchasing policy on a 
new basis was reproduced in purchases of optical material* 
Through 1944 the Army and Navy took charge to an 
increasing degree, although Mitsubishi continued to 
negotiate for f and collect data on, glass manufacturing 
techniques. Optical glass is particularly suitable for 
submarine oargo and apparently retained a high priority 
for transport by Japanese and German submarines. 

The Japanese • in the late stages of the European 
war t stowed interest in two closely related types of 

In the days of surface blockade running extan- 


special glass— Certal and Neophane. As the Germane 
are believed to have provided data on the selective ab- 
sorption coefficients of these materials in the visible 
spectrum, the Japanese apparently required these 
materials for some form of color filtering, possibly 
to produce more natural effects in aerial photography. 

The Japanese produced optical glass themselves 
hut in 1944 there was strong evidence that Japan was 
In short supply of such material. Continued Japanese 
purchases and shipments when space was at a premium 
bears this out, since there was no indication that 
Glass shipments had been for prototype use. A little 
more light on the unsatisfactory state of home 
production is afforded by the inspection by Mitsubishi 
representatives of the Zeiss plant. That inspection 
revealed speoially detailed Japanese interest in the 
manufacture of crucibles for use in making optical glass. 
Furthermore, the Japanese apparently did not require from 
Europe raw materials for optical f^lass production. 

Towards the end of the war, the Japanese in 
Germany were negotiating for still closer collaboration 
with Zeiss, The acquisition of special processes was In 
question j it is not possible from avilable evidence to 



specify details, nor tc infer to what extent Zeiss, op 
other German technicians actually were to supervise 
production in Japan. It would appear that the Zeiss 
process for increasing the final penetrability of glass 
was to be substituted for the Leitz process previously 
in use by the Japanese Kavy, but not considered to be 
as pood as the Zeiss or Schott methods. 

As an indication of* the quantity of glass which 
the Japanese obtained from Germany, Zei3s~Jena shipments 
have been ascertained from German records in the following 

October 3? to September 38 730,4 tone 
October 38 to September 39 574.7 tons 
October 39 to September 40 256,6 tons 
October 40 to Sent ember 41 1,153.3 tons 
October 41 to September 42 905.3 tons 
October 42 to September 43 672.3 tons 
October 43 to September 44 1,490,9 tons 

The above tonnages represent sales ex-Jena; 

sales from other' £Las3 makers in Germany ar« believed 

to be of negligible quantity. 




... ^Qi^-r ^jt^^ Aerials 


Manufacturing processes 224 

Aircraft 224 

Fuels 251 

Iron and steel 256 

Aluminum 238 

ivsi sce.llan.~oue 239 

Raw materials: special manufactured- materials 242 


Manufacturing processes : 

& Henschel Company mass production technique 
for alroraft : In October 44, the Japanese Navy became 
interested in the Henschel Company's method for the mass 
production of aircraft— used in Germany by Dorrier and 
Helnkel as well as Henschel—and detailed reports of 
the process were compiled by Navy technicians * 

In November, Naval representatives in Berlin 
began negotiations to buy the manufacturing rights for 
the process and to arrange to send an engineer and the 
necessary drawings to Japan. Later that month, films 
describing the production of spars for the M£«109 and 
ME-410 and the production of wings for the MK-109 were 
delivered to Japanese representatives in Germany. In 
January 45, manufacturing rights for the Henschel process 
were released to the Japanese Air Force* Drawings and 
films were acquired too late for shipment to Japan and 
negotiations for a Henschel engineer to go to Japan never 
were concluded. Pohl, a Henschel Company engineer 
already in Japan, is reported to have a general knowledge 



of the process. . 

b* Helnkel Company, techniques ; In October 
42, Japanese Naval authorities were anxious to arrange 
for the construction of an aircraft factory in the Par 
East in collaboration with the Helnkel Company; Hitachi 
Aircraft Company was to be the opposite party in Japan. 
Hitachi was scheduled to build the factory., while machinery, 
machine tools and production technique would be contributed 
by Helnkel. It is not believed that the plan ever 

c. Junkers technique 8 : In September 41, 
negotiations were begun between Junkers and the Manohu 
Aircraft Company for the conclusion of an agreement where- 
by Junkers would supbly to the Japanese firm aircraft, 
machine tools, Jumo-211 engines, manufacturing tech- 
niques and technicians, and, in return, would receive a 
capital interest in Ivianchu Aircraft Company. The 
Japanese Government was anxious to promote the 
enterprise in order to procure German production skill 
and equipment; It is not known, however-; whether the 
agreement ever was concluded. 

Although there is no evidence of a tie-up 
between Manchu Aircraft and Kawasaki Aircraft , the 

Junkera Company appears to have 

a similar joint enterprise with Kawasaki. Information 
on that project le Incomplete, but Kawasaki planned to 
manufacture Junkers alroraft and engines and Junkers 
was to contribute manufacturing rights and the necessary 
teohnlcal aid and equipment. Difficulties in transporta- 
tion of personnel and equipment from Europe to the Far 
East interfered with realization of the plan. The 
scheme appeared to cover a wide field of mass produc- 
tion techniques, prototypes, and equipment and may have 
Included Junkers, Messerschmitt and Hensohel prooeduree 
in engine and aircraft manufaoture. 

aircraft t Negotiations were begun by the Japanese Army 
in July 1944 to secure plans and manufacturing rights 
for machine tools for aircraft manufacture. At that 
tine Army representatives In Berlin had begun negotia- 
tions for manufacturing rights for certain machines, 
and was preparing to negotiate for the rights to other 
German machine tools. There is no further information 
on the outcome of these negotiations. 

It has additionally been established that prior 
to the outbreak of the German-Russian war a large quantity 

Machine tools for the mass production of 



of machine tool and heavy industrial equipment was 
supplied by the Germ&ns to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria, 
thie material having been transferred by the Trans- 
Siberian Railwayc (TAB N provides details on the 
materiel known to have been transferred by this means.) 

J* tlffht alloy castings fo r Daimler-Ben z 
motors (aircraft and marine) i In August 44 , the 
Japanese Army requested that a Oerman technician 
skilled in the production of large, li$tit alloy castings 
for Daimler Bens engines, be sent to Japan. At that 
time detailed explanations and photographs of the 
technique and equipment used in the large-scale produc- 
tion of cylinder blocks and crank housings also were 


required. In September it appeared impossible to secure 
Gterman technicians because of their scarcity in Germany 
and the disorganization of the industry as a result of 
air attacks. However, two engineers from the Furukawa 
Company and one engineer from Sumitomo, who reached the 
Far East during 1944, are thought to have received 
technical training in this field in Germany and may have 
furnished valuable information to the Japanese. There 
is no information as to whether the drawings and photo- 
graphs requested in August were sent to Japan. In 


January 45, the Japanese Array was apparently anxious 
that negotiations for the manufacturing s'lghte for 
light alloy castings be stepped up, but it is not 
thought that the rights were acquired. 

£• Glessharz : In April 45, Japanese Naval 
representatives in Berlin obtained, information on the 
production of Giesaharz, a castable resin suitable for 
making moulds used in processing light alloys for air- 
craft fuselages. On 11 April 45 manufacturing rights 
for Oiessharz were released to the Japanese. 

£• Ruhrstahl steel casting method : In June 
41, the Japanese Army and Navy both initiated negotia- 
tions for the Ruhrstahl steel casting method. The Army 
planned to have the Kobe Steel Works conclude an agree- 
ment with Ruhrstahl, while the Navy was to have 
Hitachi Manufacturing Company negotiate with Ruhrstahl. 
Evidence points to the discontinuance of these negotia- 

jh. Wooden aircraft : The Japanese Army and 
Navy have evidenced considerable interest in German 
methods of manufacturing wooden aircraft and their 
Attaches in Berlin have Investigated or purchased the 
following processes: 

pressing process developed by Dynamit A.Gk was 
releaser! to Japan « 

(it) In September 44, the Japanese Naval 
representatives in Berlin visited one of the 
MssserBohmitt plants and studied the manufacture 
and use of Tego film, an adhesive used in the 
manufacture of wooden aircraft, Construction of 
the wooden parte of the ME-163 B also was studied. 

(iii) In February 45, the Japanese 
Army Indicated their wish to purchase manufacturing 
rights for Kaulitf lime- *a urea resin composition 
sheet used as a bonding material for plywood and 
laminated material of wooden aircraft— in order to 
acquire the necessary detail on the material and its 
applications* The contract wa& not concluded, 

(lv) k contract was conluded in Feb- 
ruary 45 betv/een the Japanese Navy and Schwablsohe 
Formholz, Ulm, for the transfer of patent rights 
for the Bells process for construction of aircraft 
from plywood. This process was developed jointly 
by the firm Erwin Behr* Wendlington, and Messer- 
schmltt, and served the strengthening of wood by mould- 


ing of veneer stripe glued ftit^p$$| j^QIu 

employment of the eights was to bo for the duration 

of the war only, 

As one of the terms of the contract, the 

following documents were delivered to Japanese 

representatives in ftermany In Deo ember 44 J 

a, Tan production machine drawings and 
drawings of machine parts, 

b* Two manuals on production machine a. 

c. Two delivery regulations, 

cL *Two lists of essential machinery and 
equipment required for production. 

An arrangement existed for the training 
of Japanese technical personnel and Schwabische 
Formholz apparently v;ere willing to supply 
German specialists to install the process in 
Japan* A Serroan P/W has stated that a commission 
of Japanese was trained in the Belie process at 

Japanese interest in the Bells process 
arose as a result of their interest in manufactur- 
ing the ME-21Q, ME -163 and ME-262 and their 
inability to produce special resilient steel sheet 
for parts of aircraft fuselages. 

Berlin acquired information on initial development 
T/ork on Homo gen— a fiber with binder—and 
Lignogen— a fiber without binder— for use in 
the manufacture of fuselages of wooden aircraft. 
Manufacturing rights for Homogen and Lignogen were 
released to the Japanese Navy on 20 April 45. 

(vi) Japanese in Germany also have 
studied the British Mosquito; parts and drawings 
were made available to theni but the shipment, of 
part 8 at least, appears to have been lost en route. 

Fuels ; 

a. I.Ck Farben hydroge nation process: Nego- 
tlonatlons for the 1.0. Farben hydrogenation process were 
begun by the Japanese Army in 1941, but it was not until 
January 1945 that the contract finally was signed. The 
long delay was due principally to Japanese reluctance to 
pay the price demanded by I.0-. Farben and that company's 
unwillingness to transfer patent rights which were 
legally held by the International Hydrogenation Patents 
Company (IHP) at The Hague. 

Throughout the war strenuous negotiations were 
also carried on by the Japanese Army for the special 

machinery necessary for the hydrogenation process, but 
no deliveries were made because German industry was too 
busy with home ordure. 

LGr Far-hen was to make available to the Japanese Army 
patent rights and technical aid regarding methods, 
equipment and catalysts for the hydrogo nation process 
as far as these were necessary for the operation of 
hydrogenation plants in the Far East, It is thought 
that the agreement applied to Japan, Manchuria and China, 
and rights transferred by included its own and 

those received from thirl parties, including IRP. 

of the agreement; is understood to include the processes 
by which coal, hrosm coal, coal tare, lignite, peat, 
wood waste and petroleum are used to manufacture the 
following products by the introduction of hydrogen or a 
hydrogen compound; aviation gaeoline, methane and other 
hydrocarbon gases, light oils, heavy oils, lubricants 
and paraffin {wax?). 

On 15 January 45, a laboratory \?as set up by * 
I«G. Farben at Heidelberg to construct and experiment 

Under the terms of the hydrogenation agreement; 

The hydrogenation process within the meaning 


with an apparatus designed to produce aviation gaetfrfna 
from various types of Manchurianooal. The experiments 
were delayed by last-minute changes in Japanese ideas 
concerning raw materials, and it is believed that little 
was accomplished by the end of the European war* 

Arrangements were made by Mitsubishi to pur~ 
ohaee blueprints and manufacturing rights for various 
types of manufacturing equipment from German firms, but 
the rapid development in the military situation prevented 
the Japanese from receiving those plans and drawings. 
Several Japanese technicians-- Fukao, Kinoshita, Mikaxnl-* 
were trained at I.Gr. Farben plants before the Allied troops 
entered Leverkusen, but none of those technicians returned 
to Japan, nor were any German technicians sent to the 
Far East. Lt. Col. Yoshida, who arrived in Singapore in 
July 44, is believed to have had some knowledge of the 
I. Or. process and to have had drawings in his possession, 
but, inasmuch as he left Europe before the agreement was 
signed, it is not believed that Farben had released 

detailed drawings at that time. I.G-. has for many 
years maintained an office in Japan, and the Japanese 
may have obtained from this source a small amount of 
assistance in improving hydrogenation plants already 



existing in the Far East 

b. Lub ricating oils : Various processes 

of manufacturing lubricating oil— the Ruhrchemie and 
Voltol methods in particular— were examined by Japanese 
representatives in Germany* The Voltol process consists 
of the eleotrical polymerization of fatty oils, commonly 
rape seed. 

consideration ?/as given to methods of catalytic cracking 
for the production of gasoline and details were obtained 
of an iron catalyzer oven* A Japanese fuel expert now 
in Japan, Lt„ Col* Hanaoka. is thought to have received 
training at the Ruhrchemie plant . 

between Ruhrohemie and Mitsui in respect to production 
of 12,000 tons of lubricants per annum at Hokkaido . 
Jlnzo 3eklyu, and plans for the necessary plant were 
provided* The process was to employ soft cracking of 
soft wax and low temperature polymerization of Fischer 
feed stock comprised of either 200/3200 Diesel cut or 
soft wax* The plant Is thought to have been operating 
in 1942, 

In connection with the Ruhrchemie process 

A contract is known to have been signed in 1940 

c. Solid petroleum fuels : In July 43, 



Japanese Army representatives in France *tiopQ\ighly ] 
investigated a French process Tor solidifying petroleum. 
Negotiations for the process continued until September 44, 
but a contract had not been concluded at the time of 
the liberation of France* The Germane are thought to 
have acquired the French process. In which case this 
approach may have been open to the Japanese even after 
the fall of France. 

The process can be applied to gasoline, heavy 
oils, light oils, kerosene, chloroform and paraffin and 
its advantage lies in ease of packing and storage. The 
product can be transported in wooden cases and only 
needs pressing to extract the original oil* 

d. Alcohols ; Between May and July 42 , the 
Japanese made various Inquiries in Germany as to 
German practice in the production of alcohol! 
particularly Butanol, Iso-Propanol and the conversion 
of Iso-Butanol to Iso-Octane. Further inquiry covered 
the synthesis of cai-bon monoxide and hydrogen for 
production of Iso-Butanol. Orders were placed in 
Germany for equipment required in the manufacture of 
Butanol and Iso-Butanol for conversion to Iso-Octane. 

Subsequently ? the Japanese appear to have 
lost Interest in German practice, probably since Japan 1 s 

independent development in the production of alcohol from 

Lurgl Jlqw tew^grature carbonlaat i o?LJt:igjjMg * 

In 1942, Lurgi transferred to the Japanese 
patent right s and three sets of drawings fop their 
low temperature carbonization furnace; those drawings 
undoubtedly reached Tokyc. 

X ron , and ate el ; 

Sinter irons The Japanese have examined 
in detail the process of using sinter iron as material 
for the rotating bands of shells and its other uses, 
such as for self -lubricating abaft and axial bearings* 
The advantage in the use of steel so manufactured lies 
in the economy in use of copper, or other material in 
short supply, which sinter .iron can replace. It appears 
that the Japanese eventually decided not to proceed with 
negotiations to purchase manufacturing rights; it seems 
possible > however—- and in fact there is some evidence 
to support the suggest ion— that in connection with their 
investigation of sinter iron the Japanese also acquired 
information on iron powder for high frequency purposes. 

b. Krupp open .hear th method for ste el cartridge 
oases ; Detailed information wm given to the Japanese in 

^ -236- 


etc. * v;ae successful 

December 45 on the equipment; used In the process and 
the composition of the pig iron and of the different 
grades of finished steels needed for various types of 
ammunition. The contract for manufacturing rights 
had not been concluded by June 44 , although by that date 
Japanese representatives in Germany had received 
manufacturing drawings. Although there is no indication 
that such drawings ever were shipped, it is possible that 
they reached Tokyo before the cessation of hostilities * 

£• Ferrltal process from Italy ; In 1942-43 
the Japanese Army was considering the purchase of 
rights to manufacture an Italian alloy steel known as 
Ferrital. This steel was designed as a substitute for 
oepper, brass, etc*, for use in small arms ammunition 
and cartridge cases* It is not known whether a contract 
for the manufacturing rights ever was concluded, but 
samples of the material are thought to have reached 
Japan* The extent of Japan 11 s knowledge of the process 
is difficult to determine- but from the fact that they 
negotiated for small lots from Italy in 1943-44 it might 
be assumed that they were reasonably confident of their 
ability to produce that alloy, 

de Steel tube rolling mills ; Beginning late 
in 1942 the Japanese negotiated, through Mitsui, for the 


purchase of Stiefel and Pilger stee, 

plants for Sumitomo. In late 1944 the orders were 
cancelled because of ^;he transportation situation and 
the destruction of manufacturing plants of M. F. Meer A.G* 
In February of this year, however, Japanese Naval 
representatives in Berlin were proposing that manufacturing 
righto and drawings for the Pilger Mill be acquired* Xt 
Is not; known whether a contract was signedc 

were negotiating for technical help from Germany in the 
construction of simplified coke ovens* The Japanese 
attempted to apply the s&rae principles of simplification 
to Otto coke ovens in Anshan as were used in ovens of 
Herdt construction in Germany, This is believed to have 
been prompted by the high susceptibility of coke ovens 
to bomb damage s,nd the relatively long time and high 
degree of skill required to build or rebuild those of 
usual construction* 


way in May 43 for the granting of patent rights to 
Japanese Interests for the Seailles process of alunlna 
manufacture which was being used in Germany* The 

.§* Coke ovens i In late 1944 the Japanese 

a» Seailles process : Negotiations were under 


process permits the manufacture of alumina from colliery 
wastes and limestone, and can be employed in cement works. 
It requires, however, a complicated and large plant and 
yields -a snail scale output* it Is understandable that 
Japan wanted to use her surplus cement capacity and ensure 
any source of supply of aluminum not dependent upon im- 
ports of bauxite from the Southern Regions and Mandated 
islands* There is no information as to whether Japan 
acquired rights to the process from Germany, 

b. Oaproii l Company process; In September 44, 
Japanese Naval representatives in Italy investigated the 
Caproni process for manufacturing aluminum from volcanic 
@sh. It is not known whether designs, plana and drawings 
were acquired* 


a. Magnesium: In June and July 43, Japanese 
Army representatives in Berlin investigated the methods 
than being used in producing magnesium in 0-ermany, They 
were in favor of purchasing the Farben process but 

there is no evidence of further negotiations* 

32 ♦ Rubber; Following negotiations with Mitsui 
in October 42, the Germans agreed to make available 
the Farben process for the manufacture of synthetic 

rubber (Buna) , The Japanese Array proposed oivilian manu- 
facture by Mitsui or its affiliates end the plan called 
for a plant of 9,400 metric tons per annum capacity. 
Drawings, technical oooperation and machinery were to 
be provided by I.Ck Farben. It is believed that negotia- 
tions were not completed. 

to have acquired patent rights for an "airtight vaouum 
system" carbide manufacturing plant from Germany in 1942, 
but plans are not thought to have reached Japan. 

Tokal Denkyoku Seizo K.K., Tokyo, concluded. an agreement 
with a German firm for a license to operate roasting 
furnaces for manufacturing oarbon electrodes in Japan 
and Manchuria. Some drawings for these furnaces already 
had been reoelved in Japan by the previous September and 
plans were made for an engineer from the Oerraan firm to 
instruct the Japanese in furnace construction and opera- 
tion. The remainder of the drawings were scheduled for 
delivery in March 44„ 

Japanese technicians were trained in Germany in 
cloth manufacture in 1942; five technicians with a 

c. Carbide : The Japanese Army is believed 

d. Carbon eleotrodes : In November 43, 

e. "Cloth? There is some evidence that 


knowledge of German technique are be.'.:! c / j-."'. o icve 
reached Japan. 

In February 45, the Japanese Navy was con- 
sidering the purchase from I.G. Farben of manufacturing 
right 8 for a special material for the garments of 
personnel working on the ME-163. Since T-Stoff-.- -con- 
centrated hydrogen peroxide— damaged regular types of 
olothing, I. G. developed a product known as PG, a 
cloth coated with rubber material and other chemioals. 
In order to learn the details of this material from I.G. , 
Japan was required to purchase the manufacturing rights* 
It is not known whether or not an agreement was concluded. 

f . Rasohlg process : The Japanese Government 
in June 43 Initiated inquiry through Mitsui with a view 
to obtaining rights to the Rasohlg process for oatalytlo 
conversion of benzene to phenol. The Germans apparently 
were willing to supply drawings and equipment for the 
experimental plant. 

It nay be assumed that the Japanese were inter- 
ested in the Raschlg process as a souroe of picric aoid 
(tri-nitro-phenol for manufacture of high explosives) 
from ooal as a raw material. 

The latest information on the negotiations— as 



of January 44— Indicated that they were not progressing 
favorably and were unlikely to be successful. 

Raw raterlal and special manufactured materials : 

Considerable quantities of raw and manufactured 
materials were purchased by the Japanese in Europe prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the 
Soviet Union and were transported to the Far East via 
the Trans-Siberian Railway.* Thereafter, the Japanese 
were foroed to rely upon surface vessels for the 
transport of goods between Europe and the Far East and 
a wide variety of commodities was imported by this means. 
Finally, in 1944-45, when trade was confined to sub- 
marine blockade running, certain raw and manufactured 
materials continued to move from Europe to the Far East. 
Their high priority makes this class of goods worth 
mentioning briefly. 

5. Mercury : Approximately 1,500 tons of 
mercury were purchased by the Japanese in Italy from 
1942 to the time of the Italian oollapse, and this 
commodity held the highest priority for shipment to 
Japan by submarine. Information on shipments during 

*A list of those commodities appears as TAB N, 



the period of surface blockade running is fragmentary, 
but successful shipments are believed to have amounted 
to 141 tons; sinkings may have totalled 119 tons. 
Approximately 520 tons of mercury ere thought to have 
been shipped in numerous submarines from Europe since 
the summer of 1943 with a known loss of over- half of 
that amount. 

be Special steel; In the latter part of 
1942 the Japanese placed an order in Germany for 
10,000 tons of alloy steel to be produced over a period 
of ten to twelve months and to be used in the manufacture 
of aircraft engines. 

A considerable quantity of the original 10,000 
ton order remained to be shipped after surface blockade- 
running had ended. A few tons of special steel in bars 
were carried in the keels of the submarines which ran the 
blockade in 1943-44* Total arrivals are not known, but 
are believed to be small, Inasmuch as several shipments 
were sunk en route to Japan, lost at Bordeaux or damaged 
by bombing, and large quantities are thought to have been 
lent back to the Germans « 

o* Aluminum : In the summer of 1943, before 
the final abandonment of surface blockade^running, a 



very high shipping priority v/a^ given to 6,000 tons or 
aluminum for the Japanese Army and. Kavy in equal share cu 
The reason for this urgency has never been explained, 
but falling other evidence it 1b assumed that a special 
grade of purity waa desired. 

Some aluminum was shipped from Europe on 
Italian submarines in the summer of 1943 and small 
quantities of aluminum in hars occupied valuable 
cargo space of German operational submarines leaving 
Kurope for the Far East since the -summer of 1944. 

dL Lead; Early in 194 S the Japanese completed 
a secret purchase in Spain of 1,000 tons of lead, which 
had all been transported to Germany by November 43, In 
June 44* arrangements were made to ship approximately 
350 tons of thie lead to Japan by German submarine and 
it is fool laved that shipments reached that figure * Of 
the amount shipped, at least half waa probably sunk 
en route, 

e* Platinum: The purchase of platinum in 
Europe was controlled from Berlin by the Japanese Army 
authorities but the materia], itself vrae almost entirely 
obtained in Portugal < The exact amounts obtained are not 
known* Shipments by submarine are thought to have amounted 

to at least 26 grams, of which about hal:* probably was 
lost; since platinum Is easy to smuggle, the traffic was 
never fully recorded. The assoc£ated preoloue metals, 
iridium and rhodium, also are believed to have been 
bought in smaller quantities. 

the se were closely parallel to those for platinum. Some 
shipments and losses are known but, as with platinum, 
total acquisitions are not known. Diamond dies are 
believed to have retained priority for submarine ship- 
ment up to the end of the European war. 

Japanese bought considerable amounts of ethylene 
dibromlde. It is thought that their own production, 
scaled to their output of tetra-ethyl-lead for aviation 
fuels, eventually was adequately developed. 

Germany in former years but the substances which retained 
priority for more recent submarine shipment seem to have 
been confined to metallic ziroonium, metallic lithium 
and neon gae. 

Ball bearings, steel balls, and piano wire ; 
The Japanese bought ball bearings in Germany all through 

£. Industrial diamonds ? Negotiations for 

£* Industrial chemicals : Up to 1943 the 

Numerous chemical produots were brought in 


the war, but the chief source of their European supply 
was Sweden, The Swedish firm S.K«F, had branches in 
Japan proper and in Manchuria; it is thought- however, 
that imports on a commercial level were not large 
during the war- Many thousands of balls and finished 
bearings of different sizes were shipped by submarine and 
It is possible that the Trans-Siberian Railway also was 
used on a smaller scale for this traffic. Piano wire for 
use in aircraft ?/as bought in Sweden but there is no 
evidence of shipments toward the end of the war a 

Steel balls of diameters from 3 to 16 mm re* 
tained a priority for shipment during recent months, 

1. Technical books, journals, etc, : The 
Japanese constantly have expended time and morey in 
acquiring in Europe and forwarding to Japan certain 
books and Journals of a scientific and technical 
nature; American and British publications figured 
largely therein. At one time physical and chemical 
text books were bought in Switzerland. 

J. Special synthetic materials i The Japanese 
acquired information in varying degrees of detail regard- 
inga number of synthetic products which had been 
developed by the Germans for special applications. In 



most caoes- simple descriptions of the proauaT'^ 
were sufficient for Japan to produce the material, while, 
for more complicated material, methods of production 
were described or demonstrated. 

Examples of these special materials are; 
Igetex Synthetic rubber cloth produced from ingelit 

manufactured by 1*0. Parben. 
Vinidol Polyvinyl chloride, an anti-eorrodal material 

for lining ammonia tanks in production of 

hydrogen peroxide* 
Oppanol Lining material for retorts for production of 

hydrogen peroxide* 
Mipram 11 Curtain" used in preparation of hydrogen 

peroxide catalyst lf D86 M . 
Vinnol Synthetic rubber used in preparation of 

hydrogen peroxide* 
Klingehit Asbestos packing used with fr Z fl material, 
Woltopren Low density plastic produced by Dynamit AG* 
Dynal Phenol treated wood fiber used in combination 

with Moltopren for trim tabs of FV/-190, FW-189, 

TA-15& aircraft, 




Surface re seal* 

a. Successful 

b, Unsuccessful 

a. Successful 

b, Unsuccessful 



a. flrwt Seaaon July J.34.1- Hay *P42 

Tonng^e (grt) pepartttre mi Arrival in Cargo 

1 . Portland 

2. Rio Grande 

3 . Regeasburg 

4. Tannenfeie 

5 . Dresden 




Oct 41 - Jan 42 

Oct 41 - Jan 42 
Feb 4? - July 42 
Mar 42 ~ July 42 

Mar 42 - June 4? 

DynaKO & and 
electric power 
plant equipment, 

Iron and steel. 

' Iron and eteel . 

Iron and steel 

Iron and eteel 
Aircraft parts. 

b. Second. Seawn Sept 43 Apr 43 
1. Weeerland 6,528 

2. Brake (tanker) 9,925 

Sept 42 - Jan 43 

Sept 42 ~ Dec 42 


Machinery and 
Hydraulic tube of 
large dimension. 

941 15 cm shells 
60 round 8 of 
15 cm tracer 
960 15 cm cartridges 
6,000 3.7 cm shells 
4 t 803 rounds 2 cm 

13,500 rounds machine 
gun ammunition, 
fuses, etc. 




6. ?ietro Orseolo 6,344 
6. Burgenlfiad ? t S20 

8. Kio Grande 

9. Qsorno 

10; Alsterufer 






Ho record I 

Sept 42 - Bsc 42 
Sm>t 42 ~ Hov 42 

Oct 42 
Oct 42 

Dec 12 

Oct 42 - Dec 42 
Oct 4R - Sec 42 

Mar 43 « Hay 43 

Mar 43 - May 43 

Arimnition, guns* 
aircraft, aviation 

Mo record. 

Machinery for 
hydro-elect ric 
pin nt; aircraft 

Ho record. 

Machine p&rts, 
heavy jnachi nery f 

Aircraft, Aircraft 
engines, sine 
sheeting, mercury, 
weapons and 

Weapons, ammunition 
aluuimurt, optical 
glass, piano vire ( 
special steel, 
aircraft engines. 

a. I 


X. Slaa ^ssbcrgor 6 .103 Sov 42 - Damaged, Ho record. 

rA\t b^ok. 

2- Spichera (tanker) S,323 

3- Axmeliese 

4. Oortellaso 

5. German! a 

8. Portland 

7. Himalaya 

5 t l?3 


Hov 42 « Damaged, 
put bncfc. 

Hov 42 - Scuttled 
same month, 

Soy 42 ~ Scuttled 
same month. 

Nov 42 - Scuttled 

Dec 42 

Feb 43 - Sunk 
Apr 43 

M&r and April 43 ~ 
Daamged, put 

back . 


Dy£a f bicycle parte, 
piano wire, 

600 tens hydro- 
turbo machinery. 

No record* 

Hydro-electric plant, 
100 x 50 litre druxis of 
ethylene dibroside 
(used for prepsra- 
tion of tetra ethyl 
lead) , nercury, 
aircraft engines. 

Small arme, 
amiitun i t i on t f u ee lage 
for German aircraft 
(tyr>e unknown) . 


a. 1242 

Hone recorded. 

D ex?ftrtttTc flal Arrival 


b. iaia 

1. U-180 

2. U-178 

3- U-511 

(M*rco Polo I) 

4* UiT-23 


5. UIT-P4 


6. tUT-25 

?♦ U-168 

8. 1-8 

9. U-1062 

Feb 43 - July 43 

hpr 43 ? » Aug 43 
Apr 43 - Aug 43 

M^iy 43 - Aug 43 
Hay 43 - July 43 
June 43 - Aug 43 

June 43 - Hot 43 
Oct 43 - Dec 43 
Dec 43 - Apr 44 

Rendezvoused April with Japanese 
submarine and transferred its 
cargo of ammunition, drawings 
and weapons. 

Ho record. 
Technicians ♦ 

Aluminum, ammunition, machinery , 
steel for aircrpjft engines, roller 

Bomb sights, ammunition, ball 
bearings, steel for aircraft 
engines, aluminum, ammunition. 

Mercury, ball bearings, steel 
for aircraft engines, aluminum, 

Foders - Telefunken engineer. 
Sat&ke - Japanese technician. 

Ho record. 

Ho record. 

Bo record v 


1. U-181 

2. U-196 

PeTrartiire <md Arrival 

Mar 44 - Aug 44 
Mar 44 - Aug 


Ho record. 
No record. 

Other submarines which are thought to have "been in the Far East in 
1943-1944 end probably made the voyage sometime during thnt period? 







U-861 . 



1. 1-20 

Left Aug 42 - Sunk off 
Singapore Oct 42. 

1 Sete Gerat 
1 S-Anlnge, 
hydrophones, weapons 
and drawings. 

b. isia 

1. Ta*zoli 

2. Bflrbarigo 

3. Cagni 

Left May 43 - Sunk. 

Left June 43 - Sunk. 

Left June 43 «• Surrendered 
Sept 43. 

Ho record. 
Steel, aluminum. 
Ho record. 



1. V-1224 

Polo II) 

2. U-864 

Left H*T 44 
May 44. 

Left Feb 44 
Bergen . 

- Sunk In 

- Sank off 

3. U-234 

Left Kar 44 - Surrendered 
to U.S. Jleet off 
Newfoundland Hay 44. 

Ho record. 

Plans and parte for MS-163 
and M3S-262, drawings for 
new German aircraft. 
Chlingeneperg « Measerschmitt 

Schomeruo - Measerschmitt 

engineer . 

Plans for installation to 
manufacture 500 MS- 262 1 a 
a month t data on high 
performance German air- 
craft t data on electronic 
equipment , uranium oxide. 
General Messier and party. 
Brlngewald and Buf - 

Messerschmitt technicians. 
Shoji - Aircraft expert. 
Tomonaga - Submarine expert. 

Other submarines which may possibly have been sunk en route to Japan 
from Europe in 1944: 

(Attilio Bagnollni) 






A, Japanese personnel now in the Far iSast who 
received technical training in Germany 

B, German personnel no* in Japan 

C. Japanese personnel in Euroue as of the end of 
the European war 

D. German personnel scheduled for voyage to Japan 
at time of Germany 9 s surrender 

£» Personnel lost in transit between Burope and the 
Par East 






Resulting directly from the technic*! exchange, various 
Japanese technicians were tent to Germany to study material, production 
and technique, and a few German technician* were sent to the Far East to 
train the Japanese in German methods. Over twenty Japanese technicians 
reached the ~ar East after snecial training in Germany, a few were lost 
en route to Japan, and a large number are now in Europe, having been 
captured by the Ameg or interned in Sweden. Limited transportation 
facilities find sinkings of blockade running submarines and surface 
vessels prevented any appreciable number of German technicians from 
reaching JaT>an. 

German and Japanese technicians involved in the exchange are listed 
in the following schedules. 


Technical Training in <><?rww 

Aehiba, Koriyuki 

Bonsai, Ichiro, Lt* Gen. 
Hanaoka, Minari, Lt. Col. 


Xomuro, £teuo f Col, 
Nakamura, Shoso, Lt. Col* 

Nomaguchi t Major 
Nomura, Naokuni, Aim. 


Sakato, Chikai 

Satake, Kiuzi, Lt. Col. 


Representative of Japanese Ministry of Railways 
in Geratany. Liberated "by the Russians in 
May 45 on the surrender of Germany. 

Also known as Sakaniehi. Former Military Attache 
in Germany- Left for Japan December 1942. 

Japanese Army Air Force. Investigated German 
lubricants. Trained in methods of manufactur- 
ing high grade lubricating oils at Ruhrchemie 
plant , 

Returned to the Far East with Bansai in 
December 1948. 

Commercial secretary in Germany. Liberated by 
the Russians on the surrender of Germany. 

Studied German aircraft technique. Returned to 
the Far £&st via Siberia in 1942, 

Studied German gu:. mountings. 

Former member of Japaneee-Geraan-Italian Joint 
Specialist Commission under Tripartite Pact in 
Berlin. Reached Far &aet in summer of 1943 • 

Returned to Far Bast in December 1942 with Bans a i - 

Medical expert, Reached Far Bast in summer 1944. 

Technician from Nihon Gekki who studied wooden 
aircraft production in Germany. Reached Far 
East early in 1944 . 

Received training in radar at Telefunken Company 
in Germany and returned to Far East in l^te 
summer of 1943, Believed to have worked at Tama 
Laboratories in J^oan on the development of 
Japn nese radar* 


Skiba, Hiroto, It. Col, 

Carried on investigations of German munitions, 
particularly in the optical field. Trained in 
the production of predictor equipment for Ah 
guns for Zeiss Conrpany c Inspected Schott 
optical goods? factory at Jena, and production 
of telescopic sight at 0, S, Steiahoii at 
Munich. Made a number of trips to Italy to 
conduct Japanese purchase© there. Beached 
Far E&et in July 1944. 

Medical expert, B.e turned to the 3*ar £*st in 

Suzuki, Mekoto 

lateno, I*t. Col, 
3?eufcud& # Osainu 

tfeno, Yasnehi 

Toahida, Kasahifco, it, Col 

An aircraft inspector. Wae liberated by the 
£ti&&iaft& ia Kay 1945 upon Gorin&ny 8 8 surrender. 

Aviation technician. 

Visited important oil installations in Germany 
in 1942. Returned to Japan before December 
that year, 

%val officer. Arrived Singapore 5 December 
1943 after trip of 81 days by tfuhaarine. %s 
to be chief of Hosearch Department, Hlr&teuka 
S&ga&i Art^Bai, 

Mitsubiehi employee concerned vith purchasing, 
shipping and Insuring negotiations in various 
European count rise, ^'as liberated by the 
Kuaclaas in May 1945 on Germany 1 e surrender. 

fxk&i expert who studied German methods of pro- 
duction for aany years. i*rain$d in the pro- 
duction of solidified fuel, th© X ,G,?art>en 
hy&roganation process and high grade lubricating 
oils at BtthrchOTsie. 

Bs&g,: Hear Admiral lokoi, who was succeeded by Kojlroa as £&val Attache, 
sailed for the Far Ea-^st on a <J*rp#neee submarine in September 1943. Vice 
Admiral Nomura , vho preceded Aba, left Gr-rieany in March 1943, 

gQBfttcUQn with ^afffrnlcfft ^cfrftBg&g, 


Erlnker, Ob. Ing. 
Fodere, Heiarich 

Groneu, Wolfgang von, 
Maj. Gen. 

Haeberlein, Ob, Ing* 

Hagemann, H*n« Hains 

Kaden, Herbert 
Xrayer, C> Dr. 

Kretschmer, Alfred, Col. 
Lunge, Ob, Ing. 

Hehaits, WUheln, Air 
Commandant Engineer 

Peter sdorff, von t Major 


Radar technician from Gema Company* Arrived 
?ar East in 1943 to set up r>lant« in Japan 
for manufacture of radar equipment . 

Radar technician from TelefUnken Company. 
Arrived Par East late summer of 1943. Assisted 
Japanese in production of Wurssburg D. 

Air Attache in Tolcyo. 

Representative of Maschinenfabrik Ausburg- 
Jfarnberg. Heached Far East in 1943 to assist 
Japanese in submarine construction. 

Junkers representative who arrived in the Far 
East in 1939 with three other Junkers represen- 
tatives. Handled liaison between Junkers and 
Japanese firms. 

Messerschmitt engineer sent to Jap^n in 1941, 

For many ye^rs representative of l*urgl 
(Jesellschaft fur tfarmetechnlk in Tokyo. 

Military Attache. 

Engineer from Deschimag sent to assist the 
Japanese in manufacturing U-boats and marine 

Assistant Air Attache. 

Assistant Military Attache. 


Kuhl, Otto 


St shiner, Heiarich, 

Stoer, Willi. 
Weansekar, 3?aui, Mm, 

Mess production engineer from Hensch*l Company 
originally charged to instruct the Japanese 
in the Kenschol pressure process. 

I.B.Farben representative in Jp.pnn. Scheduled 
to aid th* Japanese in setting up I.G.Fftrben 
process for saanufacture of synthetic fuels. 
Ifcd been in Jnpsn for a^eml yoprs, 

Koiukel Company engineer who assisted Japanese 
designers at Nnv&l Aircraft factories* 
recently reported to be building a new 
aircraft factory by order of Japanese %.vol 
Air Force. 


Signal #K>p&ratue technician* Arrived ?ar 
K&st enxarfler of 1943, 

A r;iIot frosa H&ssersch&itt Company */ho reached 
the far Slast in 1941 where h-s waft employed 
for several ye^ra. 

ifev^l Attache, 

Heart of German Economic Mission to Jnpnn., 
Arrived in Tokyo 26 April 1941. 


II. freriMii > Personnel Thought to be in . Ja^an Whose Servicer Key 

hasLMfa %ulU%& f<?r %Blollat.lPiLflL Swam %>ctoal.tnntf 

Abel, Ward6ffiann 

Bnclz f &rwin Tokonosuke 

Becker, Henry >5. 

Bengsch, Gustav 

fcer;?miller, Jer^ise 


Brecht, Waiter 

Cording, Hjane 

Engineer of the German Aeronautical Industry. 
On 28 August 1940 reported to have returned 
to Tokyo from a visit to iSurope where he in- 
spected GAP activities ia Poland and Norway. 

Eurasian (Jaoeneae) . Arrived in October 
1P40 to make cultural fiLiss. Known to l?s 
still in Japan in mid* 1941, 

Works with Tatrnjitoto ^hok»i a.K. who import ^r. 
i-:;-*nufecture textile other rrachinery 
mxy import Japanese military requirements 
(September 40 ) * 

Pre vision instruments mechanic, formerly 
erarnloyed by one of the ^heel firoun Oil 
Conmanies. Spileu from U«S. for Japan 
29 September 1940 , 

Chief of -azi Air Corp. Model Plane Departmej 
Chief Instructor of German -State Kodel Plane 
School. In fray 41 arrived in Japan to 
demonstrate flying capabilities of German 
models. Expected to stay for seven weeks. 
De nurture not noted. 

Construction engineer to Avianca. Ia June 
41 w^fl en r >ute to Jf>t»an from the U,S„ 

Representative of I.G. Farben. More than 
PO ye^rs in Japan. 

Believer! to \e Lufthansa pilot. Due to 
arrive in December 40 from South America. 

director of ^innon Kali &agaku K.K. 
(Chemical firm - Agents for Phosnhatee 
d 'Alsace) . 


Deck, Ing. 

Ehrmann, Kurt 
State, Dietrich, Dr. 

Fransen, Kurt 
Freeden, von 
Frlcke, W. 

Ooseler (or Kessler) , Dietrich 


Hpckl^r, Karl 
H*inrich, Walter 
Hertle, J*ochlra 

Daimler Ben? engineer attached to Air 
Attaches office in Tokyo, 

Representative of I.G. F^rben, Tokyo. 

t'etallurgic engineer of Xrupps Orusonwerk. 
Arrived in Ja^n In November 40 from 

Civil engineer. Left U.S, for J*r>*n in 
Awil 41. 

Representative of Roechlin/* Stahlwerke, 

Engineer. Left South America 3 Jul/ 1941 for 

Due to s*il for Ja-oan from South America in 
April 41 to b<» employed as electrical 
engineer in Manchuria, 

Is reported as ? Bxnlosives ex ert (12/11/41) 
? Ai?ent (3/9/41) 
? h^viost been instructing 
Japanese in Chinp in use of certain pircr^ft 
*fter working for * U.S. nirernft factory 
(27 August 1941) , Reported back in 
Shanghai 5 November 1941. 

Believed to be Jmfthansa Pilot, Due to 
arrive in December 40 from South Americr- 

Believed to be ^Lufthansa Pilot. Due to 
arrive in December from South Americ; . 

German aviator. On 16 O c tobsr 1940 
reported to have arrived from South 
America * 

Hilgert, Kdgpr 

Hinrichsen> Johannes 

Hornamann, Hu&olf 
Xsrbar t Friedrich, Dr, 

K^umimn, G. 
Keonln, ^ichnrd 

Kellerman, ^ilhelm 
Xinze, Victor 
Kreyer f Dr ♦ 
Kurp t a f Rudolph 
Lnckner, Josef 


fcarann submarine officer, Arrived be- 
ginning of October 40 via Siberia en route 
to Pnnas&. (Departure not noted), 

Tr pined electrical engineer specialising 
in wireless telegraphy. Left U,S. for 
t^T)an in April 41. 

Engineer, left South America for Japan in 
April 41. 

Noted German Metallurgist, director of 
Kaiser Wilhelra Iron '^orka. In June 41 
was to be invited to Jnr^n in the rutumn. 

Chief Engineer of Heinkel Aircraft Company. 
Arrived in Jap».n from Shanghai in November 
40. In January 41 reported to be going to 


Swiss engineer residing in Yokohama . 193?/ 
33 Director of0erlikox: s Zurich. 1938 - ? 
in charge of Japanese factories using 
Oerllkon. stents for the manufacture of sicnll 
nrms. (Report dated 11 December 1940v) 

Civil engineer. left U.S. for Jap^n in 
April 41. 

Believed to be Xufthnns* nilot. Due to 
nrrive in December 40 'from South Ajr.ericn. 

Representative of Roechling Stahlwerke, A.G. t 
Tokyo . 

Mechanic, left South America for Jaxwn in 
April 41. 

Electrician, left South America for J&pan 
in A-oril 41. 

&rupps ronresentptive in Jpwn. Went to 
Shanghai in February 41. 



Michael, ^ilhela 
Kohr s Bernard 


Klet3ahke, Gerhard 

Otte, r rnst 

Otto, Willi 
Puzich*, Kurt 

ftipps, -p.lter 
Scn?»Gfer t Kurt 

Sctafer, -urt. 0. 

»ii'crr»ft tse/tni ?tr.n - Reported in r 
<-l to be cn-ployM by D^i ^i^ron Airway o 0j o 

Repre«en tlvo of I*C>. r*rben. 

director Si v *Eens~Sclxuckert X>enki 

K, 2\ , '•'•'ofryo . -'^r-sonal .-vldr^BS of 1*""' 

October 44- 13 Chiyii^shi ^oy,"ku t loKya 

Ship construction snsineor 3ent to Jr>r,H£ ;n 
1943 to f!"i;it thf* ^aonjirse in U-bo^t 

'"■nginerr tnS t^st v>5.1ot for ^oinkel, Tokyo. 
Arri-vof ^v.o-jt 10 t^-ober 1941, 

^3presert.*-»tire of Asechlin* ^tn.hlv^rkf: ^.Jr. 

KsHio oner r,t or. -pft South Americn for 
J.iorr in April 41. 

Electrician. Reported cu 22 October 
1941 as hrving recently arrived. 

Wireless operntor, Reported on 22 October 
1941 as having recently arrived, 

Bftlievfrrl to be Lufthnns^ - p ilot. Puc to 
--rrlve i 21 ^ r 3ce;nber 40 from South Adrian. 

^annging TJir^ctor of Johe Riechr-rmnn ir 
Kobe (October * )) ♦ 

H^:;resoutrttivo of 1.0. Fpxban 

Connect prl vi *,h Oort^ugerrn* CoEiopny, Kobs, - o 
of le: Sf»T>teMber 44, 

Civil f?n/?irxe-°r . ^cft U.S. for Jno*n in 
April 41 


S chexu - rman t Ar « o 
'Schiffner, Kng. 

Sohlr-nk f h erin/m 
Schmidt, Svter -0%. I n g # 

Schmidt, W. f Ih. 
Schmidt . Wolfgang 
Schnols a Gerhard 
Schoening, Pnul 

Schot t , 5 red 
Saifert , . 

Singer, -s.u4ol"oh 9 2>r- 

Stapefeldt, C.H.I*. 
Stoil, Otto 

Representative of I Aj . r.irben 

SuV -nrine expert who reached F a r 2 a st In 
stywuer of 1943. Expert in ? caustic 
equipment * 

Representative of 1.6-Fsrben, 

Representative of Carl Schmidt, NeckarsuLiu 
Arrived Fair £n*t l'H3, 

Hepreeentative of Deschinrg. 

Representative- of 1.0. i ? nrben. 

Representative of I*G- F^rbeiu 

Marine and aircraft engineer. On 12 Koveui- 
her 41 was re?>orted to have arrived recent- 
ly from South America and to he acting as 
technical aftvieer to the Canaan Havel Attache- 

Gftrmau chemist. In August 40 he loft 
Japan for three months in Shanghai; his 
return was not noted. 

^xt^iueer in Kobe. Head of German --^vo^iieae 
Industrial ^r^rd2ation. 

Living at O&iy^ . Understood to he doing 
important chemical research work ror ths 
Japanese government . (Rep, of 6/11/40). 

He is Csochoel^v^kiftn.. 

Civil engineer, left U.S. fcr Jan*m in 

A*L>riX 41 / 

ft s^r s sent a 1 1 vg of ^ohler Bros. (October 4" J • 

Tiedemann, H. 

Wackier t Tram 

Weinert. Erh*rdt 

Weymayr t Friedrlch 

Wicker t 

Wolf f t Herbert von 


F unction 

German consulting engineer. Reported in 
July 40 to be making factory plans for Tcyo 
Aluminium, Mitsubishi *nd Sumitomo. He 
drew the pl*ns of a factory then being 
built near Shiauok*, His office: Hon-cho t 3 
Chome, Omeri building, near Honbashi-ku. 

Due to sail for J^nnn from South America in 
April 41 to be employed electrical 
engineer in Manchuria. 

Engineer. Left South America for Ja^an 
in AmtII 41. 

Engineer, Left South America for Japan 
in April 41 . 

"Endio Attache" fit the German Brnbassy in 
October 41. Hot on the diplomatic list. 

Manager of Kobe agency of Christian 
Poggensee of Hamburg , exporters -of 
machinery, metals and chemical • ♦ 

Zenger, Ing. 

Jieinkel engineer working In Air Attache 1 s 
office in Tokyo • 

. -266- 


Abe, Kf?t3U0 

Adnefci, Takssaoa 
Ksil, Tetdusiro 
Fokao, Kenjl 

Hattori, Sokuro, Major 
Ikeda, Haruo 

Iki t Tadi. Comdr. . 

imaeata, Kaauo, Coadr. 
Xnaba, Paymaster Gomdr, 

Ishige, 5hozo, Col. 

Iehi2uka v 3?akeo t H. Col, 

Kaaiya, Chiaata 
Xavakita, Jiro f Major 

Japanese representative on the Tripartite 
F*ct Commission. 

On staff of Saval Attache. 

On staff of Naval Attache. Submarine expert, 

Mitsubishi oil refinery expert scheduled to 
receive training in X>£.Fax*ben hydrogenation 

process , 

Expert on machine tool??. In U.S. custody. 

delivered Japanese naval purchases in Europe. 
Arrived Europe March 1944. 

Studied metallurgy at Krupp,, .Magdeburg, about 
April 1945. 

Meaber of Japanese %vai Air Force staff. 

Formerly chief accountant for JppRnese Bnvy 
in 5ersany, Went to Italy in 1943 . 

Kepresentative of Ministry of War and Qrd. Adr*. 
Hdoa. in Germany. Oil. expert and specialist 
in munitions in tank production and use. 
Negotiated with I.G.Farban for hydrogenation 
process. How in U.S. 

Assistant Military Attache. Aircraft armament 
expert trained in Manufacture of weapons « Eow 
in U.S. 

fuji Electric Company engineer. 

Arrived Kurope March 1944 , Studied German 
rocket and jet propelled aircraft production 
and techniaue. How in U»S. 



Kigoshi, Yasukazu, ftajor 
Kikuchl t Koichl, Major 
Kinoehita, Toehisada, Major 

Kitajlma 5 Maaaaoto 
Kobeyaahi, Shigaru* Major 

Kobayashi, Ichiro 
Lt , Condr . 

Koji£!£i t Hideo, Hear Adm. 

Komateu, Mitsuhiko, it .Gen* 
Kotani, Etauo, Col. 

Kuroda, Tech. Capt. 
Mika&i* Yoehioai, Eng, 

Kinagava, Kiyoshi, 
Tech* Gomdr* 

Raw materials exo^rt. 

Japanese Array Air Force staff member. 

Representative of Japanese Fuel Ministry in 
Germany* Received training in manufacturing 
high grade lubricating oils at Rufcrchemia in 
1941. Nov in U.S. 

Aircraft engineer* 

Aeronautics expert connected with purchase and 
investigation of aircraft, aircraft engines, 
weapons, V~l t etc* Studied electrical per- 
cussion cap aanufacture at Bhelnmetall. 
How in U.S. 

Member of Medical Corps. 

Naval Attache, Accompanied Oghiica on tour of 
German military installations, Kow in U.S. 

Military Attache. Kow in U.S. 

Military expert and adviser to Military Attache 
In Germany , Arrived in Buropo April 1943 as 
member of it. Gen. Okaiaote'a party. Believed 
to have specialised lu Russian intelligence. 

Weapons specialist. 

Studied natural end synthetic oil production. 
Vioited Buhrchemie plants. Was scheduled to 
receive training at I.G«?arbe& in hydrogenation 
oroceso for making synthetic oil. Now in U.S. 

Arrived Europe March 1S44 &s Assistant Haval 
Attache, Studied manufacture of missiles. 
In Awil 1945 was engaged in studying and 
experimenting on a cast a bis 1*3 sin (Gteissharz) 
suitable for making the moulds used in proceed^ 
light- alloys for airplane fue^lag^ft at Konstans 
-on^er the direction of fVof . Se&sidt . Kow in U 


Nagamori, Capt. 
Gchiai, Takeo, Col. 

Ogawa, Sueo t Lt. Col. 
Ocaiya, &itsuo f Col. 

Oshima, Hiroshi 

Otani, Qsarnu, Maj. Gen. 

Sakai, Maoe 

Sftkimura, Shi gee hi 

Shimamura, Tetsuo 

Shimosato, Kezuo 

Shizuno , Yoshlda, 
Tech. Capt. 


Arrived Eurooe March 1944. Member of Japanese 
Naval Attache office* Bandied negotiations 
for M5-163 and ME-262. 

Visited Krupp works and £elss plant. Reported 
new technical development s* In U.S* custody 
at Bad Gastein. 

Munitions expert. 

Member of mixed commission under Tripartite 
P*ct. Munitions expert. Now in U.S. custody. 

Military Attache Berlin 1934-38. Ambassador to 
Berlin 1938-39. Reappointed 1940. How in U.S. 

Ranking aviation specialist in Germany. 
Handled lipiaon with GAP. Now in U.S. 

Spent 30 years in Europe attached to Japanese 
Embassy in Berlin. 

Representative of Japanese Iron Control 
Association* Still in Europe. 

Former member of Japanese Iron Control 
Association in Berlin. Engaged in negotiations 
with the Germans for chromadur and tlnidur and 
trained in its manufacture at the Krupn plant 
fit Magdeburg. Still in Europe. 

Believed to have received training at Deschlmag 
and BucScau (H.Wolf A. 6.) Company in the pro- 
duction of turbines and suction condenser pumps. 

In April 1945 was engaged in studying special 
batteries and high Quality wood made from 

sawdust at the Electro Chemical Research 
Laboratory of Dr. Schmidt at Kenetans. Now 
in U.S. 

Director of Army Air in Italy, Inspected 
weapon production at the Ansaldo Company in Italy, 


Suesa^ t eu , Shiger i ea , 
U, Col. 

Susuki , T&t#ushlro, 

Sarutsni. Yoshikuchi, 

Xoyoda, Kximso, G&pt, 
W&kada, Koichi 

Yutaaoto, Yoshio 

Yo shi Jtiari , Mutut arc , 
ht. Col, 

Yoshikawn, Haruo 

Studied German rocket and jet propulsion 
technique, Nov in U.S. 

From 1944 a mender of the staff of the Ai*my 
First Air Technical Lahor*tory and was 
resident official of the Air HQ,, Kow la U*S. 

Keeeived special training In the manufacture 

of propulsion equipment for the 

especially the Jumo-004, and has studied jet 

propulsion in general. 

Assistant Hav^l Attache, Said to be in charge 
of flight training, 

Machine tool e>rpert reaponsible for the 
select ion of machine tool parts and the 
aCQUisltion of drawings. 

Masher of the staff of the Kaval Attache. 

Instrument and electrical specialist, Now in 

On the staff of the Bavsl Attache. 


gj» of temny\g. surrender 

Caspar, Victor 

Kessler's Party 


Mueller, It. Dr, 


Junkers engineer* 

Messerschmltt mass production engineer who was 
scheduled to direct manufacture of the MB-262 in 
Jai>an. Formerly eianloyed "by Junkers and 
?Odce~Wttlf Company as a mats production engineer. 

It was originally planned to have Oen. Ketsler 
(See Section E) taice a small staff with hi* to 
Japan to give the Japanese technical and 
tactical assistance in aircraft matters. 
As originally proposed, Kessler's party was 
made up as follows i 

Haenlech. Dr. - Interpreter, 

Harke, Tech. Major - Radar and aircraft expert. 

Hahlfeld - Construction engineer. 

Mayer, Capt. 

Mens el, I*t. - fiadar and radio-controlled weapons. 
Sandrart, Col. - Ajk expert; general aerial 

defense * 
Sauer, Cppt. 
Schubert t Major, 
Schumann, Ofcerlt, - A/ A guns. 
Stepp t Lt. Col. 
Wild, MaJ. Cen. 

Subsequently the party was reduced to eight 
and then to three. Those three, Kessler, 
Sandrart and Men2el # left Europe on the C-234 
and were captured. 

Was scheduled to act as interpreter for German 
Naval officers assigned to duty on Japmese 

Mechanic for mass production of KE~262, 

Junkers Company jet propulsion engineer trained 
in manufacture of the propulsion unit of 105*262 . 


Bringevald , August HosserachKitt mis* production engineer who \mt 

to direct manufacture of MSU262 in Japan, 
Formerly was designing technician ^nd chief $t 
the fuselage and armament' eection of Ren&chel 
Cosmany where? he worked on the KS 122, HS 123 
and HS 130, Left Europe March 45 on the U-234 
and was captured by the Allies when the (rerman 
submarine surrendered , 

.Bulla, Rirhardj 

In December 44 ten German flaval officers vers 
to "be eeni to the Jar East to oerve vith the? 
Japanese fleet in operation. The objects cf 
this proposal were the improvement of coojHi ra- 
tion, exchange of experience and the foundati - 
of post«war connections between the two naval 
service e with particular reference to the 
reconstruction of the Sermon Hayy, Only tvo 
fterfflHn naral officers ever left Shirope, I*t. 
Bulla and Oberlt. Heinrich Hellendoom (aec 
below)* 'Both were? on the U«234 whicfh left 
Surape. at the end of March 45 and becftme 
prisoners of var when the subaaxine «ur rendered . 

Cfclingeneperg, Rolf t von 

Meeeerschfflitt engineer scheduled to direct 

mamf* cture of Mlu*16Jj and 252 in Japan, lost 

on in February 45. 

Pal ck 3 - bar d t , fi 
Fr ega 1 1 <.mkapi t an 

Gondo\ K&sa^ake, Ool 

Hful engaged i:c liai&on with the Japft&ese in tha 
construction of e-lee»ric jaotors. Wan schsdulad 
%o be attached to Haval Attache s office in 
•Tokyo and to assist the Japanese in ship 
construction mid electric welding in aircraft 

construction. Left Europe on the and 

tfac captured by the Allies, 

Former Assistant Military Attache in Italy 
iost en route to Far East in 1943. 

Helled oorn, Heinric'a 

k/h gixar\B?$ expert- "tfae scheduled to servo vi t:i 
Japanese fleet in operation* (See Bulla) 

Xeesler, Ulrich, Ctenobet. 

Mental t Erich, Oberlt. 

Miura, Hiroshl, I*. Col. 

Hakai, Toshlo 

Hieschllng, &ay t 
Geschwader Richter 

Ruf t Trans 

Sandrart, Frits, Oberst, 

Schlidc« tt| Heia2 

Sonderfuhrer-Xorv .Kapt . 

Was scheduled to replace Major Gen. Ton 

Gronau as Air Attache In order to bring 

about better liaison between Germany end 

Japan in aviation techniques. Left Europe 

March 45 on the U~234 and was captured by 

the Allies when the German submarine surrendered. 

Member of Xeesler 1 * party and expert on radar 
and radio-controlled weapons 9 especially the 
HS 293 remotely controlled bomb. Left Europe 
March 45 on the U»234 and was captured by 
the Allies when the submarine surrendered* 

former Army surgeon attached to Military 
Attache's office in Berlin. Lost June 43 
en route to Far East. 

Received training in Germany in manufacturing 
fuels for ME-163. Lost en route to Japan 
in 1945. 

Scheduled to act as a Naval Judge in Tokyo 
under Ada. Wennecker. Left Europe March 45 
on the U-234 and was captured by the Allies 
when the submarine surrendered * 

Mechanic in the mass production of the ME- 232, 
Messerschmitt Company's chief technical expert 
in the manufacture of Jig tools. Was to have 
supervised the construction of a ME-262 factory 
in Japan. Left Surope March 45 on the IU334 
and was captured by the Allies when the 
submarine surrendered. 

Member of Kcssler'e party. Tactical anti- 
aircraft officer who waa to advise the 

Japanese on defense of their cities. Left 
Europe March 45 on the U-234 and was captured 
by the Allies when the submarine surrendered. 

A technical specialist in the field of radar 
and infra-red. Was to report to Japan all 
developments in this field in Germany. 
Left Europe March 45 on the U=?34 an<| wa« 
captured by the Allies when the submarine 

Schomerus, Hi clef 

Shoji, Tech, Comdr. 

Tomonaga, Hideo, Lt. Col, 

Messersehtt&tt Cosspany engineer who was 
scheduled to sssiet the Japanese in the 
development of jet propelled aircraft* 
W^s especially trained in the manufacture 
of turbine-blades for the KE-262. Lost 
en route to J&pxn in February 45 • 

Jet-propelled and rocket-propelled aircraft 
technician. Left Surope in Harch 45 on the 
U-234 and committed suicide *<sfhen that sub- 
marine surrendered to the Allies* 

Heached Europe in summer of 1943 and 3tudie& 
German submarine construction. Left Europe 
March 45 on the U-234 and committed suicide 
when the submarine surrendered to the Allies* 

Yaaiato, T&dao 

On the Japanese Havel Air Force Staff. Expert 
on electrical equipment. 


Vims AW) iNS"'ITUTIQyS IN JAPAK associated 


tl rms ik jap/v n associ ate wi^ii TjSch tical i&gftiKHBs 

ffapie o f ^lrm 
Aichl Kolcu K.X. 

Anehan Steal Works 

Aviation H{*eoarch 
Arsenal (N;*vy) 
(jfokosuka ^tr Tech- 
nicai Depot?) 

Carl 2eise 

DpI Nippon Air- 
transport K.K. 

Dai Mippon Kali 
Kagaku K.K. 

Fokkes & Koch 

Fuji Denki K .K, 

Farukawa Benki 
Kogyo K.X. 

Purukawa Metal In- 
dustry K.X. 

Hitochi Saisakusho 

43 A InnaAga.Shinden, Aircraft manufacture 
Mi nr- to ku, Nagoya, Aichi 


Seitetau Kojo Chi Ku, 
AnsKm 3 ity, Fen^tHen 
Pr ovi n ce f Ha n chur i a 

No record of ad^rass 

20 Karunouchi, 2 chomn, 
Kojlmachi ku t Tokyo 

1 Yuraku. Cbo, l-Ohome, 
Xojimachi, Tokyo 

Teihoku Lifa In&urance 
Building, 1 Marunouchi , 
1 choine, KojirnAcbi Jcu 

11, 14 Marunouchi, 2~ 
Chome, Kojiranchi 

1 TanfL'bf" Shin&an, Kfiwr~ 
aaki , Kanagava 

3 ^nmouchi, 3 chorae, 
Kojlmr.nhi ku, Tokyo 

3 Mftrunouchi , ? chome . 
Kojiinachi ku , Tokyo 

12 Marunouchi, &-Chojne t 
Kojimnchi Ku, Tokyo City 

Steel t>roducticn 

Aircraft development, Jet 
and ro<* v *t tromilsion. 

ptical £lass an*, cameras. 

Commercial Airway 

Jjgnan agents for Phosphate 

Ijiroorters. Engineering 
equipment, aircraft engines 

Radar and ra^io manufacture 

fllectric*»l PT>Dpratus f light 
alloy castings, 

Light metal alloys, alloy 
castings, aircraft propellers. 

Electrical apparatus, aircraft 
components • 



Kara *LlXx& 

Holcaido Jinzo Sakiyu 
KI, (Svu-sidiary <yr 
Nippon Jinzo Sekiyu 

7 Odori Kishi, 3chome f Synthetic lubricating oil, 
S a pt)oro f Shicho, Hokaido 

Ifcutn laboratory 

No record of address 

Electronic research 

lilies and Co. 
(Tokyo fvjent for 
numerous German 

1 Marunouchl , 1 chorae » 
Kcjimchi ku f Tokyo 

General merchandise, aircraft 
and engineering components end 
manufacture. Synthetic oil and 
processes . 

Kawanishi Hikoki 

Kawasaki Kokuki 
Kogyo K,X. 

1 Dnito t Naruo Mura, 
Muko Gun, Sjyogyo 2*n 

6 Yadayama Dori , 1 
chome f a ayashida tai, 

Aircraft manufacture 

Aircraft and aircraft engines, 

Kawasaki laboratory 

No record of address 

Electronic research 

Kyusku Hikoki K«K, 

354 Mugino f Kfika hura, 
Chikushi Gun, Aikuoka 

Aircraft manufacture 

Manshu Hikoki Seizo 

Ill Ohoangai Dalto, 
Ho ten, Fengt'ien, 


Aircraft and aircraft engines. 

Miltrkft laboratory 

No record of address 

Electronic research 

Mitsui Sussan K.K. 

Mitsubishi Denkl 

Mitsubishi Sho,Ji K.K, 

1 Marunochi, ? chome, 
Nihonbashi ku f Tokyo 

4 M*runouchi # 3 chome, 
Kojimachi ku, Tokyo 

10 Marunochi, 2 chome , 

Kojimachi ku t Tokyo 

Engineering plant and equipment, 
processes, patents snd manufact- 
uring rights, raw materials, 
synthetic oils, 

Badar and radio manufacture 

Engineering plant and equipment, 
nrocesses, patents pnd m*nu- 

factoring rights # raw materials, 
aircraft, aircraft engines nncl 

Kagoya Araenal 

Kateiji:^ Jiifcokl 

Kihon Ctekki K.K. 

Nihon Kusen Denshitt 
K.K. (Subsidiary of 
Nippon Muses K.K.) 

Nir>r)on Chiaso Hiryo 
K.K, Konan Korea 

Pin-on Kokan K.K, 

Okaynma Laboratory 

Okura Shoji K.K. 

Shows. Iron *orka 

Siemens Schuckert 
Denki K.K. 

Surcitomo (There 
is no evidence *s 
to which of the 
Sumi t one sub c id i ar i e s 
is actually concern- 

Mo record of address 

4 Marunouchi, 3 chome, 
XojimaeM ku, Tokyo 

250 Knknsawa-cho, %ir« 
amaieu, Sbizeeaki en 

■930 Kaiai JUnjatai, 
Mltaka hum, Kitatama 
G u n | Tokyo 

1 Sose Cho. Kita Ku, 
Osaka City. The address 
of the Konan Plant of 
this coamaay is* Konan 
f Kanshu Oun t Kankyo 
Nando, Korea . 

* M&runouchi, 1-Chome, 
Xcjimachi Ku t Tokyo 

&o record of address 

2 Sliw!*, chome, 
Xyobr.shi ku f Tokyo 

5 Gins a, l--Chome f 
Kyobashi Ku, Tokyo City 

2 Maranouchi, JMJhoinc, 
Kojlmachi Tokyo 

The head office of 
Sumitomo is believed 
to be 60 Kiimini cho, 
Okashims Xonohama Icu, 


Aircraft armament 

Aircraft f*nd aircraft 

Aircraft and aircraft components, 

Radar and radio manufacture 

Heavy chemicals, fertilisers, 
hydrogen reroxtde, oxygen, 
nitrogen , acids* 

Steel pipes, etc. 

electronic research 

Engine a ring equipment, 
manufacturing rights and process*? ■ 

Steel and iron production 

Agents for Siemens Schuckart 
electrical equipment. 

Aircraft cosroonents, light metal 
production* steel processes, 

riaaufncturing rights* 

ed In technical 
changes. The pnrent 
company of Sumitomo 
group ie Sumitomo 
Jukogyo K.K. Sub- 
sidiaries likely to 
be concerned pre one 
or more of 

Sumitomo Kinzoku K.K. 
Sumitomo Aluminum K.K. 
Sumitomo Kvagaku Kogyo 
K.K. f or 

Sumitomo Kogyo K.K. 

Tama Kilita?/ 
Technical Laboratories 

Tokai Denkyoku K.K. 

Tokyo Teikoku Daigaka 
Koku Kenkyujo (Tokyo 
University Aeronaut ical 

Tsukaguohi Laboratory 

Yamamoto Shok^i K,K. 

Ko record of address Electronic research 

6 Marunouchi 9 1 Carbon electrodes and electrode 

chcme, Kojimachi ku, manufacturing proceed. 


No record of Aeronautical Research 

address available 

No record of Electronic research 
adnress available 

3 Ginaa t 2~Ghome, Import and manufacture of 

Kyohashi Ku, Tokyo textile and other machinery 



Rocket-propelled aircraft 
Liquid rocket fuel* 
Jet-propelled aircraft 
Jet- propulsion unit a 
V~l and Piloted V-l 



Bs^lfiSuafJli^ This "hot" version was dsvclo-nsd from the curlier A 
"cold" subtype, an a fast-climbing, short«rf?rgo interse-otor for 
operations Against daylight heavy hoi.-ber formations in defease 
of specific targets. The A subtype va a related to training 

-he MS~163 2-1 1b the cojn&on operations! subtype* 

£ftUXXl&Ji£&< 3ingle~seat flyiiv? wing design of mixed znetal an* wood 
construction. The wing, of wood with -nlywood skin, is of special, 
sh*r?ly f swepWbr. ek design, carries "ele^ona* ~ serving the dual 
function of elevators arrl ailerons—outboard ne#r the rounded tips. 
The very short fuselage, of teardrop shpne, is deep in relation to 
its length an* is of sueta! construction. The rear portion, containing 
the rocket unit, is detachable, *Ph*> tail unit hae only vertical fin 
and rudder , no horizontal surfaces. 

5i^fi?^ion^(ft),^ Spans 30.6 Length: 19.4 Wing area (aq ft) 5 186 

if^Lt^itfil^ Normal take-off; 9,500 

Povgr platnt: Ons Walter FWC 109-0*5 09 bi~fuei (T-and C - Stoff ) liquid- 
rocket unit, 

Ayqaroenle,? 2 a hK«108 (one in each wing root) with 60 rounds per gun. 

ggx£o raiancft.S.. tax aneed? 515 m-nh at S.L.s 558 mnh at 13, 000-39 ,500 ft. 
Hate of climbs To 40,000 ft. in 3.6 mine. 
After climb to 40,000 ft. duration of powered flight is 
4»t> mina. 

R.Qfl»ftgfr;aj Take-off (at 170 mnh) is ?r.#de on wheeled undercarriage which 
is then jettisoned. Climb at 50°«60° at about 440 xnph. Landing is 
effected on a skid, with a landing run of about 1,300 ft* Landing is 
not nn easy manuever ?na requires considerable skilly it 3hould net 
be attempted with a fuel load, which will explode in the event of b 
crack-up. ^he aircraft should always be landed on a grass surface. Due 
to the explosive nature of the fuel, take-off ia not without danger to 
the T>ilot; if not airborne at a certain tjclrvt on the trke-off run, the 
T>ilot must brie out to avoid the inevitable explosion when the aircraft 
crashes at the end of the runway. 



Acceding to 0-crmpa test nij.ots the bnd features of the ?*3~163 
hvqZ (i) instability in high-sp^^ flight; (ii) limited endurance 
restricts opera'in^ range, r.n* vxuvlia in landing oroblems 'because of 
difficulties* in reaching awropriRte "bases; (iii) not suitable for 
51ying by ni#ht or under windy conditions; Civ) lateral instability 
becnuse .r.^rrow track undercarriage ^nl hish C.G, ^reduces tendency to 
nose over; (v) difficulties in holding aircraft in .<> straight line 
on tpkr-off; (vl) engine failure ia coasraon: (vii) entry of ateazn into 
the cockpit ^o£s the windshield; rn* (vili/ Angle of climb is bo steep 
thflt r-ircr/>ft instruments do not function - r -ro;oorly. 

The -povrsr unit (which weighs About 4?0 lbs) is in two main # 
psseftblies . The forward one consists of n housing for the turbir.e; 
two worm tyoe rjumpg for delivering the fuel; p control unit: treasure- 
reducing vrlve; j&n electric stater motor. A small cylindrical 
unit ftt^chpd to the forward housing, by thp action of r- solid catalyst 
on th* T«Stoff t produces stefsjn to drive th* turbine. The second 
nssercbly consists of the combustion chMihar. The fupl t*nks hold about 
?2S gallons of T- St off , 110 grllons of O-Stoff . 

Flight endur^nc^ enn be increased by nltarnrtin^ cowered *nd 
gliding flight. 



ME^lflS ,0 Interceptor. 

fi£ml^£JVk' Variously referred to the M*S«133 C K^f>3, , 
this aircraft was developed from the fc£U162 j3 nr.d incorporates 
improvements found necasspry for operational anrt production reasons, 
Production was turned over l>y faeseercchmitt bo Junkers, 

^ascripti^n ; Although bearing a strong resemblance to the ME~163 JB, the 
subtype was cleaned up to give a greatly improved streamline 
form. The fuselage, v/hich is much sliinmcr, froir the nose to the 
wing trailing edge is of projectile fora, syaisaetrical .ibout the 
longitudinal axis. A pressurised cockpit is fitted. A retractable 
tricycle undf*rc^rric';.£e replace t* t*e skid of the I* subtype. In- 
creased fuel tr.n*pge--*#52 gp-llons of T^Sto^V 185 gallons of C~ 
St off— together with modified power unit give increased oovar^d 
flight endurance. 

Pi aerations (f t) ; St>an* 32.2 Length? 23.1 Wing area (sq ft) 5 197 
*»Uht>Ufrfi)* *W*1 taie-offj 11,280 

foyer pla nt a One HWX 103-509 0, having an auxiliary cruising jet, 
?naller than the main jet, positioned immediately below it in the 
tail. *otal thrust /l ,400 lbs. 

Ara ^ent " J? x MU108 (one in each wing root) with 75 rounds per gun. 

PqrforiflJiflqei Max steads 590 mph pt 13,100-39,300 ft. 
Service ceiling* 52,500 ft. 
Hate of climbs So 40,000 ft in 2 mice 

Total powered flight 15 ©ins (l Bin take-off , 2 tains climb, 

12 juins at ftititude) « 

Ii£&&X&& : Suffers from utany of the flight difficulties of the B subtype; 
the tricycle undercarriage, however, leads to better lateral stability 
at take-off. The C subtype was to be fitted with a parachute brake, 
which, with the tricycle undercarriage, reduces the landing run to 
650 ft, 

There i* no indication that the kE~163 vr.~s ever used 


The Walter pov;*r unit of the reQUlrad special 

liquid chemical futils. Those fuels vere* 

I-Stoff? Concefitr&ted .aydrogen neroxide, At a concentration 

of SO-Sftfi, 
i3..Stoffi Hydrazine hydrate* 

C~Stoffs A solution of -fl-Stoff in vatcr nn*i methanol, 
^ litoff ; An aqueous solution of 7lnc in tjot^ssiu© or cslciua 
^r:iinn£nn«te uced in the «arly version of the Walter pov^r 
unit. It was "nter r?pl~ced by the more satisfactory C~ 
St off and v*s then used only for 1 punching the V«l. 

A cement made by mixing ^ot/io^ium dichromfite, 
-pot^saluiu chrot .nte, potassium permpng#n>*te , emistic oota <h 
and hi^h-grad* "or t land cement, used as * catalyst for the 
decomposition rf T-Stoff . 


Hydrogen peroxide received far wider attention in Germany 
during the t>*st eight years thsn anywhere else in the vorld, both as 
regard* the investigation of its properties and amlicat^on pnd the 
development of l*rge«seale methods of production. T-Stoff , the 80-8 5$ 
corcentrate, was produced* stpndord commercial 30-35S& peroxide. 
Concentration w-s Achieved in special fractionation and distillation 
columns. The 30~35j£ peroxide was manufactured by hydrolysis with live 
steam of potassium wrsulphnta, an^ the vapor a from the hydrolysis 
rectified *nd condensed to form the low concentrate porduct. *Phe product 
of the standard persulphate process was not t>ure enough for direct 
concentration and was therefore distilled in a hulk evaporator, the 
vepor t>eing fractionated in a normal p*»dked fractionating column to give 
the high concentration material* In some cases the material was distilled 
a second time for even greater purity* 

An absolute pressure of 40-50 mm was maintained in the steam-* 
heated retort of the concentratit<? equipment. The concentrating 
equipment was made throughout of stoneware except for the condenser which 
was of aluminum. Stainless steel was used for ancillary equipment; all 
stainless 3teel surfaces were kept highly polished. 

The 30~35£» peroxide usually contained *bout 2 grams per liter 
of sulphuric acid; this was neutralised with ammonia until a concentration 
wrs reduced to 0,5 grams per liter . At that point a atabilizer was 
added awl the stabilized solution ^ed continuously into the concentrating 
retort. The vapor leaving the retor* was 30# peroxide and 70$ steam. 
All of the impurities regained behind in the retort — one of the principal 
reasons for the stability of the concentrated product. The vapors from 
the retort were massed through a rectifying tower from which a G5> 
concentrate was obtained. That nroduct then entered a second retfttft for 
further concentration; = »n 80# concentrate was obtained and drawn off . 
The high concentrate nroduct was cooled nnd transferred to storage tanks 
and stabilized by the addition of phosuhorous acid. 

The high purity achieved w*s necessary chiefly for stability «nd 
storege reasons but »lso was v*ry essential in cases where the peroxide 
was to be used in conjunction with a solid catalyst, in which case deposi- 
tion of residues would poison the catalyst. 

The concentrated product had * high degree of stability. V/hen 
stored in pure aluminum tanks outdoors, the loss in twelve months was as 
low S,8 2#. 



Transporter Ion of the concentrated neroxi&c as *t*11 as etoraga 
v*»s carried out in containers of aluminua of a, high decree of purity 
(9$. 5 - 99.9/*). Ail rluBimxm surfaces coming into coatftct with the 
concentrated peroxide )ia.d to "be treats, moat carefully; any impurity 
or contpini nation would remit Ut decomposition of the parotide. All 
distilled water used in the maimfa.oturiiiv; plant was obtained from aluminum,, 
stainless steel or stoneware container sj tho lea>st traue of copper, 
such as sight be nroduced by a copper container, wag exceedingly 

The manufacture of hydrazine hydrate was effected in Germany 
*oy the reaction in water solution of ammonia with sodium hypochlorite. 
Actually three concurrent inactions were involved in the -orocess* in 
the first chl or amine w&s formed from the reaction of ammonia with sodlwn 
hypochlorite; in the second chlorasaine and arc&oftia produced hydrazine; 
and in the third, hydrazine ann water produced hydrazine hydrate. 

'The manufacture wns r*n exceptionally difficult on* because* the 
formation of hydrazine hydrate rroc^eded slowly an* there was a etrong 
tendency for the hydrazine to react with chlcramine as fa3t as it i/as 
formed 4 with thr- production of nitrog&n an* asriinoniuffi chloride, Shat 
difficulty aieceesfully over co roe by (i) speeding up ell the stages 
of the reaction as far as possible b,v the *rc a of heat an* pressure, 
ann (ii) the use of inhibitors, such as iron or copper sulphate, in very 
8#nil amount, ^boe- catalysts were succe^^ful in isr-ading th* decomposition, but must not be present in quantities great enough to permit them 
to r?act themselves. .?hat. was further nrotected by the U3e of albumia, 
lira or casein— of vhi ch albumin ic preferable-^ as zx\ additional inhibitor 
to prevent ?ittack on tha copper or iron salts* 

In the G-erjziftn process the formation of hydrazine was favorM 
by very ra r >id heating to 160° (allowable Anting time one second)* 
That tender atura reouired a -nres^ure of 30 atnieaoherea to maintain liquid 
■ohae« conditions . * i'he r-aa.cte* mixture \m% then immediately expand ed to 
n.trao snheric nres^ure, which flashed off most of the excess asuboziIsl and 
froze the hydrazine in the remaining salt solution in the form of » 15& 
concentration of hydrazine hydrate. Subsequent operations consisted 
primarily in salt reasovai an** concentration of the hydrazine hydrate to 
80-100$ strength (average- °l-92$) by multi-st^e evaporation end 

As might be expected, the operation vas reolete with practical 
problems which made it anything but ths simple -orocess indicated by the 



primary chemistry involved. Ammonia, sodium hypochlorite *nd hydrazine 
are corrosive to many and ftlf faring constriction materials* with the 
result thpt almost the entire plant had to be constructed of stainless 
Steele and ceramics. Only the arciaonia system could "be meft* of ordinary 

The raw materials used were ammonia » caustic and chlorine. As 
practiced ia Germany, the steam and water requirements were relatively 
large ♦ The relative amount of stainless steels used in German olants 
was l^r^a. the estimate "being rs much as 1,000 tons of such materials 
in a unit producing 100 tons per month of hydrazine hydrate. 

FroflUfiUOT Qf C-Stgffj 

To produce C-Stoff f hydrazine hydrate was dissolved in a 
mixture of methanol and water end mixed with a reaction c*talyst~~ 
potassium copper cyanide, She usu.*l concentration was 30$ hydrazine 
hydrate, 14$ water mid 56$ methanol. Pour-six grams r>er liter of 
potassium copper cyanide we^e added as a reaction catalyst. 

Sodium and calcium permanganate werr manufactured in Germany 
hy passing potassium permanganate through * sodium or calcium zeolite 
(rlui*ino silicate), giving sodium or calcium permanganate. The potassium 
oerjr^n^annta was separated nnd filtered out in the process; to insure 
its complete removal the solution was cooled to -*10 C and refiltered, 
The product was then diluted to the desired concentration nn* stored in 
iron vessels. 

Transportation and storages 

The transportation * nd storage of the liquid rocket chemical 
fxxels reouire special precautions because of problems of corrosion. 
Tanks of aluminum of a high Hegree of purity are suitable for T-S^off . 
J\nr the large-scale transportation and storage of B-Stoff and C- St off 
iretallic containers must be lined with opnanoi or enamel lacouer. 
Synthetic ruhher linings also are suitable for B-Stoff transportation, 
as are containers of chromium nickel steel. 


ttK-?62 Put lea ? * n^i^/^div^^^lw reece 

Development s Designed In 1938 1 the ME-262 was first f .own in 1940 with 
Jumo~°ll engines* The airfrejLe nrovlng satisfactory, the prototype 
jet-powered aircraft flew in 1942, with Jumo-004 A units. The V-6 
(with Jumo-004 B 1 a) appeared in 1943 pnd the V-9, the forerunner of 
the production aircraft, in 1944 • 

Sub- types; The A-l (with A guns)' is regarded as e fighter, and the A^2 
(with 2 guns) as a bomber! although some JU-l's were used for bombing 
and reconna is sance. A two-seater night- filter version w«s under 
development . 

Description s All-metal monoplane. The wing has a sha:rp sweep-back and 
is fitted with all metal ailerons and slotted flaps. The fuselage , 
oipde in four sections, has a nose cone of steel construction which houses 
the guns and ammunition. Betractable tricycle undercarriage; single 
fin and rudder. Power units under slung under wing- Pilot f s cockpit 
at aid- fuselage. 

Dtmansions(ft)g Szspxii 41.0 length * 3*, 8 *ing area (sq ft):> 234 
Vei ghtsdbs) % Hormal take-offs 13,430 Waximua: 15,390 
Pnwer nlant : 2 x #umo-004 B-2 turbo- Jet units 

Armament/Bomb Io*4 * J^l; 4 x MIU108 (fixed nose) with 100-80 rds per gun. 

A-2? 2 x MK-108 (fixed nose) 

2 x 250 kg (or 1 x 500 kg) externally slung under fuselage. 
(Drop tanks can be fitted to the nomb-carrier e) . 

Performing Max *r>eed: 4?2 aroh at S.L.l 528 mnh at 23,000 ft. 
Service ceiling l 39,400 ft. 
Rote of climb; To 26,300 ft. in 11 nine. 
Flight endurance is 45-50 nine at low altitude; 60-90 alas 
at high altitude. 

Bemn jks * The carrying of an extern*! bomb~load by the A*-2 version reduces 
performance date (as given above for the A-l) by 5~10$». The Merits of 
the MX-262 lie in its high speed and. heavy armament, Its demerits In 
its lack of maneuvrabillty, relatively short range and the extreme 
vulnerability of the jat units, which tend to catch fire very rftadlly 
if hit in aerial combat. 



landing speed is 155 &ph; stalling speed vdth full load about 
120 mph. Because of inferior structural workmanship * it was not infre- 
quent for parts of the M£»262 to ba stripped off in a ateep, fast dive. 
The W8-262 functions efficiently on one jet unit: landing on one unit id 
possible although not preferable * 


£u£ifi£* ^omber/ recce. 

P ^VQl o p^ nlj i The B~subtyr,e-~the first oroduciicn model— first flew in 
December 43, and. went into product ion f after very little modification, 
in June 44. This subtype was used operationally on a small scale 
both as a tactic?! bomber and as a reconnaissance aircraft. 

Sufr»typgp : %e A-subtype, from wiich the £ was developed, had a jettisonable 
undercarriage ^nd landed on skids; it v/es not T>ut into quantity 
production. There were two versions of the £«subtype* the B-l, a 
reconnaissance tjroa, and B~2, \ bomber tyne. 
C *nd B subtypes were under development— see "Remarks" below. 

Description All-metal high win^ jaonoolane with underslung jet-units 9 
Wing has eounre cut tf o* with rounded corners. Cockpit set well 
forward in rounded nose fitted with many transparent surfaces. Single 
fin and rudder. Retractable tricycle undercarriage, with main wheals 
of very narrow track, ^eriucooic borabsi^ht nn^ triaxipl automatic 
pilot fitted to bomber version* Fuselage skin has very smooth finish. 

Pimenslons(f thSrmn.» 47.3 Length; 41.6 Wing erea (aq ft): 298 

Wfti f hts (lbfl) s Mormal take-off; 18,500 Maximum: 19,500 (22,000 with assistevi 

take-off) . 

Eower pl ^nt: 2 r Jumo«004 turbo-jet units. 

Armffinent/B oipb Lpnda 2 x MG-15l/:3) fixed firing aft (?50 rounds r>er gun). 

Bomb stowage; 1 x 2,200 lbs under fuselage; 1 x l f 100 
lbs unier each jet unit (drop tanks alternative). 

£fiIIflXfflaafi£^ Max st)eeda *72 a t 19,000 ft. (440 smh with bomb load). 
Service ceiling; 37,700 ft. 

Hate of climb? To 26,200 ft in 18 mins <34 mins with bomb load) . 

Sfiffifil&ft* Good performance on one engine, including landing, is claimed. 

Parachute t airbrake fitted to reduce, Irnding run; take-off run is 1,950 yards 

with 3 x 5^0 kg bosbs (940 yards with assisted take-off rockets). 

CU Sub type s Under development; nowered by a. fcair of BKW~003 9 s under each wing. 

Recce version; 2 x KG 151/ 30; max- speed 543 mr>h; service ceiling 
40,700 ft, Qs&t Unarmed bombar; max speed 555 mph at 19,700 ft; range 472 
miles with 4,400 lbs of bombs; service ceiling 35,400 ft. C-ff S Bomber; 
2(or 4) x KO 151/20? max. spool 437 nmh at 19,700 ft. with 4,400 lbs of bombs; 




flight endurance 50 inint with 4,400 l^e. of "bombs, 110 wins with 1,100 1d»« 
of bojabe. SsdLL Recce veraioc; 2 x KG 151/20; flight endurance 130 mine 
(maximum); max, soeed 525 mnh ?.t 33,000 ft, 

B~ Subtype* Projected development with 2 x Hirth HeS~011 Jet-unite. 
Stated mx. speed 525 nroh rt 29,500 ft, with 1,100 lh« of bombs* 


3BU16 ? Putlog 3 Fighter 

fynrttiopment s Popularly known ps the "Volksjftger* (people's fighter), 
the HB~162 wee designed to enroloy ns little as possible of mftteri*l 
in short supply. The design was accented by Goring on 23 September 
44; designing work begpn ths following d*y f *nd blueprints were 
completed by 5 November. The first aircraft ws ready by, end the 
first test flight flown on, 6 December 44. 

S*ib~types S The A-l was the standard service version pt the collapse. 

Description * Shoulder-wing monoplane of mixed construction; wing, tail 
fins and rudders of wood, fuselage of duralumin, steel f dural and 
wood. Taiiplane, with dihedral, carries rectangular fin *nrt rudder 
nt each extremity. Betr^ctrble tricycle undercarriage using zn*in 
wheels of the spine tjne ps thpt used in th* KE-109. Turbo-jet unit 
mounted centrally r*nA rbove fuselage, exhnust jet pessing over trdl- 
plpne pad between fins. Single- sent cocknit set well forwerd. 

D^ensi 1 ofia(ft)s Spans ^3.6 Lengths 29.7 Wing pre* (sq ft}? 130. 

Wei ffhts(lbs) f Hormnl take-offs 5,480 Maximum? 5,940 

Power plant s 1 x Bf'W-003 E-l turbo-jet unit (Jumo-004, HaS-011, 3KW-003 B-2 
ray alternatively be fitted). A quick oowrr-^lpnt change is possible. 

ATMreat/Sgtf? 2 x MK-108 (50 rounds per gun) ) , 

^ j mount eel low xn 

2 x MG-151/:*! (1% rounds per gun) ) fuselcge * ide ®° 

Pprformgnce ,* Max sr>eed: 490 sroh pt S.L.g 522 m-pb at 19,700 ft* 495 nr>h 

Pt 3ft, 000 ft. 

Service ceiling; 39,400 ft. 

Rflte of climb: To 19,700 ft. in 5.6. mine 

B*nge$ 410 miles 36,000 ft (normpl fuel) 

620 miles pt 36 t 0O0 ft (maximum fuel). 

PfiltfTftft* 'to* wrfopmpncft figures given rbove are official figures, but 
were not rttrined by the early production aircraft. 

Was operation*! only in very limited numbers. 


Il£££lQM&&Ji ' Firr^-t seen April 44 -photographic ccy« of %ochlin, 
the JU-2S7 had net progressed loyond the prototype sta^e; it w#€, 
however, the first jet-wof^lled heavy bombor to fly, 

Descri ption s The JU-^BV'b most striking ch*racttf?iBtiC9 pre the length 
of the no bp of the fuselage &nr t?-<r 25° sweep forward of the wing. The 
full crew v;*8 to comprise pilot, MYigfftor/boab^aixaer 4 /*nd radio operator/ 
gunner. Ultimately to "be ryro^ellcd "by two l*rge turbo- t 1et units of 
5,500-7,000 lbs. thruet :nch, 'he ^rototjroes were -nowered by virions 
arrangement o of four or six EM 1 i?»003 A~l'a (l f 760 Ibi. thrust e*ch) , 

3iffiensioaq(f t) 5 Sprung 66.0 Ler.gtfcs 60.0 #ing area (aq ft); 628 

- Normal ta>:e-off : *'\5C0 KmIjiiuih; 53,000 

£qg.fti; ..plrflir * 4 6} x Br V/-003 ';urbo-jet units; arrnn/Teraents varied in 
grou-oa of three under er:ch win,;, or groups of two under arch vin? *nrl 
one low flown on p.pzh si^e of nose, 

Ajrffament/Ssp]>- kopA'< '^ia 1 '6-1 31 \a remotely controlled t^ii turret 
Bomb-lond; 4 f 400 Vis (norcipl), 9,900 lbs (rcaxismm)* 

Performance.: Mf* ape*&: 509 mvih ;?t 5.1, 2 :>3? mph *t 16 t 420 ft.; 

4B? mph *t 36,100 ft. 
Rate of cll^ib: To .32,800 ft. in 33 aine, 
K n nge? 9B5 mile?* v th 8,800 lbs of bombs, 
l,3°ft oiles with 4 t 400 lbs of bomb 3, 

^23 3-= 

Junkers carried out some preliminary work on jet propulsion 
in 1937; the end of 1939 they began design of a full scale turbo- 
jet unit. Conetruction of the Juiio-044 A was begun early in 1940 and 
the first unit was run at the end of that year* Several units of that 
type were ready in the summer of :.941, at the end of vhich year first 
flight tests were made, using *n as a flying test "bench. The 

B subtype was desi£i;<*d #t the end of 1941 and embodied several 
modifications. The first unit of that subtype ran at the end of 1942; 
in the early suitoer of 1943 r oro 4 ;otyne M¥LJ>r>2 with those units was 
flown* Larf*e-scale ^reduction wa«5 planned to start in the summer of 
1943, but Vf»s not fully achieved until Kay or June 1944. 

Type ? 

ft-stage axial- flow cojnp'retsor with single stage turbine. 

A subtypes First rass production unit with 1,848 lbs thrust. 

B~l sub*/pe« An improved type of compressor and with thrust 
of l f 980 Us. Unit he.4 a life of 25 hours* (30-40 flights) between 

B-4 subtype? Same as the B~l but with hollow blades and nn 
overhaul life of 35 hours. 

C subtypes Designee but not built. 

D~4 subtypes 2 f 200 lbs thrust and overhaul life of 50-75 
hours. Designed and planned for tease wo Unction in June 45. Fitted 
with new and better governor r»nd exhaust pipe. 

K subtype D*si£n of this 4,000 lb* thrust unit was completed 
and construction started Just before the collapse. 

' A 'he light alloy compressor casing is built in two halres and 
bolted together. The conror^ssor rotor consists of 8 light alloy disks; 
all blades p!*o *re of li^ht alloy. 


Hot* trouble v#f* experienced with combustion chambers than 
*»ny other part of the unit- "here ?re six chambers disposed radially 
ground the czu%ln& whi^h crrries the rear compressor and 
turbine shrft bearings; each eh*a.ter has a fnel injector which injects 
fuel upstream. '£h& c> ^b*,rs are built up from aluminised mild steel 
sheet, a special method having been developed for resistance welding of 
the Brains. If the turners go out in flight, the pilot must descend to 
13,000 ft. to reignite; at Altitudes above 26,000 ft- full s^eed flight 
jnust he maintained to preserve combustion. 

There are 51 turbine -"blades, fixed into the disk by a forhed 
blade root anft secured in position by rivets or, alternatively, the 
blades may be silver soldered to the rotor. Because of a scarcity of 
alloying materials and the tim<> required for machining the first solid 
blades, the turbine was designed to use hollow air~cooled blades which 
pre manufactured by & deep-drawing process from circular sheet metal. 
The blades pre brazed and pinned onto the wheel. Tinldur or chromadur 
wrs used for turbine~blades. 

Fail pipes; 

The tail pipe contains a moveable ''bullet 11 operated by a 
servomotor through the throttle lever anrt capable cf moving longitud- 

Oil is carried in an annular nose tank. A diluted standard 
oil was used; without dilution the oil is too heavy. 

Starting mttw- 

A Riedel S- cylinder > 2- stroke starter engine is mounted in the 
air intake coaxial-y with the compressor shaft, This engine 9 of 10 hp, 
can be started electrically from the cockpit or by hand by means of a 
cable and pulley. 

Air temperatures at the entrance anfl exit of the turbine stage 
respectively ware 360° C anr 650° C. Experimentally attempts have been 

made to increase th© thrust of the unit by *ffcer burning, v;ith *hich 
turbine exit temperature waa 1,000° 0. 

5?he unit was designed to operate on gaaoline, but vas 
diverted to fuel oil or centrifaged crude oil operation; on those 
oils the unit operated satisfactorily, except that the ©park plu^s 
"became dirty, 



Preliminary work on jet propulsion was started by BMW in 
1?3£; work on the BMW«003 project began in 1939 rnrt the unit first 
ran in August 40. 

Type : 

?-stnge axial compressor with single st#ge turbine* 

The combustion- chamber is s straight-through annular type 
with 16 burners ?nd 6 auxiliary burners for starting. The chamber ia 
made of Sicronu»l or, alternAtively , aluminized steel. 

The air-cooled hollow turbine blades nre of well thought- 
out design which reduces losses introduced by the use of cooling *ir. 

design ia adrsptpble to quantity production *by means of inexpensive 
punch press methods. The blades are welded to the turbine rotor • 
They hardened and crocked rft^r about 50 hours bench running and were 
considered to be the limiting factor on the life of the unit. 

A Vfirifsble area exhpust nozzle is electrically operated by 
e 4-position switch in the cockpit. 

A Riedel stprter ifi used, «s with the Jruao-004. Starting in 
the air can be enrried out only rt altitudes below 10,000 ft, and at 
speeds approaching 350 mph. 

A-l .»nd A~-2: These were in series prodtiction #nd h*d a static 
thrust of i>?G0 lbs. 



subtype; ^his tin e, with n eo&pre*sscr of Brcwa-Boveri 
dssign ?rifi !ar-nufa.cturc', hnfl * thrust of 1,980 Ibo. 

D subtype? Only rsreliialn^ry ddsi^a cnlculptiona were uMe 
for this subtype t which wee tc meet the order received from the GeraAn 
A ir Ministry in April 45 to improve nerforannce to 2,420 lb«, thrust. 

8 Subtype * S*he X«l .^n* K-2 pre Identical respectively with 
the A~l #nct iU2 series except thr»t engine mounting is changed to fit 
the 55B-162 instruction. 



HeS~011 (109-011) 

The Kei nkel-Hirth turbo<~jet unit program began in 1936; up 
to 1944 there were three experimental unite and six projected units. 
The HeS-S unit was installed in the HE-178 aircraft and made the first 
jet-propelled flight in Germany, The HeS-H (later known* a e the KeS-Oll) 
was begun in 1944, culminating in the series produced xxnit. 

The unit has an impeller at the intake; a compressor consisting 
of a dlagonsl stage an* 3 9xi»l 2«etMje turbine with hoilow blades. An 
Adjustable Jet nossle is fitted, having 2 positions , fully in for idling 
»nd fully out for all other conditions, Th<* unit appears to have been 
csirefwlly designed to provide the neceasary air cooling and readiness of 

The designers reported the greatest *i faculty with combustion 
or fuel Jet and hurner design and with the control of gas terpereture 
at the turbine entry, Difficulties were also encountered with the isipeller. 
The unit did run fcr » certain time at a thrust of 2,540-2,860 lbs. 
but much work waa still to be done on the unit »t the end of the war. 

The unit has the same weight as the Jumo-004 but nroduced a 
etatic thrust 50$ greater. Production of the Heinkel-Hirth unit was 
intended for the end of 1945. 


The V-l was developed as .«n expendable ^Hotless aircraft 
intended for long-range bombardnent of towns in Southern England. 
It is p mid-wing monoplane with sin-le fin and rudder, the roar 
portion of the fuselage being *u refuted "by an Argus jr/t unit. 

Light metal is used for the extrajne nose of the fuselage 

all control surfaces, and the rest of the airframe pre of steel. For 

ease of transport and assembly, the fuselage is made In sections 
which bolt together. 

A steel cylindrical fuel tank of 130 gallon capacity 
comprises the central section of the fuselage* Behind the fuel tank 
is a compartment containing two wire-wound spheres 1 ft. 9 l/4 ins. 
in diameter, containing air under very high pressure. Further aft is 
p compartment housing the automatic pilot, and the fuselage terminates 
in h cone carrying the tailplane and rudder. 

The propulsion unit comprises a new form of ^thodyd (aero- 
thermodynamic duct), actually an impulse duct machine. At the front 
is n grill containing twelve jets *nd an arrangement of shutters 
which close when the pressure within the tube is? great -ir than that 
in front of the grill. 

The engine operates intermittently in conformity with the 
opening and closing of the shutters, but the fuel supply is continuous. 
L^w~grade aviation fuel is used and is forced from the tanks to the 
jets by conroresssd air from the spherical pressure bottles. 

A rudder and two differentially acting elevators comprise 
the control surfaces. 'Abe weight of the warhead an* the blast effect 
produced are comparable with those of p one«ton "bomb. 

A minimum range of 125 miles, 350 mph. s^eed in level flight 
and an ^pDroach altitude of about 2,000 ft. are attributed to the T-l. 

The weapon is launched from a ramp, hydrogenoeroxide and 
pprmnngenfcte being used as a pror>ellant. (In the late days of th« 
attack against England some V-l*s vere nir- launched. 

The piloted V-fr : This aircraft is slightly larger than the 
T-l ^nd incorporates several changes. The control assembly Jias been 


• removed and the single air tank is moved about two feet to the rear^ 
the warhead is covered with a rounded, hlunt, plywood nose case, 
the cockpit control© and flight instruments are located Just forward 
of the propulsion unit, end ailerons have %een added to the wings; 

Piloted V~l fi s were intended to "be launched from fcomher type 
aircraft. While the pilot was equipped with a parachute, P/W 
technicians have stated that only 1$ were expected to survive. The 
aircraft was to "be flown to and directed into the target and then the 
pilot was to jump Just before the collision. 

Length of fuselage 21 * 10" 24 9 3* 

Length of jet propulsion unit ll 9 3 rt 12 ! 

Max. dlara. of fuselage 2' 8 l/4 u 2* 9* 

Wing span 16' 18* 9* 

Grots win* are& 55 sq. ft* 






Developme nt : Standard f Jghter/recoe aircraft of the GAFo Designed for 
catapult operation from warship© (which could carry up to aircraft) 
and shore basss* Intended primarily for recce, also used for attacks 
on eneisy long-range aircraft and for anti-submarine operations* Twin 
float version standard; although single float version also exists c 

Sub- ty pee ; Sub- types A, B and C have been identified* 

Description : Single-engine two-seater low-wing monoplane* flings do- 
signed to foldo Single fin and rudder set well forward with respect 
to tailplaneo Transparent cockpit. Fuel carried in floats * Mixed 
construction- -metal, stressed skin, fabric. 

Dimensions (ft) ; Span; 2*1*0 Length: 36,1 Wing area (sq ft)j 307 

7<eights(lbs ) : Worjaal take-off: 6,600 Maximums 6 f 800 

fioyer pie pi; : BfcSV 132K, 9 cylioder. air-cooled radial (920 h»p, at S.L«) 

Anaament/Boab Load 1 1 x 7*9 v& fixed forward fuselage 

2 x 20 mm fixed rring 
Twin 7*9 ™ flexible dorsal 
220 lbs (max, stowage) 

performance ; ifex speeds 195 aph at 3«L* 
Service ceiling 1 21*500 ft 
Rate of climb 1 6,00C ft in h«5 mins. 
Ranges 340 miles at 120 aph (with 220 lbs bombs) 

Remarks : Bonib carriers under wings c Aircraft stressed, for catapult 
launching. Maximum speed of pull-out from dive is 316 mphc 


Developjneut ; The DO* 217 2 was the earliest operational subtype of the 
DO* 217 and was developed fro;a th® DO-17 2. and the DG-215. 

Sub -types; J— night-fighter version (structurally similar to E f except 
for redesigned nose) has BMW 801 engines; K~~bojaber has BM 801 'a* 
and M—bomber has DE 6 03 A engine a o E-5 carrying HS-293 glider bomb 
«Q8 used against Allied convoys* night-fighter Tersion of M sub- 
type with heavier armament (ssay include 2-4 oblique guns)* 

Description; Twin~engine * shoulder wing zoozioplune * All~&8tal stressed 
sklr^ Wing tapers x&oderately to rounded tips* Cockpit is forward of 
loading edga Twin fina and rudders 9 Fins are slotted for single 
engine control: landing gear retracts rearward* Jettisonable 
umbrella- shaped dive-brake was once used for the tails wing dive- 
brakes nay be used* 

Dii^naionaXf t ) i Span* 62 ! 5 15 Length i 56* 6* Wing area (sq ft)? 610 

geif ght8(lha) : formal take-offs 32*000 Maximum* 34*000 

Power plant : 2 BMff 801 a/2, 14~cy Under* twin-row, air-cooled fan-assisted 

radial , 

Arigaxoent/Bog^ Load : 1 x 7«9 na flexible nose (1^000 rounds) 

1 x 13 im dorsal turret (500 rouMs) 

1 x 13 um ventral (1>000 rounds) 

2 x 7*9 ^ (75° rounds each) 

Performance ,* Max speed 1 290 ioph at ScL, 330 mph at 22*000 ft 
Service ceiling* 27*000 ft. 

Ranges 1*170 xoiles at 210 m&h (with normal load) 
I.I65 miles at 240 xaph (with normal load) 
2*400 miles (with aaximum fuel) 

Remarks * Used as a bomber t and dive bomber t also for torpedo-dropping 
xaine laying or towing gliders o Cannot be considered to have been a 
success in any operational field * 


Develoray nt t i r ne unusual tandeat^engine layout was patented by Doruier In 
193?l permission to build the prototype was not givsn until 1942* 
Available in small numbers at the end of the war, it was never en* 
countered on operations, 

Sub-types t A-0» day fighter and fighter boniber* A«l 5 day-fighter and 
fighter bomber* A-6, night-fighter^ A-10* 11 1 12 two-seater trainers. 
B-aeries patterned after the A series 9 modified and equipped specifi- 
cally for use as a heavy fighter and night fighter * 

Description ? Twin-engine , low-wing iconoplane 6 The engines drive pro- 
pellers at opposite extremities of the fuselage. Tail unit is of 
cruciform shape with fin and rudder continued below fuselage « 
Retractable tricycle undercarriage • 

JJiiioonsionaCft^ t Span* 45*3 1 Lengths k5?5* Wing area (eq ft)? 414' 

ffelghts(lbs) ; Normal take-off * 21,l6o lEuiHarat (A»b) 22,230 

power pjlant ; Two IB 603 E*a in tandem in the fuselage, the nose driving 
a conventional tractor propeller and the rear engine $ positioned behind 
the pilot, driving a pusher propeller at the tail through a long hollow 

Armaiaent/Bottfc Load ! Day fighter 3 x MC-103 2 x V0-151/2O* night 
fighter 1 x MC-I03 2 x 10-251/20 (all fixed firing forward) 
Maximum bomb load 500 kg. 

*erf oraan ce : Max speed 1 477 aph at 21,000 ft* 

Service ceilings 37? 000 - 40,000 ft* 
Rate of climbs To 26 00C ft in 13 sains 
Range? 868 udlas at 428 mph at 23*000 ft« 

1 6 280 miles at 295 *£pk at 19*700 ft (at economical 

cruising speed) 

Reicarka s Dr* Dornier built and flew at least eight different types of 
tandem propel lered aircraft in the last twenty years* His latest , the 
DC~335 9 has been described as a little difficult to fly with a tendency 
to porpoise o Its performance is nevertheless outs tending® 

Two 00*333*3 spliced together by a common wing center-section* Sach 
fuselage and tailplone is complete in itself Aircraft has four engines 
and propellers (two tractor t two pusher), and a four-wheeled landing v fcaar 
(two nose wheel© , two main wheels )* Probably envisaged as a lonJlV^^ee 



boa&ar-reaoimalssaitca aircraft; had ne^er flo*xio 

Spas 90 ft, f?irig area 866 t to 

Maximum speed 450 uph at 21 30C ft (with m-5Q), 

Maximum range 4? 720 milea at 21 *300 ft* 

FI-156 JXitles : Staff transport : short- 

range reconnaissance, 

Developnsnt t An original design developed specifically for slow-speed 
flight and landing and taking-off from short, restricted and unpre- 
pared airstrips < One of the GAF's principal army cooperation aircraft » 

Sub-types i 0-1, staff transport; 0-2, short-range reconnaissance; F-> 
can he fitted with external carriers for light bombs c All C's are 
tropical versions* 

Description : Single -engined high-wing monoplane. Metal fabric cover- 
ings Wing is parallel in chord, braced by "V* struts* Adjustable 
metal slot fitted along wide leading edge*, Fuselage is rectangular,, 
There is a braced tail 3 single fin and rudder* landing gear is fixed 
and exceptionally strong to permit heavy landings * 

Dimension (ft) : Span? 46*7 Lsngthi 32c5 Wing area (eq ft)s 280 

WeightsClbs) : Stomal take-off > 2,920 

Bower plant : Argus AS-10C/3, 8-oylinder t air-cooled t inverted »V». 

Anaaaent/Borflb load : free dorsal - 1 x 7o? sun 

Performance i Max speeds 110 mph at SoLo 
Service ceiling: 16,700 ft 
Rate of climb t To 6*500 in 9 min. 
Range i 240 miles at 60 mph (at SoL*with crew of 3) 
630 miles at 60 mph (at S*I*o with crew of 1) 

Remarks : Stalling speed 34 mph, landing speed 25 mph with run of under 
100 ft* 


Development : TA-152 was the first series product ional ana operational 
subtype of the modified FW-l^Oo The "long-nosed Fff-190* was re- 
designated the TA-152 by it© designer when he altered the noes* to 
give a smoother fusslage topline and installed hydraulic operation 
for the flaps and undercarriage 

Sub-typea : TA 152 A (almost identical with the FW-I90 P) had a Jumo 213 A 
engine but did not go into production* the TA 152 B with a ^uxoo 213 E 
was never produced in large quantity * C subtype with D3-603 L,TA~152 E 
used for races, and TA 152 H (with pressurized cabin) for high altitute 
recce (48 1 6* wing apan)* Cfcly C» E and H subtypes were intended as 
standard equipment* 

Description s Single-enginea 9 low-wing cantilever xaonoplaneo Wing structure 
modified to carry extra fuel tanks thus raising internal fuel capacity 
to 231 gallons (also 32 gallons of M~5° can be carried). 

Digjanai ona (f t^ : Spam 360I Wing area (sq ft) 1 2l6e 

Power plants All subtypes have a liquid«cooled engine* The B 9 E and H 
have a Jumo-213 E* the C a DB-603 L* 

^aaaiaant/ Bogib ^oad : Heavy armament fitted-cosibinatioB of 20 cm and 30 mm 
forward firing gunso 

frarf ormance : Max speed? C-subtype* 4&7 »ph at 35*000 ft (using 1W-5 )* 
H* subtype; 465 mph at 30 f 000 ft (with MY«50) ; 472 iqph at 41*000 ft 
(with GM*1) 

Remarks t series is a long-span version for high-altitude operation 
and is fitted with pressurized cabin© 


Bevelppment j Designed to meet a specification for * ehort range night- 
fighter and bad weather d*>y fighter with a hie;h mimjn sneed ^nd an 
endurnnce of 2 3/4 hours, Rapid development and quantity production 
were emphasised, together with extensive use of material not in short 
supDly, especially vood s 

Siks^XS&a.^ ^-1 two-aeater day fighter, A~2 single-seater dny fighter, 
A«3 two-seater night fighter. B series (with metal nose) never pro- 
duced. C-l two-seater night fighter, C~2 single-seater day fighter, 
C~3 two-seater day fighter, 

P,eB,<;rXBtj.9BS Twln~en#ined t high-wing monoy>lnne . One "oiece shoulder wing of 
wooden construction vith straight leading edge, and swept forward 
trailing edge, Nacelles project beyond trailing edge. Constructed of 
wood, the fuselage ie in one piece from front bulkherd to the nxio of 
rotation of the rudder with prraor protection for the pilot an^ wireless 
operator in cockpit forwrd of leading edge. The cantilever tailplsne 
is of light metals Tricycle undercarriage* 

Dimensions (f\)i Snans 52.5 Length: 41.3 Wing area (so ft)* 349 

Weight s (lbe)g Normal take-off? 18,600 Mav^iuias A-2 (with ©Ul) 19,480 

Power plant 3 ^o d'umo 2115 or 21 1R engines. Annular redifttor*. 

Arraasie n %/S&9M$J&Q& » 2 :i KK-108 and 2 y MG-«15l/20 fixed forward fuselage. 

(4 x KK-108 or 4 x MG-151/20 nre alternatives) 
2 x MK-108 oWiQue guns may "be installed in fuselage, 

gejtformfiius.e (FW-;L54 A) * Max speed? 383 sroh nt 19,000 ft (with Jumo-211 N) 

394 nrch at 26*3<X) ft (with Jumo~211 R) 
Service ceilings 31,200 ft, (with Jumo«211 N) ; 

35 5 800 ft. (with Jumo-811 R) 
Hate of climb; To 26,200 ft in 16 inins (Jwro-2il H) , 

i.u 14imina (Jumo-211 H) 
Range- (Jumo-211 N) 1,195 miles nt 23,000 ft (with 

2 X 66 gpl droT) tanks) 
(Jumo-211 R) 1,160 miles at 23,000 ft 



RfilSar&S.' Outstanding differences between A *M G sub-types are the 
installation in the of two Jumo ?13 A engines, a metal nose, nad, 
night-fightey two oblique, upward-fighter MX-108 guns. In the day 
fighter version of the C subtype, provision is made for 6 x MK-108 
(fuselage mounted). The emergency Maximum sr»eed of the C«3 t using 
0*Wl f is 428 mrih at 32,800 ft. 

The TA-154 never became operational; it is reported that 
of a suitable adhesive for its wooden construction l^d to many 
difficulties, including a number of £&tal crashes on teat-flights 

The TA-254 was intended as a high-altitude modification; 
differed from the TA-154 in that nn increased wing span provided 
increased wing area. A nnd 3 «ubtyr>es of the TA-254 h-ve been 







Duties 3 Ftghta?/ ground-attack, 

D evelopment; S First version, with BMW-139 14- cylinder radial, flew in 1938, 
Sngine then replaced "by 3MW-801 ^nd several airf rozne structural 
modifications incorporated. Intended ultimately to fit liquid-coo2 &d 
in-line engine. Became operational in 1941«~used extensively thereafter* 
Performance substantially increased by fitting of po^er-booftting systeme^ 
heavier nrmajnent mounted as improved ^uns hecaKie av*il*ble. 

Sub- types ; JUls * -: 7.9 mm 3 -j: M<M5l/20 
jW3/R~6* 4 b: K£K-15l/30 t 2 x MO-131 
Other A subtypes with variations of srra&ment* 
B subtype r airframe differing in detail only, 
D *mbtyr>e£ DB-603 or JtuiiO-213 liouid-cooied engine— only 
became operational in the finnl stages of the ynr. The H long« 
nosed 1 * FW-190. 

Descriotiop* Single-engine, low- wing cantilever monoplane. Wings h^ve 
moderate taper, blunt tips with rounded corners/ Ketal stressed^skin 
construction, ^ingle fin sntf rudder. Wide-tmck undercarriage. 

Dimen Bion^(ft ) ; Span* 34.5 Lengths "9.5 Wing area (sq ft) i 197 

Weights (lbs) * x'orm^l tske~off f 8,600 Maximums 10 1 350 

£awfiIL2llaai 5 BKW-901 D, 14~eylinder 3 two-row, air-cooled (fan assisted) 

Armam ent/Bomb lor d* 2 x ?.9 (or IS) mm fixed forward fuselage 

2 (or 4) x 20 im fixed wing 
550 lbs (normal), 1,100 Ibc (rasx) 

Performp^c- fc*x s^eed? '*OS mr.h 18,^00 ft. (408 mvh at 20,600 ft with 


(With BMW- Service ceilings -54 1 000 ft. 
801 en*ine)llnte of climbs 'Co 33.0C0 ft in 2S\ rains 
Hpnges 950 miles nt 29f nwh 

Her^yfc.gJ S-oecif*! bon b<*r version carried one 3500 lb bomb. 

The B~9 subtypsd, with p lffi-6C3 cr Juiito~213 liouid-cooled engine 
«nd KW-50 boost attained * rtaximum snrsd of 440 moh At 15,600 ft. A 
later subtype, the D--12, with MW«50 boost allied to the Jumo-213 engine. 
£lves 453 raph *t 37,000 ft. Provision ie mane for a 30 sun cannon- firing 
through ihe -oroneller boss. D- subtypes have fueelsge of increased length 
(33,9 ft). 

Bomber/ recce. 

fi^IfllflDMBJt* ^ militarised version of the FV-200 "Candor" transport, 
first produced in 1940. The C series then became a standard long-* 
range r^o^njui seance boater. 

Suh-tvp^pi 0*1 md C-2 had BMV-132 engines; subeeo(uent G-serles eubtypee 
had MW-323 f s. 

D««erlptiopi Four*- exy?i ned low-vlng monoplane of all-metal mixed stressed- 
skin and fabric construction. Bout bay in form of extended bola below 
fuselage has gun positions fore and aft. Single fin and rudder. Re- 
tractable undercarriage. Crew of eight. 

DAmAnn\an*(tt)i Span* 107.6 Length; 78.2 Wing *ren(sq ft); 1,270 

W ft yrhttt(ih T ) i Borstal take-off, 50,000 

Povftr tiliinti BtfW-132, or 323 9-cylinder redlals. 

ArmAiaenif /Bo^b Lp»ft i Dorsal: 1 x 15/20 mm (forward hydraulic turret, 1 x 13 mm. 

(manual aft turret) 
Laterals 2 (or 4) x 7.9 mm (or 2 x 13 mm). 
Ventral* 1 x 15/20 mm (forward), 1 x 7.9/13 mm (aft) in 

Bomb load* 3,600 lbs (normal); 10,800 lbs (maximum) 

Performance! Max snpedi 2.7 iroh at S.L.* 340 miih at 13,000 ft. 
Service ceiling: 20,500 ft* 
Bate of climb: To 16,000 ft in 25.5 mine 
Range* 2,150 miles at 165 mph (with 3,600 lbs bombs) 
2,700 miles at 165 mnh (max fuel, no bombs). 

BamArka i 3 omb stcjaga, additional to under- fuselage bomb bay, is provided 
by external carriers under outboard* engine nacelles and outboard of 
those nacelles. Tomedoes, if carried, were slung from those outboard, 
wing carriers. Provision made for carrying two HS»r>93» Sf one from each out- 
board wing carrier. 


Development s This twin-boom transport glider w*s fl.esl 

to the ultimate installation of engines, the powered version "being the 
In extensive use from 1942 on. 

Sub- tyne s 5 A and * subtypes differed only in detail. 

Description s High braced wing, twin booir. monoT>lpne of wood, fabric % plywood 
and metal tubing construction. Has a central nacelle, hinged in the. rear 
for loading purposes. Flaps an d lift spoilers *re fitted to the wings. 
Jettisonable wheeled landing gear is provided for the glider version, 
landing being effected on three skids£ the powered version has a simple, 
robust, fixed tricycle undercarriage. Typical tug was the JU 52, H£ ill, 
or ME 110* 

gj,m^n^on^(f t? \ Span* 79 1 Lengths 52.6 *ing area (sq ft) % 700 
««ijfht^(lh«Oa Normal take-off, 17,500 

Power plant (GO-P/u) x Two Gnome-Rhone 14M, 14- cylinder, twin row Mr-cooled 
radials installed in nacelles forming the extension of the twin booms, 

Arfflpr^nt/^PPlb Lgpfls ?ree f'rd fuselage l/2 x 7.9~mm Free dorsal 1 x 
Free tail 1 x 7.9-mm. Typical stowage - 840 cu. ft. Freight 5,300 lb . 

Performan ce (00-244 )* Max speeds 169 mph at 10,000 ft 

Cruising speeds 100 mph at S.L. 
Rate of climbs To 10,000 in 31 min. 
Ranges 375 miles at SL 

RftaaX&a* Crew of two carried in forward section of fuselage, which is 
well glazed e 




KB-],?? Bomber/recce/torpftdo- 
*KE-277 dropping *nn gli^r-bomb attacks. 

Development % Produced in 1943 After four years of development, Production 
abandoned in October 1944 after some 200 aircraft hpd gone into service. 
Trouble with the coupled engines led to development of the 3. subtype 
with four s*?>arrte engines* this subtype did not progress beyond the 
prototype stnge* 

j»uh~typgtt 2 A«l (bomber) subtypes h*.d ° x BB-606 "double engines" composed 
of two DB~691 E engines genred together. Subtype® from JU3 were cowered 
by 2 x DB 610 (each of two 1)8-605* s). iU7 BB-613 engines an«1 increased 
wing s?)an. 

Dearriptiqp i Tvrin-»»ngine , aiid-v/ing monoplane. Metal streased~skin 
construction. Technically four-engined, it appears as twin-engine*. 
Highly-develoned *\>wler fl*p arrangement designed to cover greater 
pprt of trailing edge. Fuselage is of rectangular section, rbout on**- 
third of length forward of lending edge, Single f in r .n* rudder en*ul»r- 
shaped . 

Dliaenslons(ft )a Span 103,5 Lengths 72.0 Wing area (sq ft); 1,076 

Weights(lbs) l Kormpl tnke-off, 63,000 MazimunJ 73,500 

Power ttlrmt s DB 610 ( ff Twin M EB~ft05) t 24«cylinder, liquid~coole£, inverted 
twin H V«. 

Armpmept/Bomb Loqfl s All free 2 Forward fuselage 1 x 7.9 mm; Dorsal s 
forward turret l/2 x 13 mm, r^ar turret if 2 x 13 mm; Tails 1 x MO 
151/30; Gondola 1 x MO 151/ "0 (forward), 1 x 13 mm (rear); 
0b8*rver*s nosition? 1 x 73 mm. TyoiCftl bomb- loads prei 48 x 70 kg, 
or 10 x 500 kg v or 6 x 1,000 kg, or 2 x 2500 kg, or 2 x HS-293 glider 
bomb 8. 

Performance s Max eneed? 250 mph ?,t S.L.i 300 mph at SO ,000 ft. 
Service ceiling*: 26,500 ft. 
Rate of MfKbs To 17,000 ft in 25 mi a. 
Ranges 1,150 miles at 310 mnh ( Normal fuel / bomb load) 
3,000 Kiles at 210 mph (Max fuel, no bombs) 

Remarks : Used for enti-convoy rnd lM?o?»t cooperation duties. Subtype A-3 
and A-5 used in night attacks against England in January 1944. ^ever 

*HE-377 5 An improvement on the HS-177 h<:d four sepaxate-IXB 603 engines an* 
a cruising rnnge of 5,000-6,250 miles. 

very successful in its operrtionrl use nn** introduced into somb 
in limited ounntity only. Almost ceased to operate sfter an in 
effective *nn weak effort p^inst the Rormandy invasion, 

fiatXeg.* N i«ht fighter 

fifiYelQpiRfnSl^ designed in 1940/41 *s a hi^h Toerforr^nce fighter it came 
into service pl night fighter during 1944/1945, 

Sub-tyne^ Representative subtypes pre A~2 with 2 x DB-603A engines, 
A-5 *nd JU? with DE-f03 f s. Ch«s HR.219 B f a long-euan version with 
Jumo~222 , s t did not ^o into service. 

Descriptions Twin-engined mid«win£ jnonopl*nf» of all awstal construction. 
Fuselage is long and slim with nose projecting forward of engines. 
Long engine nacell** extend beyond trailing edge. Twin fins and rudders. 
Tricycle landing gear, fully retractable. A turbo-jet unit may be 
fitted optionally under central bola. 

Pimenalonafft); Span; 60.7 Length: 51.0 Wing are* (sq ft)s 480/500 

Weights(lb s)s Normal t*ke-offs 26,000 Maximums 29,900 

PftW?r Plnntg Two DB 603 12-cylinder, liquid-cooled inverted "V" engines. 

Armament/Bomb Lopds 4 x KG 15l/°0 (300 rds per gun) in detachable fairing 
under fuselage; provision for two addition?! forward firing /runs in 
wing-roots. 2 x MK-108, obliaue upward«firing, behind cockpits 

Performnn^ g Max sr>eeds 325 nmh at S.L.: 400 nroh fit 22,000 ft. 
Service ceilings 32,800 ft. 
Ranges 1545 miles (with mnx fuel load) 

Q60 miles «t mpx continuous sneed. 

R gfflftrfcg * It is sflid a rocket projector tube c*n be mounted under each wing 
outboard of npcelles. GK-1 power boosting eouipment may be fitted. Com- 
prehensive r*ri*r installation was fitted to night-fighter. 

Crew of two (or three) provided with full Armor-plating. 

Heralded as the answer to the Mosquito, the HE-219 did not live 
up to its pre~oper*tion*l publicity. 


SS^ISS. Duties §Blve "bomber/ground Attack 

D eve lonmen t s Designed primarily for grounA-at tack operations. ?irst used 
operationally as countemp rt of Russian H Stormovik n (I.V-2) in 194 2 1 now 
obsolescent, De-eloped for close cooperation of OAF with &rwy. Noted 
for heavy armor a art armament • 

Sub~tyT>es $ A subtype, the original version, was fitted with ASM 10 inverted 
"V" air-cooled engines; B subtype was fitted with French-built Gnome- 
Rhone 14 M 04/05 air«coolei& 14-cylinder radials. B-l and .B~2 pre the ©ost 
common subtypes. 

Descriptions Twin- engine' 4 single-seater lov-wing mo no Diane . Wings are 
tapered, tips alight ly rounded, Fuselage of triangular section; nose 
drops away sharply forward of cockpit. Metal, stressed skin, flush- 
riveting. Single fin and tall rudder. Landing gear retracts into 
nacelles | p. portion of wheel remaining visible. 

Dimension^ ft) s Span? 44.5 Lengths 33.3 Wing area (sq ft) 3 305 

Wei ght s{ lbs) j Normal take-offs 11,400 

Power nlpnt ; 2 Gnome-Rhone 14M 04/05, 14-cylinder, twin«row t air-cooled 

Armament/ Jfoafr Logd ? All fixed firing forward* forward fuselnge 2 x 7.9 mm £ 
2 x 15/20 mm. One 30 mm gun (or 4 x 7.9 mm) forwnrd firing under fuselage 
as alternative to the 770 lb bomb load. 

Performance * kax speeds 240 srph at S.L.S 275 mnh at 9,000, 
Service ceiling* ,BO0 ft. (with max. load) 
Bate of climb : 'i 5 o 10,000 ft in 7 min. 
Ranges 440 miles at 150 tirch. 

350 inile3 ft 216 nroh* 

Rftmftrks g Some subtypes vera experimentally e quired for antitank 
work v/ith a battery of six 75 nun smooth-bore recoiliese guns, fitted 
in the fuselage to fire downwards and re*rwf»rds. 


H§dL2Q BtttAtUL^ High-altitude bomber/ 


Development l Developed during 1943 as a high-pltitude bomber and re- 
connaissance ^ircrr.ft, but not used operationally. 

Subtype s* A- - two PB-505 engines and no armaments - two BMVU801 D 
turbo-eu-uerch^r^ed engines. E« 2 x 33R=603 #nd 1 x DB-605 (see below) 

Description? Twin-engined, 8>id~wing monoplane with pressurised cabin. 
All metal, stressed skin construction. Circular section fuselage with 
cabin forming 'forwafd p^rt* Cantilever tnil unit, single fin ?nd 
rudder. Single-le# undercarriage, retracts hydraulically into nacelles; 
retro st/vble tail wheel. 

Pin^flftlorififfft) z Sr>an^ 108* Lengths 64.?' 

WMx;hti.(ll)fl) a Ponnal take-off, 38,000 

Power -nUnt g 2 x IXB-603 S or T £ 1 x MB 605 T; the iRtter is fitted in the 
fuselage and drives ft Roots blower for sunr>ly of nlr to superchargers of 
the D3-603 ! s. 

Arn jajnept/Bomb Load s 2 x i'G 131 in turrets, one *bove and one below cf>bin 
rotptin* through 360°; 1 x KG 151/ 30 in tail turret. All remotely 
controlled mid with r>erisccpic sights* 

Pe yfonfl^ eeg kax speeds 320 mnh at 1<\00C ft. 

Service ceilings 45-50,000 ft. 

Bemarka ; In efforts to secure a propeller suitable for the r>ower at 
altitude, blade widths of 17,7 ins were used$ to reduce weight to a 
minimum, the -oro sellers were made of r>ine or balsa wood by the Schwartz 
process, or of light~alloy. 

Special ftloctrical eouipment was required for high-altitude 


Development s First flown a borcber in 1936 *nd mnsroxiinntely 50 h*d 
been built by the beginning of 1939. B ft sic design was subsequently 
ndftt>ted for p wide variety of duties and JU«88 Aircraft in vrrioua 
forms were in operation pad production when hostilities ceased. 

Subtypes* 1? subtypes in the A- aeries were oroduced, powered by various 
subtypes of the Juuse~211; several of those subtypes were trainer tyoee* 

Deseripflloft* Twia~enpined low-wing aonoplane. Wing center section slightly 
I? gulled* . 'A>p find bottom of fuselage pre flnt, side* curved. Kose 
i>nd cockpit of pn--jular, faceted type. Single fin »nd rudder. Slotted dive 
brpkee nre fitted under wings, ^ending retracts re»rwerd into 

nacelles, wheels turning through 90°. All metal, stressed skin construc- 

Plran9iong(ft)s 3*omi« 65.9 Length-* 47.0 Wing area Uq ft)* 590 

W^i^ht^UMl^ Hormal t*ke-off; 28,400 Mflximuas 31,800. 

k&Zl&L^iLsil&t Jumo-Sll J, 12~cylinder, linuid-cooled, inverted H V W . 

Artugjaten t/B omb LjOp d «r 3F 1 e ■ xi bl e noses 1 x ?,9 mm. Dorsals 1 x 7.9 mm f 
1 x 13 nnru Yentrsls 1 x twin 7.9 aim. Bomb loads uo to 6,600 lbs. 

$$&£MM8&&&* Kft^c &oeedi 242 mph ?»t S.L.s 291 mph at 14 % 000 ft. 
Service ceiling* 2? t 0'Y) ft. 
H n te of climb: ' J? o 16,500 in 21.4 rain, 
fienge: 1,310 miles *t 133 mph ] with normal 

1,230 miles et 254 mph ] fuel bosib lend 

&fin&J&S s Bftta supplied is for A«4 nnd ?*pr)lies b^eicplly to subtypes A~l 
to A-14. 

^31 9« 

JIU29Q Duties! Boaber-Oli der toving 


Development ? Developed from the and intended to supersede the FW~2O0 

for long-range, over- v *ater, nnti- shipping; and T J~boat cooperation work. 
Originally designed for transport work and fir at test flown in 1941. 

gub~types 3 JU1, transport; A-*3 and A-5 reee^; iw6 transport; A~8, recce 
(With provision for carrying two KS-293) , 

B subtyne was a projected heavily armed long-range bomber version, with 
a strengthened fuselage and modified nose design. 
C (transport-recce), D (long range bomber) and $ 
(projected night-bomber) subtypes also identified, 

Peeerintiop g Four-engine* low^win^ monoplane. Metal stressed ekin 
construction. 3Hiselage is of square section with rounded corners* 
Pilot's cocfcoit well forward in nose. SVin fins and rudder s at ex- 
tremities of horiz-^fital stabiliser. Landing gear hr>s double wheels 
end retracts hydraulically rearward into inboard nacelles, 

Dimnnniongfft ); Sr>anS 138 Lengths 92.0 Wing at en (s ft)s 2,210 

Weight s( lb a) i Normal t^ke-off J 90,000 Maximum* 100,000 

Power plants Four BKW-301 L~2, 14~ey)in-ex% twin-row, air-cooled, radial. 

Armamen t /Bomb Lopds Varies according to duty. Nose-heavily armed 
reconnaissance version carries 2 x 20 mm (dorsal front), 2 x 20 mm 
(dorsal rear) t 1 x 20 mm (tail), 1 x 20 ram (ventral forward), 1 x 13 mm 
(ventral rear), 2 x 20 mm (lateral) and 1 x 20 mm (nose). 

Performance s Fax speeds 209 mph at S,L.i 280 mph at 18,000 ft. 
Service ceiling? 19,000 ft. 
Rate of climb* T 18,000 in 43.5 mi a. 
Range? 1030 miles at 191 mph ) With normal 

990 miles at 203 mph ) fuel/bomb load 
2490 miles with 17,600 lbs of freight. 

Remarks 3 Transport version carries up to 48 p&ssengars or 22,000 lbs of 
freight. Underneath of fuselage constitutes hinged ramp to facilitate 

JH-388 fiaiiaa* lighter 

Develop ment s The JU-388 w^s the Intent of the JU-88 series to reaeh 
the production stage. First test flown in 1943, it was included in 
the restricted production T)rogp^m which we3 in forc^ when hostilities 
ended, Developed basically from the JU-1R8, many features of which 
are retained, end of which it is essentially a pressurised version. 

Sub-t;ym ifl3 JU~388 K bomber version has large bomb bulge similar to that 
on the JU-88 S and JU-1R8 S. Only -armament Is rear turret * twin MO 
131* JU 388 Ii recce aircraft similar to K, bomb bulge omitted. J 
subtypes are night fighter versions, with hepvy * r moment . 

Description ; Twin-engined # low-wing monoplane. All subtypes have provision 
for nreesurized cabin, Br 7 sic appearance is same as the JU-188, except 
for remotely-controlled tail turret. On the long-range versions, the 
fuselage beneath the bomb-bay has a "bath-tub" effect. 

BiTOMi<WfQ.* v tng area (s q ft) 5 602 

Weight s( lb a) s Normal take-off, 30 f 000 Maximum: 32,350 

to 30,700 

Power pl ant ; : 2 x BMW 801 TJ or 2 x Juao 213 ? ( turbo-super charged). 

Armament/Bomb Lo»d l Wight fighter* BoIp 2 x M& 151/20 f 2 x MX-108; 
pblique 2 x MG 151; rear turret-twin tfG 131 (remote-control). 
-Bomber and recce « Twin MG 131 in remote-control re*r turret. Provision 
for both internal and external bomb storage. 

Perform,* pee s Max speeds 272-285 mph at S.L.s 389-407 mph f»t 30,000 ft. 

(wit^i MW-50). 
Service ceiling: 40,000 ft^ 

Rate of climbs 1545 ft/min at S.I.; to 30,000 ft in 27.5 mins 
Ranges 1400-1600 miles at 36,000 ft (no drop tanks) 

1700-2000 miles ^t 36,000 ft (with drop tanks), 

R*mnrktt i Crew of 3 (4 in night-fighter) well protected by armor-plate. The 
L subtypes were intended for photo reconnaissance. Jumo - 222 A/B 
engines were planned r* alternative power units. A special t>eriscopic 
sight~wa* fitted for ar.e *1 *h the remote-control tail turrets 


S5iiiS2L » Transport/ bomber/ long- 

Development^ A six-engined development of the JU-2SQ with incr^.nsed 
sr*an and overall leagsa. An e>;tra oanel Grunting £ BMW 801 £ engine 
introduced in each wing. New fuselage centre section increased length, 

■ Test flown in 1943, 

SOisiSBfla.^ Datr* herein ^iven ie for transport version, l*OBg~range recce 
type has six built-in fuselage tanks. Armament identical with JTJ 290 
C (recce). Long-range bomber version has four build-in fuselage t*nka 
mi equipment for HS. -93 operations is added, 

VjL^ilZ^dMk " Si3c~eiy*ined t lovr~ving monoplane. 

Plmengiona(ft)* Spftns 165 Wing ares (sq ft)? 2,723 

&§&£ktelJ*£§h Normal take-off, 161,000 

£&£££j^^i 5 6 x Bi^Uaoi B 14- cylinder, twin-rov» air-cooled r*di*l. 

&rmnm^ni/Aomh. Loafl g *vin 20 ,mm in forward dorsal , aft doranl, tail, 
central and nose positions 

-ggRfQgjBaattfe^ **ax speed; 260- mph at 18,700 ft. 

Rate of climb? At S.L. (Wt. 161,000 Ibe) 690 ft ^er min. 
Range* 4,970 kIIro at 205 mph at 6,500 ft (7,500 gal« fuel) 
4,040 miles at 217 arch at 6,500 ft (6,000 H ) 

Development * With the object of developing a f cur^eivdned bomber with a 
minimum of disturbance to existing design production prrFsrigciaeiyfcs, 
the Germans experimented with fitting four ermines to "basic JU~ 
188 ^nd designs. Hone of the developments exceded prototype 


Pgggrfotiqn S Four~engined lov~wiug monoplane. New inboard uring sections 
each mounting one extr^ engine. Noeo similar to JU~188. Fuselage 
lengthened by Mding new sections. Tail unit similar to with 
twin fins snd rudders, 

Ptmf>TiHtonfl(jrif.I: Span* 100 Lengths 66.? 

Power plant £ Four BMW 801 engines 14« cylinder, rdr-eooled radipl. 



SeyeXop^rt; KB 103 S developed fxsn original MS 105 which a^eared 1936- 
1937. Used as standard single acot fighter until end of 1940 1 when it w&e 
superseded hy the F and 3 types, yin&l main role as advanced trainer. 

Peacri-QtfcqflS Single-engined, lov-ving monoplane. Automatic slots and 

slotted flaps tive fitted. Adjustable strut«°hraced stabiliser. balanced 
rudder and elevator. Fixed tail wheel, fading gear retracts outwardly 
(hydrsulically) . 

Dlmensi onfiCfth Sppn* 32.5 Lengths 29.0 Wing p.vw (sq ft) I 175 
Kelgiflfl (l^B )* Normal take-off, 5,850 Maximum; 6,500 

P nyer pl^t: DB 601 A, 13~ C ylinder , liquid-coled inverted "V". Gtt-l may 
- he Installed. 

i&3&JIfc^&l[^^ 2 x 7.9 mm ;:ixed forward fuselage 

2 x fixed forward wings' 

4 x 50 kg fcypicpl bomb stowages alternative 1 x 250 kg. 

S^IaffiafiJ^? Ma.x speeds 300 sapfc at 8.1. ? 355 mph at 18,000 ft. 
Service celling* 35,000 ft, 
Rate of cliche To 16,500 in 6.2 min. 
Range;: 855 miles at 200 mph (with normal fuel ,wi 
450 miles at 300 iaph (tomb load" 

Ren^ftr^g j Germany originally intended to concentrate on o single tyt>e of 
fighter hut neither the 1)3 601 nor the BMW 801 engine could h^ produced 
in sufficient quantities. Leek of a satisfactory engine delayed the 
development of o new fighter aircraft and the ME 109 airframes underwent 
continual modifications. These change o without alteration to the 
fundrr : ental design interfered with mounting additional armautent 
and reduced endurance of the aircraft. Alterations became a 
series of progressive deteriorations in aerodynamics « 

jj.eye'i.g>j)u]e^t l Developed from MS 109F. Appeared in service in September 
1942, very extensively used until (feraany's cpoitulation. 

,%o-.t'yj> e ^ * *nd --5 hava pressurising eruipw«?nt for sustained 

operation at high fltitudes: pert wing carries oxygen bottles. G~2, 
h^s no uressure cabin or «X; &«6 t has ulywood t#il. G«10 t fastest 
subtype (S-L 34^ yrroh) ., 0-14 -nlywoon tail unit, 

Pe>3crVptlofl-j Single«sngined t low cantilever wins;. All- metal monocoque 
fuselage. Bounded triangular section. Made in two halves. Cantilever 
monoplane tail; usual tail unit has metal covering on fixed surface© , 
fabric on movable surface 6. Semi-retractable tail wheel. 

Dimevig,ior r s(ft)^ S TO u 33.7 Length? 29,9 «iag *rea (sq ft)* 172 

Mtehfe^jj^aig Kormal take-off* 6,830 MaxiiawnS 7 9 230 

gower..-.T}lant* £3 605 A/ 1 12- cylinder liquid- cooled inverted W V« 

Ariagmant/Sftmb .Loafta Fiieed forward fuselage 2 >: 7*9/ 13 sun 

?ixorl forward wings 2 x (fitted in f Firings 

under wings) 

1 x 20/30 Kiai through propeller hub. 2 x 21 cm 
^"cliet a untfer wing. 

Performance* Max soeeft: S30 mnh at S.L.s "80 smh at "0,000 ft; 400 moh st 

">?,000 ft, 

Service ceilings 39,500 ft. 

Bate of climbs To 19 f 000 in 6 min. 

Range: 615 miles ."t 200 mph ( with normal fuel) 
450 ailee at 330 mnh ( fi rJ 18 > 

79S miles at 310 snoh (with maximum fuel). 

Itfi^ ^ ks S When wing tpxne *re fitted, maximum speeds are reduced by about 25 
nroh, service ceiling "by 1,000 ft. Fitting of KW-50 increases emergency 
sueed "by about 40 urnh. Two cameras sometimes fitted in r*ar fuselage. 
Late sub- type s incorporated greater use of wood azv1 r?lyv?ood ao sub- 
stitutes for metal. 

Typical bomb storage? 1 x 550 lbs, or a $ no lbs; oa.ximuE 
1 x 1100 lbs. Kxtarnal stowage "below fuselage. 



Development s Developed froa the M3-109: overall construction showed 
greater limitations in connection with its employment thfin the ME- 
109. Scries production vab rejected find it t/ru* never uaed onerationplly.. 

Description ? Sin^le-en^ined low-winR monoplane with inward retrnctin? 
under err ri^ge. 

Blmen«loM(ft) : Spans r*6.0 Wing a re* (so ft)? 182 

Wpjghts(lha) ; formal take-offs 8, ano 

Power plfint g D3 603 -with two-stage super charger. 

Armp-icft nt/Bomb Load s 2 x 20 mm (or .TO mm) fuselage ( nil fixed forward 

2 x 20 mm ^ x 30 nun wing (firing 

Perfoppftjiq? s Mr>x s^eed i 453 mph m 38,000 ft. 

Service celling 5 38>?oo ft. 

Rate of climlK 2,150 ft/ mi a at S.L.; 1,770 ft/min at 26,000 ft 


i3£s21Q SaJiifift^ *omber/ fighter/ giu>un£- 

Attack/ reconnaissance 

Ss2SlfiSjO£aL* Appeared in service in 1942? was eventually ren'lr.ced by 
the KE-410. 

Sub^.tyoea s A pn3 B subtypes hnd DE«501 P engines; subtype povered 
by DE-eO-S 1 8. 

DpRflrlptlQ fi^ Tvin^n^ined, low-win^ monoplane. Metal, stressed skin 
construction. Wings h?>ve pronounced t#per to rounded tips. Kose is 
blunt. Fuselage slim with humped cockDit i&closure at forward end, 
finishing nnnroxiirintely over the tr^ilin^ edge. Single fin rudder 
is lerge, -^n^in^ ^enr retracts into nacelles* 

Pimer«ione(ft)e Span* 53.6 Lengths <0.3 w ing pre* (eq ft)s 400 

Wei^hts(lbfl) ? JTormpl t*ke-off* 21,600 haximumS 24,500 

Pfl.weT„plantg 2 x DB-605 (or DB-601) 12* cylinder, liquid-cooled , inverted 
W V* engines. 

^ moment/B omb Lpp.fl s 2 x 20 mm, 2 x 7.9 ram fixed forward fuselage 

2 x 13 mm later*! in remote control ""blister" "barbettes. 
Bomb londs 1100 lbs ( normal) £ 2400 lbs (maximum). 
Var i ouo r It ernp t ive stowage 3 . 

.3>rform^ngg^ ?nx sr^ed: 315 mph et S.L- ; 370 mr>h at 31,000 ft. 

Service ceiling: 29 f 000 ft. (with normal lo>>d); 35,000 ft, 

(minimum fuel, no bombs). 
Hate of climbs To 19,000-. ft .in 11,8 mlns 
Range; 1350 miles a f t 240 mob (with norm*! load of 
1180 miles r\t 315 nmh (fuel a.n'l bombs. 
2120 miles *t 300 mr>h (with maximum fuel and no bombs). 

fiemarks * 5he JB-*210 C w^g the most viduly used of the ?:K«21Q subtypes. It 
wps superseded lr>iv*ely by the improved WE»410. rearward firing 13 

n\m guns in "blister 11 barbettes on the siflea of the fuselage slightly *ft 
of the Viing *re electrically remotely controlled from the rear cockpit. 



Jbiiififi* ^omber/ long-range recce 

Bey e i op jqpn t 3 Be ei an ed to supplement the and"'HE~177. HB-177 was un- 

satisfactory and. this design was nushed by Messers'^hmltt for he^vy 
bcsabing and long-range recomvissmice, A f pw expermental models constructed 
never operational. Prototyne first flown in December 42. 


Bescriptiofig Four-eagined monoplane; wing of exceptionally high aspect 
ratio. A tricycle undercarriage is fitted and each tr^in oleo leg hps a 
su?volejnentnry sheet for take-off with full lord which is jettisoned. 
th*n undercarriage is retracted. Turrets .*md window zans. 

IHrnensionsCft) s Span? 141 Wing arw (sq ft)*. 1375 

WMghts(lbs)g Konnnl t*ke-offf 107,800 Kaxxmuu* 123,300 

yover r tlpnt g. Four Jujho~211 engine bs 3fcV~801 ? 8, D3^603*s or Jumo-213°s 
ult inicit ely were to be fitted. 

Armanye n t /Bomb Lo ^d 3 1 x 13 mm (nos*) 

1 i 13 siffl (dorsal forward) 
1 x 20 ram (dorsal aft) 

1 x 20 mm (ventral) 

2 x 13 mm (lateral) 

Performance * Bnar speeds 358 moh at 21.000 ft. (without GM~l); 372 mph at 

27,200 ft (with GM-1) 

Service celling* 26,200 ft, of climb? 350*630 ft, per mln »t S.L< 

Ranges 9,300 miles (without bomb lo*d) 

Remarks s Originally designed for "bombing th* American homeland from bases 
in Germany, ^ne of I -essrrgchmitt 1 s most promising designs. Two 
supplementary BMW 003 or Jumo-004 turbo-jet units were to be fitted 
for bursts of high speeds with those units estimated maximum ©need was 
407 mph at ?2,000 ft, 

A six-engined version, projected but nev^r "built t hpd p>n estimated 
TFiVkge of nbout 11,500 miles * 


PyrtlM* Fighter 

Dpvelopmftnt i This aircraft was developed as a result of development 
of the DB fi03 engine, "but it dirt not advance beyond the eroerimantpl 

Description s Resembles the KB-109 T but fuselage is larger; reported as 
faster r«nd more maneuverable * Retractable tricycle undercarriage, 
pressure cabin, and catnrailt seat. 

pQvrr pl^nt i BB 603 13-cylinder, Houid-cooled inverted * V n 

ArttftBfilrt/ftftBfc IfQflfls 1 x KK 108/30 mm crnnoa ) fixed firln * forward 

4 x M<M51/20 mm cannon ) 

Ramark* i Bid not J*ive satisfactory T>erformance t since DB-603 developed 
only 1600 h.p., not 2000 h.p. *s eroected. The NE-309 was abandoned 
when development of the showed signs of success ♦ 

L2LS2a MlX^J Transport 

D evelop ment » Developed froi? the HE- 821 towed slider. 

,§£&=jUE2£&« 3-1 ^ ^-6 hpve variable-^itch metal prooellers; B-2 has 
wooden fixed pitch propellers. 

Descriptions 3ix~*ngined, high-wing monopl?}ne . Power 6* . version of the K12-S21 
glider. * ,T ing has pronounced taper to blunt ends,- entire center section 
h^s p plywood akin with fabric covering. Fuselage of eteel tube frame* 
work with fabric covering} tall unit arranged to pivot and provide 
variation of toil plane incidence. Undercarriage comprises ten wheels, 
and is designed to overcome ground obstacles like a caterpillar tractor* 

DiB.en8lons(ft)a Spans 180 Length! 94.1 W'ing area Uq ft)i 3226 

.Weights (lbs)* Normal take-off J 99,000 maximum* 132,000 

Power. p^anM 3 ix Gnome-Rhone 14vN 48/49 14-cyiinder air-cooler] radials. 

A rmame nt /Bomb Lo^do Free forward ftoselages 2 :c 7.9 mm upper, 2 x 7.9 ma lower. 
Free dorsal? 4 x 7.9 nun forward, 2 x 7.9 mm rear, 6 x 7.9 mm lateral. 

2 x 7,9 ciHi, ventral aft, 
Freights 26,900 lbs (normal), 44,800 lbs (max)? 60*100 troops 

Performance s M*a sue^d* 163 mph at S.L.* 194 mph at 13,000 ft. 
Service celling 4 23,000 ft. 
Bete of climbs 710 ft/min at S.l. 

Range? 720 mile3 at 129 mph ) with normal fuel and 
640 miles at 163 nroh ) 36,900 lbs freight. 
140 miles at 139 mph with maximum freight. 

He^^ri^^ Tvo flight engineers, who control engines 3 pre carried in cabins 
entered through cat»walks in wing; only flight controls in allots cock- 
Pit. Hot all the IB available gun positions fire used at once. Provision 
for rocket-assisted take off. Kein loading s^ace (about 2,000 cu. ft.) 
is capable of holding p. 3-ton truck or light tank. Secondary loading 
space of 1,410 cu. ft. Guns of 13 mm caliber may replace the 7.9 mm guns. 


gut 1 e& i Boznber/fighter/recee. 

Development * MR-410 is e re-engined M0-21Q, the nlrfrmnes -are similar. 

Sub- type pa A-l fast bomber; A-1/U2 heavy fighter conversion? A- 3 
reconnaissance aircraft with increased range, 

Pescrlntipiu Tvln~engined, low-wing monotone. Metal stressed skin 
construction. Wings have pronounced taner to rounded tips. Nose is 
blunt, fuselage slim with humped cocknit enclosure nt forward end. 
Behind this the fuselage is of sxnpll cross section. The single fin 
and rudder is lar§e. Dive brrkes of extruded r>lloy strips arc fixed 
on upper And lower wlxv>; surfaces. 

Dimension^ ft) a Spans 53.6 lengths 40.9 Wing nrea (so ft): 400 

Vftjghtfl(lba) a Hormal take-offs 24,000 Maximums 26,000 

r^ver plants 2 DB-603 A~2 13- cylinder liquid-cooled inverted "V. 

Armntfntf /^^h Load s Bomber version* -ixed forward fuselage 2 x 7.9 rum 

fi nd 2 x 20 mm 

Lateral 2 x 13 mm in remote-controlled 

Bomb load 1,100 lbs (normal), 2200 lbs 
( Maximum) . 

Fighter version h?>s additional 2 x 3) ram or 1 x 50 nun In bomb bay* 

Ferforannca l Max speeds 330 mph pt S.L.-s 395 znph nt ?2,™0 ft. 

Service ceilings TO, 000 ft. (normal load); 39,000 ft (minimum 

: . fuel t no bombs) . 
Rate of climbs To 19,000 ft. in 11.5 min. 
Range* 1,190 miles at 255 mt>h with normal lo*»d 
1,040 miles at 330 mph 

2,1,30 miles at 250 mph with maximum fuel and no bombs* 

Remarks & Flat transparent panel in nose for dive bombing attacks, 
although I.A.S. in a dive restricted to 310 aroh at 22,000 ft., 403 
mph at 10 t 000 ft. 


TAB y 


12* cylinder i aver ted- ves 60° nir-cooled- Singl«*-ap*od super- 
charger. Geared propeller drive. 

SfififiXiiitifllli knives hn*c steel barrels, r»lun»lnum *lloy heads; bore 
105 maij stroke 115 mm., capacity 12 liters. Ar^us-Ho'baon carburetter, 
Single lever fus»l control with putoiiifttic altitude end "boost control. 
87 octane fuel. Jsocch h;-nd/ electric starting. Clocfci-rtse propeller 
dr ive . 

-%fferch^yggl« Single iapeller with gear ratio of 6 .73*1 . Snring drive, 
Qija»..nKUii^ (ins); Widths 28,0 Length; 64,8 

jggisfcii S4? 1D«. 

Emergency? 590 hp pt 3 f ?O0 mm ^t 1:8 ao^ r*t 3.1. 
Climbing J 495 hp at 3,250 rp.-o-at 1.45 ata at 8,000 ft.. 
Max cruising s 390 ho *t 3,100 rpm *t 1.35 8,500 ft., 

Fuel coneufirotion.- 0.4*3 Ib/hp/hr. max-crui 3ing, S.L* 

Not&, I Atp ~ 14.7 lbo/sq. In. s 760 mm (30 in,) mercury. 



+ync:: 14-cylinder air-cooled rr,di*l. Cooling fan fitted. i 3 ropell*r 
reduction £ ***r , Two-*s*r <*ed sanercharger . 

Description s **osch electric starting system. Cylinder bore 156 mm. 
Stroke 156 nan. G*r*city 41.S litres; compression r*tion6.5:l. Valves 
of each brnk o^ernted by p c^m ring front ?md rear of engine, ??n^ push 
reds, toaster rods in cylinders 8 (re^r rov) ^nd 9 (front row) t Direct 
ir .lection -ump. Four~stage nrea*ur« vmir two-st^ge acMrenge r>ump 
fcr lubricrtion. "KonRanAogerAt" , master control box, controls boost 
pressure, r.p.m,, mixture strength pnd supercharger change-over height. 

Su per charger; Centrifugal impeller with two«at?eed ge&r. Drive r^io 
5.07:1, 7.46*1. 

Piny naions (ina)s Widths A-53.3 C-48.4 length: 80.2 

Welrht; A: 266<> lbs. B; 2702 lbB. Ci 3321 lbs. 

f.erforwPMg* '*o- snd 

Emergency?' 1600 hn at 2700 mm 1.32 ata at S.L r ft. 
Climbing s 1310 hp at ~400 rpm at 1,35 atr> at 14,500 ft. 

**ax cruising: 11 ? n hp at 3300 mm at 1,15 nta at 15,000 ft, 
Fuel contraptions 0,506 lb/ hp. /hour max. cruising, S.L. 

Remarks : Main difference between the 3KW ROl-A.-B^C and ~L is in the 
tyr>e of t>ropeller control, except thrst the ft- subtype has left~Handed 
rotation. Complete -cover "eg^s 11 of these engines pre dasi^ji^ted 1 A, l*'J& 
and KL: the BKW 801 C ia only surmlied as a bp re an^ine. 

developed from the Bramo-329 an* Br*~i33 t the was the 

first operational ernaspl* of engines designed to develop 1600-3000 hp. 
Development vas delayed, and after fitting to the 1)0-217 FW-190, 
continuous m^jor modifications had to be carried out in or^er to 
achieve the necessary rpli^hility. 

Liter subtypes of the BMW-601— the 1 \G ! ( V ,K I ^S r ,nd Reused higher 
octane fuel (96 octane against 87 octane), pnd inmroved compression ratio 
and supercharger design. 



Typ.g * #8~ cylinder, liquid- coaled , radial; contr^rotr t in& four- 

P^gff^AP/PiP.a^ Has the ^o^e^rance of two 14-eyllndcr radial e joined together . 
Oy*l Indira of each unit built in seven blocks of two, disposed radially 
ground the crmikenss , Cylinder blocks of tho iwo units in line. 
Supsrchprgers f<iw r>l 1 ftiudli pries driven from rear of en vine , The two 
«n.*ine units m*e placed "br^ck-- -to-t^ck*' . Front unit drives front propeller 
through »n extended shaft; rear unit drives rc&r propeller through p 
series of auxiliary shafts passing betwer-n cylinder skirts of front blocks. (im)t width 6*.0 

H&i£Ul&< 6,^00 lbs; complete power r>Ifmt 9 ,0*6 l'bs< 

Emergency? 3 f 960 hp ^t 2,950 rpm rX 1,5 at* *t S.L. 

Climbing* 3,24-0 ho at £ t 600 rpm *t 1.3 ata at 17,700 ft. 

Max cruising; 3,800 hr> pi 3,400 rem r,t l t 2 p%d sit 18,000 ft. 

Fuel consumption; 0.54 ib/hp/hrs clir.fcing nt S.L. 

Efiver progressed beyond the experimental stage in Oer sonny* 


IP-cylinder t water-cooled, 60° inverted-vee. 

Descrip tion s Cylinder "bore 150 mm, t stroke 160 mm.. f caw- city 33.9 liters:, 
end nnd msin 'bearings are roller r»nd lewd, bronze respectively. Fuel 
(' injected into e^ch cylinder "by a 13« cylinder in line -Bosch 
T^ump proveded with automatic mixture control. Starting by h*nd or 
electrically energised inertia starter. Boech magnet© firew two Bosch 
-slugs wr cylinder. 

Single stage ge*»r-driven centrifugal type* 

D Aaenp frOflfl (ins) * Width 30.0 

length 38. 5 

Wei ghts 1,400 11) « (dry weight), 

Performance a T,0. pnd 

fee rgency $ 1 , 395 
Climbing 1,395 
Max cruS s ing 5 1 1 230 

hp at S.L, 

hp rt 14,000 fV 

hp at 15,000 ft. 

DB 603 A,J3.C,X). 


Type s 13- cylinder inverted "V" 60°, liquid- coo led. In gen^r^l * 
ee*»led-up version of the DB 6C5. 

Description: Cylinder tor* 152 mm. Stroke 180 sua. Capacity 44.5 litres. 
Compression rntio (left block) 7.3S1 (right block). "Sach block 

has r single camshaft operating the respective valves through rocket 
prms. 3osch direct injoctinn pumr> is located between the cylinder 
blocks. Plain spur gear propeller type drive embodying -pltch~ change 
mechr nisei for *DM propeller. 

SuT)erc,hi?r^ er^ Centrifugal type driven through a hydraulic coupling. 

D imensions (ins)* Width 33.2 Length 104.4 (including rcrop . $h?.f t ) 

Weight $ 2000 lbs, 

Performnnc e* T.<K rmd 

Emergency s 1,750 hp tt 2,700 rpm pt 1.4 at.** at S.L. 
Climbing: 1,510 hp *t 2,500 rnm At 1*3 *t* at 18,700 ft. 

Vmx cruising, 6 1,400 hp p% 3,300 rpm *t 1.2 ata at 17,700 ft, 
Fuel consumption; .*74 lb. /h. p. /hour f max cruising, S.L. 

Remarks s The KB- 603, filter teething troubles h?d been overcome, proved to 
be * reliable engine. Although available in 1943, no suitable airframe 
was designed for it . 

A variety of stMitionpl DB-603 subtypes subsequently were 
produced; these varied in supercharger design, pover-boosting equipment, 
etc. *he flB~603 S y similar to the A t but with p> larger supercharger, 
developed 1,800 hp for take-off # 1,430 hp, *t 23,15^ ft in the rtllmb, 
sr^ 1,325 ho. nt 22,000 ft. n*vxlmum cruising. 



1?^ cylinder, inverted 60°1 lcjuld- cooled ♦ 

Bfefigripfrions Vr*ry 3ia*il»r in oasis oonsiructieii to the obsolete BB-601 , 
Thr? n*pln improvements fire nn inei v ens£ in the permissible r.p.m., 
altered valve tining, complete re-design of the oy Under block to 
obtain rnaxiiuo possible "bore with Txistir^ cylinder centers, and 
repositioning of spiriting -slugs. 

J§3Q£XS&U££X» Centrifugal impeller with 16 "blades. Sydrn.ulic coupling 
drive ratoaptically regulated by r control capsule subjact^d to 
^tjuospheric pres&urfe. R^tio (no/ slip; 10.07*1 . 

^^fi^Qaa (ins)* *Mth 30,4 length 86,3 

Wg£&i 1583 lbs. 

Emergency! 1 1 4?5 hp nt 2,300 n>m at 1,4? ?ta at S.,L» 
Climbingi 1,350 hp at tnm at 1.3 r»ta at 19,000 ft 

Kax crui sings 1,080 hp at 2,300 rpm a I 1,13 «ta at 18,000 ft, 
"Fuel consumption: ,4?3 lb, /h. p. /hour nusx* cruising, S.l. 

SfUSfiiliSS.* r ^nly went into series production nfter p» long development 
Period; still was not up to standard ??t the end of the war. The main 
weakness lay in the fact that oil was fed to the main bearings from the 
outside, r*n^ not through the crankshaft. The cylinder hsr,d was re~ 
designed, vdth chroroiujn~?>lr l te& valves find a modified sairk plug 
arrangement; by this menus it wna possible considerably to increase the 
thermal load. 

The DB-605 AS — »n "A suhtype fitted with * IB- 603 *upe*chArger-~ 

brought the pa ted altitude up to 27,600 ft. The fitting of HW-50 
improved low-altitude v^rfe'ra^nee, while G-K-i was introduced to improve 
performance at hi^i-Hltitud^. 

- uttsBASHinei 

KB- 606 

SXB&l 24-cjrlinder liquid- cooled , of two D£~601 f s counted side by side 
with a comment reduction gear and extended propeller -shaft. 

Daacriptlon g The superchargers are mounted on the outer Ride of eafih 
engine* One engine hps right~handed rotation, the other left~handed 

PlfifflMliMlf (ins)? Width: 65.2 
Weight : 3,330 lb* 

Length I 33.3 

gfflrfgnwttft* r *o* *nd 

Emergency* 2,700 hr> at 2,700 rpm at 1.42 ata at S.L. 
Climbing; 2 t 4O0 hp at 2,500 ram at 1.3 uta at 16,000 ft. 

cruising: 3,080 ho at 2,300 rr>m at 1*15 at a at 16,700 ft* 
?uel consumptions 600 llters/hour/max. cruising, S.L« 

R«m*rkfl g Provision is made for declutching the individual engines from the 
nropeller drive by means of a clutch an* lever in the cockpit. 

Abandoned ouickly, as the DB-601 had gone out of series oroduction. 
Difficulties experienced with bearings and a proclivity to catch fire 
whenever the engine was damaged. 




■Txp.ft * S~cyiin&ei% opposed-piston, Die eel two- stroke. Two crpnkshafts, 
cylinders vertical. Li quirt-cooled. 

Se.acrlp.tlong Cylindrre h^ve steel barrels nnd ?vre i>resaed into main crank« 
case casting. *^er piston controls the exhaust ports, lover oiston 
controls the Inlet ports, Light ?Iloy pistons. Two six-throw crnnkahsfts, 
up-ner and lover, Ge*r driven ccnvetvring blower* mounted at reer of 
engine . 

Dl Mivslona (lna)s Width PA Al Length 77.7 

Weight o 11** 1cb> 

Emergency § 600-700 hp 
Max cruising t 510-590 hp 

3?uel consumptions 0.374 Ifc/hp/hr . f ' aax. cruising. 


*20? D 

ypfr ? Six-cylinder compression ignition liquid-cooled engine. Two 
stroke cycle. Oproged pistons. Up :er and lower crankshafts* 

^o centrifugal superchargers in aeries, the first being 
driven by rm exhaust turbine. After cooler fitted between engine 
driven supercharger and induction g-»llerie8, Diesel oil fuel is 
sprayed Into each cylinder by xieftns of four noz^lee* Cylinders 
105 rasa* bore. Connecting rod3*H 5 ~ auction vith double row. Propeller 
drive rlght-hfiiid rotation. Foiir gear-type lubrication, pumps driven 
from lower crjwiksh/\f t • Big-end #md main bearings have steel shells. 

Super charges Engine driven centrifugal superchprger mounted benenth 
turbine driven unit. Double shrouded imoeller h^a p»di*.l v/mea *nd 
aluminiiua plloy entry guide v^neB. i>e»^r rptdo 8i). . 

. Bxhauet 'Irlventurbine consists of noczle rlag, turbine rotor 
ana outlet vciut*-. Twin wpste grfces, by-orwssing the rotor, nre used 
to control the effective mpss flow of exhaust gj»s, 

DlHienejLo»» (ins) ? Width 36,4 Length 87.0 

■(gl#h,t s 1,903 lbs (without propeller) 

gerformnpces T.O. and 

Emergency 5 1000 ht> *»t 3,000 rpsa at S.L, 

Glimbing* 750 hp at 2,7°° rpm at 30,000-40,000 ft, 

Mpx cruising-' 680 hp at 2,700 rpm at 30,000-40,000 ft. 

Fuel consumption: ,374 I'^/hp/hour, mn.x. cruising 40,000 ft, 

Bgaaai&fiS ^BicpJly a «Jueo~205 with a turbo-blower, the Jumo«307 was used to 
nower the JU«36 P high-altitude recount aa/mce aircraft, #lth GM-1 
boost, a maximum altitude of 49,000 ft. w»s pchieved '4&.500 ft. without 

*2he bore of the D series is increased by 5 mm, Bevel 'ms l t 30C h.p. for 
take off* 

JEjOiftS 12-cylinder inverted "V 11 60°, liquid-cooled. Two-speed super chr rger 
and propeller reduction gear* 

Description s Cylinder "bore 150 mm. Ca^city 34.97 litres. Compression 
ratio 6.5*1. Valve gear operrted by single camshafts through rockers. 
Crankshaft of unusual design for ah aero~en*?ine , the webs being in the 
form of flat plates mtf extended to form balance weights. All bearings 
are lubricated through holes drilled in journals and crpnkpine. Lend 
bronze in steel shells is used for main crankshaft bearings. Aluminium 
alloy pistons* Junkers direct injection fuel ;oump. 

Snp«fr^ftT» g a^ Two speed centrifugal supercharger, r^tio 7.8521 nnd 11.37U 
Impeller is of the 1 spout a type an^ diffuser is without vanes. 

P.lamnsinnfl (ins)g Width 32.1 Length 70,0 

Weights 1,408 lbs 

Emergency 2 1,200 hp at 2,400 rpm r t 1.35 atr at S.L. 
Climbing! 930 hp *t 2,300 rpm at 1.15 at a f>t 16,500 ft. 

Mm cruising: *ttG ho at 2,100 rpm at 1.10 *ta at 14,700 ft. 
Fuel coxnsurvotions 0.462 ]b/ho/hour, max* cruising, S.L. 

Rem*»rk^ s A stpndfird bomber engine in the early d?ys of the w*r. The constant 
demand for increase in bomber payload called, in turn, for an Increase in 
the power outout of the Jumo-211. At the end of its development, the F *nd 
J subtypes had a t^ke-off rating of 1,350-1,450 hp, using 87-oct*ne fuel. 
All the J series were fitted with an inter-cooler t which increased perfor- 
mance by *bout 40$; at hi^h si^eed, thpt increnee wps nullified by the 
resistance of the inter-cooler. ^Nevertheless, the improvement in the rate 
of climb of the JU~88 to more than 6.5 ft J sec. was very marked. 

3?£v£&* 13- cylinder, inverted !, V H 60°, pressure cooled. iVo- speed 
supercharger and propeller reduction gear . 

Segcriytio;!* Cylinder "bore 150 ma, Valve gcs/»r f single caaohaft driven 
"by bevel g©firs. Wished pistons. Junkers direct-Injection furl puap. 
Master control box, mounted at rear of the engine, amplifies cockpit 
lever motion into control of boost pressure, supercharger inlet v uies , 
fuel injection puxsp , magneto advance, nropeller pitch and si ow running 
cut-off throttle, 

%fi£fitoa* Hatio 6.857&ano 9.378.11. 12-bl*ded DVL fully shrouded 
impeller of 270 mm, dimeter. 15 diffuaer rin^ birder;. Pan inlet 
en sing r»;v? ^orras ; ; variable sir inlet. These blp<3©& *re movable *bonc 
their axes, the movement being ;*utomrticplly controlled. 

S3lMa»lfla& (ins) * Width; 31.0 length: 97.5 

Wai^i? 1,984 lbs. 

Emergency? 1,776 ht) *t 3,?50 r-oin at 

Climbing s 1,^80 hp *t 3,000 mm *t 18,000 ft. 

Max cr-uisirig; 1,220 hp at 2,700 nm *t 17,000 ft, 

I^uel consumption* 453 Ib./h,t> ./hour , me.x. cruising 3>X>, 

£fc^£l£&* Performance dr-tn given *fcove is for the A- subtle, Further 
development renulted in Addition*! subtyr>es$ (with p hollow propeller 
shf*ft for an engine mounted gun) , 3 (fitted with # three-speed s fewo« 
stage supercharger p.nd induction cooler), - (Similar to the 35 1 but with 
r-W«50 injected before third st^ge of the three- i*t;?ge supercharger), *J 
(with increased r«p.m. three- g-need supercharger) #»nd 5 (turbo-super« 
charged) > -he B developed 1,33C hp at 32,800 ft., the 2 1,800 ht> nt 17,700 
ft., Pttd . the !? 1,600 h.p. *t 30,000 ft. Hie K~frubty-e (2,000 h.p. for take- 
off *nd t \ rat ad altitude of 35,500 ffc.) w.s fitted to the i'A-152; it 
showed a considerable advance, ns it shoved similar $oo3 nullities to the 
well-tried <Jumo-Sli s v*»s of simple construction rsnd h^d the new servo- 



Type * ?4-cylinders in six block3 of four equally disposed radially 

around the cr&nkcase. %icyclic reduction ge&rs. iPwc^speed supercharger. 

Description ? Cylinder bore 135 mm. Stroke, 135 mm. Can^rity 46. n litres. 
Compression rptio ,521, Fuel injector mounted between the two inlet 
valves. Votr t'irow flat crsnkshsf t , Split master connecting rod and 
five art lcuin ting rods. Y^ive £©«r has single c&mshafte in nine s-clit 
bearings, "hree seo?>r/»te injection pumps. Bach rmaro feeds two blocks 
of cylinders. Three delivery trunks from supercharger volute casing. 

Supercharger ; Driven "by plain 8^ur ge«rs from rep>r of crsnkehnft. 
Rectengul^r rir intakes with "eyelid" throttles le*d the air through 
varinble-^itch guide v/mes into the eye of the gupsrehsrger , A master 
control box i* counted .*>bove the nir intakes. 

DA mengionn (ins)? Widths 45.4 Lengths 98. 8 

Weight * 2/30 ]bs. 

P^rfopmrJice : T v 0, *nd 

Emergency I r? t 500 hp *t 3,200 r^m at S £. 
Climbing* ?,090 hp At 2,900 rpm at 16,400 ft, 

hex cruising: 1,700 hp at 2,700 rpm at 17,000 ft. 
Fuel comaumptionc , 447 lb, /hp/hour, mas cruising, S.L. 

Bemnrks s The above wrforawnce data r>re for the A nntf B (Series l) 

subtypes. Series 2 and 3 of the A and B subtypes had increased capacity, 
modified ignition system, giving increased output at altitude. The C 
*md D subtypes, with increased r.p.m.» had teke~off power of 3,000 hp.. 
The B «nd F subtypes, fitted with mi pfter-cooler, had a rated altitude 
of over 30 f 000 ft, A turbo- supercharged version—the 'G rnd H subtypes-** 
was projected. 

Intended f*>r ths Jli-23:j rmd for :*urt^-sr darel*p;no?\t of the 
HK-177. development of the Jumo-222 was delayed , particularly by 
connecting rod troubles, and eventually, when it became evident 
that the problems could not be overcome in time, the engine was can- 
celled from the production list. 

£XE£* cylinder Di^el type. 

D&gii'xptiQftt Designed as r hi#h~pover Eiesel engine of low specific 
v^ight. Comprises four Jusao two-strike Diesels in rt "box fl form with 
four crrnk^hpf ts - Op-op civ y 29 liters. 

/}£jB&B.£la&£ (ins)* Width; 49.6 Lraagth? 102.4 

5,°14 11) s (complete power mlnnt) 

Emergency * 2,500 hp at 3. It. 

2,500 hp at HO, 000 ft, 
5\iel consumption* . 335 Ib^/hp/hciir* max cruising, S.L. 

Seffi£XiSA5 Several experimental models, without n turbo«3Uperch*rger fitted, 
were produced nnd later nbnndoned in favor of Juaao 224. 


MW^BO fluid consists of 49 • 45 p&rt 3 (by volume) of t.*p wnte?, 
0.5 psrnsj of pnti«-corroaion fluid rm^ 50 parte of Mentbnnol . 

lASiallnlLLOI^i On the the isixiure is sarried in a cylindrical t^nk 

of P5 gallon* caoncity situated behind the pilot. Boost wesewr* frorc 
the supercharger is utilise! to ;ro>ly pros sure to the tank, forcing the 
mixture along p pipe to an injection noszle in the eye of the super- 
charger. She flow of mixture is controlled by n soleaoid valve, actuated 
"by an automatic throttle switch na^ # water switch in the supply pine 

Performance s The system is usr>d to obtain extra Dover bfilovr the rated 
altitude of the engine. "Th* mixture is injected into the intake side 
of the -supercharger *m& r->cts an V-nti-rleton^nt, providing charge 
cooling an<- enabling higher boost pressures to b<* used . A 4^ increase 
in power can be obtained, even pt constant boost pressure. The increased 
power am be used for & m&xi^u^ of 10 minute a ni *». tirue; pt least 5. 
mi to tea jnuat elapse between successive periods of operation. At the 
increased power the sr^rk -slu^s jisve r ( . life of only 15 to 30 hours. 

Below is 3 trfblp showing the i>?rformance of the TA-152 B with, 
f»nd wit.iout the teV 50 ©vfitesi. 

DB-603 L 
3B-603 L 
DB-603 K 
DE-603 E 






Norn$l Max 

J } ^:>h.i. 


Inc Max 


-Ft^S ,d « '-fhia pov<~r "boosting system first referred to by the Germans by the 
code-n&iie n hp-h^ f1 b^c^use nitrous; oxide or !< laughing gas 1 ' 13 injected into 
the supercharger. "The nitrous oxide is retained under pressure in liquid 

Installati ons In ths JU*8R, liquid ws carried in three cylindrical containers 
locked in th?> fuselage . I^ter aircraft fed a single container* Compressed 
**ir cylinders contain r>ir used for. forcing the ^o^^sSiSflfefiSilJ^i^S^ 

the ei*gin93. At the norm*! ir*j*ction rnte of 7.95 lh/ engine/ 
minute, emlurnnce i3 45 ir.iriutes. 

Pj prf orjgsfi^e I Designed for une above the rsteA oltituae of the engine, 
this system provides addition/*! o::y^en for the engine ?>nei acte #.s *n 
anti-&eton#nt . 

Perforsiejice of r-irczv-ft, *ith «n1 without the system, 
is 3hovm below, 

GM 1 Endurance 

Vlth Pre- 


UK 109 G 




(KB 605) 



FW 190 A 

430 *t 

(bkw aca) 



24 rain 

14*6 min 


Aircraft Ai 


j Caliber 





Hnte of Muzzle 
fire .velocity | 








42.4 0.5. 75 






69 5/8 


52 3/4 








( synchros 



roni sed) 










Designed by fiheinnetallj 
hnni-held for bomber defense. 

Designed by Mauser; h^nd- 
h*?ld for bomber defense. 

Twin combination of % AL- BV s 
used for bomber defense. 

Designed by RJheinmetnll . 
Used as ft fixed gun in 
fighters, in free hand-held 
Dositions in hombrre, sr. ' ii. 
power-ooerpted turrets. 

Designed by I'puser. 
Superseded by KG 151/20. 

Standard Mpuser 20 mm. 
gun for general use. 

Short-Oerlikon. Used as 
fixed gun In fighters, 
hpnd-held gun In bombers. 





^ i<:<:& of 
t ? re 

vclod t, 

MK 103 I SO 

f-'K 108 














Anprox . 




Designed by Jih&inraetall . 
This" is the latest high- 
velocity SO sm. gun tc ?:o 
into service. 

Designed by Jlheinmetall . 
This is p low-velocity, 
h:lgh« cads ci ty ve*r>on 
widely uaed in fighters 
>»fc the end of the '■apt, 

A converted A. A. guru 
M T aed on the JU 8? D for 
ground attack. 

A converted »nti~ 

t*nk gun mounted in some 




Italian Guns-AnsaMo 





' Rate of I Muzzle 
Weight fire ! velocity 
(lbs) [ (r/o.m.) | (ft/aee) 


102/ 35 















Hormpl use! pntit?nk and 
infnntry close sutroort. 

JUormal tactical uses 
pnti aircraft. 


This rocket ras developed for pir-to~»Ir use from fighter 
aircraft 5 particularly the IV 190, and ME-163. The enemy planned 

to use it against heavy Allied bombers in conjunction with the EZ 42 
gyro---gunsight . It is not certain whether this rocket was ever used 
operationally, but it wr*s in full production. It represents one of the 
latest examples of ^iremft rocket design rvntf deserves snecip.l attention 
since it w»s intended to be usod on the newest jet fighters. 

An unrotpted, rail or tube launched, single venture, solid fuel 
nropelleri. multi tpil fin stabilised missile* the B4K is designed for 
nir«to-air employment. The wnrhead has an exceptionally thin cvze ?»nd 
hi<=ch charge weight/ case weight ration. It is motion- -.^rmed and impacts 

Overall length 31. 75 ins. 

Diameter 3,12 ins. 

Vfarheeft length 10.2 ins. 

lotnl weight 7.62 lb. 

Ho details are available on the performance of the rocket or the warhead 

filling *na uropellant. 

The warhead' consists 'of a shoot steel c?>se 1 mm. thick in two preesed 

steel sections welded together ana enclosing the H.S. charge, ^he b?>«e of 
the warhead is crimped on to r trass end-niece threaded to « screw 
in the motor. r i'he motor is a ^r&wn steel tube of 2 m/m thickness formed 

•at the tail into r- venturi of 1- . ?c; u length, throp.t dir-ine 

end outlet diameter I.0 n . Spot welded to the venturi is the «fcpVilifcing 
fin support of «ylindricf>l sheet steel. At the centre of gravity of the 
missile r single spring loaded sus-ofm-sion bracket is erot welded to the 
motor. '£he nrcoellant charge consists of r- single gr*ii.i of tubular 
cordite (l4.75 tt x l.?t>*) with * concentric hole (0.5 M ) . Igniter lends 
run through wood sealing plug in the Venture, to the igniter which ir in 
the foreard end of the motor tube. 

folded forward flush a^.l ict the motor storage snd erected hv *ir 
6T>oilere when the misaile is launched* 

Stabilisation Is achieved by eight hinge:! nr 

1 o-^.ed 

-Wflil vyoe ;\r;<l tube tyr>e l*ur- 

5 developed; neith:-, iy e 

has been recovered for examination. 



Mie boirib- torpedo also is suitable for action against land targets* Consid- 
erable numbers were manufactured, bat it is believed none vere used oper- 

'There are four sizes of the weapon, 3T-200 (440 lbs), BT-400 
(880 lbs), B7-700 (1,540 lbs), and 31 1400 (3,080 lbs). Charge/weight 
ratio of the BT 200, BT 400 1 nnd BT 700 I'd 50^- for the BT 1400 it is ?2£>* 

A long truncated cone and a cylinder ft. 4* m tha 'body, the tail unit 
takers to the rear rnd carries throe fine (to stabilise flight of the. bom!-) 
At the extreme nose a. non-ricochet o.L?te is attached* 'Ilia whole da sign is 
intended to enable the bomb to anter the water on *. flat trajectory and con- 
tinue under water without deviation ;jf course qt as great a ^peed, and for 
as great a distance, as r>o?eible. '."^meriiuents shoved no ricochet when the 
sngle impact v/aa kept nbove 3° and r. straight under-water course v/?a 
maintained • 

The turee smaller bombs hava fusingfs circuits, one instant (as 
bomb hits ship) the other delay, (0.13 or 0,14 seconds *fter bomb enters 
water) * 

Some BT~1400 ! 8 were to be fitted with a ir^gnetic riro:-.;imity«operated 
pistol having an am>ropch sensitivity cf 26 ft. 

1'he three-finned tail unit is arranged to aer;arate from the bomb on 
impact with water. In the smaller sizes this ov;curs through breakage .at a 

weak point; with the BT-1400 it ia brought aoou* oy p 

For wnti-*hinY>ia» attack tha JV 190, DO 335, K>: 262, KB 410 or 

AB 234 all were to "be u»ed as wrent aircraft, To nliow of shf>lloww»nsl<* 

attach, the TS/U2 bombsight was specially developed. 

With this bomb very low level attack on rellroads, ro^ds and other 

l?»n<l targets wi»« 7>os«ible. Even with & 10° angle of imwet the bomb does 

not ricochet. 


This rpdio-eontrolled glider bomb consists basically of & war- 
head estimated to contain 900-1,000 lbs of amatol, on which the wings pre 
mounted in the shoulder position. '£he wing 3 1 of very high nsnect ratio, 
*re of lpminrted steel nl&.te construction covered with p cement filler to 
give a smooth *ero^oil section, The t*»il unit, of wooden construction, is 
i>ired into the warhead by a nlywoorl cone; it carries twin elevators pnd 
twin fins, but only one rudder, this "being on the ->ort fin. On the top of 
each fin is p container for ft fl*re. 

It is known th^t r» similar tyoe of glider bomb has been fitted with 
^ homing device fitted to *m extension of the nose. ?he controls are be- 
lieved to have been fitted in the lower half of the t*»il cone* 

Principal dimensions of the B¥~?46 nre 21,1 ft a^nn, 11*0 ft. length. 

As a radio-controlled *Hder bomb, the BV«,?46 presumably could 
h?>ve been carried by, pu^ Mr~l?*unched from, a medium bobber. There is 
evidence that the German* plnnned to use n modified version, without radio- 
control eauipment, with the FW-190 as parent aircraft* 

Mooted for aircraft use- from Innd nrmercent models, these 
projectors were designed for low-level o^er^tions *gF»inst .^rcsored 
vehicles (*nd wre reported as «*ble to penetrate uo to IS a\* 
of armor plate) . 

Pqnger&cfrreck $ In the P^nzerscb.rer* three 98 mm rocket projectiles 
were cprried in projectors of German open-tube type held in p frpine work 
of three semi -cylindrical containers which were f5„itsd into an criiunrv F.TC 
"borobrpck under e;<ch wing of »xi FW-190. It w*s auw:*srded "by the U^Li^x 
.T'anz^rblits unit, 

P aft&erblitg $ The Paaserblits projector wps steted to hr-ve the 
seme merits the Penzerschreck and provided the Additional advantage of 
enabling rn !PW-190 to enrry six rockets under erch wing, 

Sach ppt»aratns consisted of six rockets held in * framework of 
six met*l rails, fwnilsrly called the rt gprrtcn fence* * The freme is 
secured to the wing structure by four bolts *nd cannot be jettisoned. 

Hollow chprge 80 mm, rocket-projectiles *re used, '^his non- 
rotating nrojectile consists of * periro&ner.tly linked hi #h- explosive head 
enrl rocket mo tor « $lx sticks of cordite* form the chsrg* and r>re fitted 
in the nose of the -orojectile with an impact fuse. 

The Rocket motor (veight-9.68 lbs) consists of p tubular steel body 
(12**7& % long *nd 3.15" in external diameter), a wronellsnt charge, a grid, a 
finned steel venturi 5 ?n<1 r»n' electric igniter system.-, " ' ■ V " ; 



development s "ha Natter was designed as a rockst-OTOt)elle*'i t short- 
range, horae defense interceptor to protect vital targets against 
Kiass bomber attack. Dr. Walter of Kiel stated aircraft of thia 
typs were the only answer to the problem because they could be 
launched in any weather, Operaticr in aidway between an inter- 
ceptor fighter and a directed missile, U-o to the cessation of 
hostilities,, several prototypes hrn been built and, at least one 

■Dftscriptipfig Sii^ie-engine, mid- wing monoplane cruciform tail. 
Fuselage is of sesai-monocoque construction with laminated wood 
skin; in two sections, the joint is forced apart when the 
pilot its ejected. Fuel tanks (for T & C~ Staff) r$ located isnmediateiy 
behind pilot's rear bulkhead* door'- en ving Is fixed and has wood 
epaK. Sailplane large by comparison with wing but of similar 
construction. Two fins and rudders pre fitted one above, one below 

fiimmmioaalll) « Spans 13.1 Length? HO. 6 Wing area Un ft); 51.6 
^^Sjllii?!^ Normal take-offs 4925 

Pgwer p\apt,: HWK 109~50« M-fuel. rocket unit {109-559 alternate) 
assisted take off rockets* 4 solid fuel (500 kg or 1000 kg) • 

Arma ment/B omb Lparn 33 B4M rockets, 2 x KK-108 £Uns 

£fi££j^U^* Max speeds 620 mph at 16,400 ft. 
Bate of climb? 37,400 ft/min. 
Xfengei 36 miles at 500 moh at 9,800 ft. 
Endurance: 4 . 36 minutes at 500 mr>h at 9 f 800 ft. 

RfillialdStR* ^ake off raaip inclined ft an angle to the direct vertical. 
Originally the aircraft was completely expendable v<lth a pilot 
ejecting devise; later a parachute was built in the fuselage for 
returning the rear section (containing the power-unit) to earth, 
The pilot would be ejected automatically before impact if a rasping 
attack w^re nmde. 

The ramp was tc be painted at the bomber formation and the 
A. 0:.C. rocketa fired; the acceleration being such that the pilot 
would black out, the BP-20 was fitted with ah automatic pilot to 
operate until tha pilot regained consciousness. 

(Kotes Certain Gorman ra<!*r eaulpment is applicable either to 
shore or surface installations or even to airborne 
ecrploy&ent with ninor modification) 

Wlirsburg S; 

Wlirshurg C? 

tfiir^urg A<* 

VHlrsburg Hiese^ 
(Giant Wftrsburg) s 



Rail 3 


AA fire or searchlight control r#d«r. 
^lgin*l spread of rrdio frequency t 550/580 Me. 
Maximum spread? 475/600 & c . 
iW; 3,750 ct58. 

Pulse length;- 1*5 to 2 microseconds. 
Power outmtt* 7 to 11 kw 

*his is the most widely used German r$in Iwyiitfj r&d?»r e 
3J#rly jasodol of Wftrzburg 
Bprly jcodal of Wftrzburg D. 

Essentially a W&rsburg S with a larger antenna 
parabola meter diameter compared with 3.1 


Code word for filter screen apparatus for 

Oode word for transmitter, condenser and oscillator 
for Wirsburg 

Code word for distance indicntor for W&rsburg 

c od& word for impulse generator for Wftrsburg 

Code word for filter screen a^opratun for W&rzburg 

Code npxce for height -uid direction locator on 

Zobel 8 

Intermediate frequency amplifier for Wftrsburg 


• mmms 


Dreh Pr«y A § 
y^hrstuhl Frey*; 

M*mmut (Ho^rdiiv?)? 

Seetukt (FuKO i f FuMG 
^0 G) s 

Standard fisriy w^^ ?;-dnr. 
Radio frequency ( nonri n;< 1 ) •> 1.1.5 to 146. Mc. 
PEP? 550 cps. 

Pulse length? 2 to b nicrost- -orA s . 
Povar out-out 15 to 20 &wo« 

Fighter control 

Modification of Wey* Gevatfc -I 7 . 

Hortnnnt^lly T>ol-ii?.ed r Upolc \-*irs 3 er>av r'er 

transmission rtoer>tion. 

The FVhratuhl is c hi*i.<*ht rae^Buria^ procedure for 
determining altitude of pircrolt. Ihfl pntanns 
move* in the vcn-tie?*! T>l*ne nrovtdin* height over 
3.6° to IS . 

Probably 1.2 in ft ?erl«ifi-b*r$ tend sntcnnn 

built in em*ll component© for *ir transportation, 
Motor turn« the entire ^oaxit M. 8 rpc. 

Early wprnin? r»d*r. 

Rpdio frequency: lf?7 to .-20 Mc. 

FRF; sT)iro: imntely 500 cro©. 

Co?*st;0. r.^dp.r (target search ?*i\d coAstal supervision) . 
Radio j'rpouency.' :575 Kss. (with Vfisinrr 333 to. 4£5? 
360 to 333). 

Hohentviel ? 

ASY r*d*r. 

R*<1io frenueney ' 555 Mcs. (adjustable over /*. b; 
from 509 to 5 BR tfc*) . 

Employed by the Oerirt^n-s -for Mirers ft. , surface 


■ i^o^t installations , 

Mnnnheim (Ff!G 41 T or 
FuSe f>4h 

AA fin- control rprlar. 
Rndio frequency; 560 Mca. 
FRF; 3 r, 50 ? 

Pulse length? 1>5 uicrc seconds. 
Povor out out 2 3?,«20 kvs* 

At ho s S 

Gerr^n rp-iar intercept r^ceiv^r, 

Frequency? 9 to <" ra. (3,332 Mc. to 10,000 Mc) . 



Pug 200* Hefer Hohentwiel .*hov$ 

Pug 202 ( Lichtenstein) J Air interception eouipment. 

Frequency s 490 He. 

Installation? night fighters 

(BC 2 type ejaployed the super receiver) 

Perception ranges 2h to 3h km. 

Receiver not remote control 

Fag 213 (Liechtenstein S) 3 A.SV r*ftpr. 

frequency 5 old « 4.1 inters 
new - 3.3 meters 
Hangs i; 35 km at 5,500 meters altitude against 
medium ships. 

Fug 21 6A ('Sep tun. V)£ Tail warning radar 

Frequency : 165 He. 

Fug 224 Panorama (Berlin) s German equivalent of British H2S. 

Frequency* 3333. S Mc. 

Kpvi^tionul end line bombing #id 

One modification ^rovedes •oanaramic search for 

night fighters. There are severpl modifications 

of this set in existence. 

Fug 25 s Identification friend or Foe. 

Radio frequency ap-oroxiiaately 550 Mc receive)? 
f^nd 150/160 transmitter. Provides identification 
to Wfcra'burg. ^ntenn? streamlined rod 3/4 wave 
length 551 Mc. Vertically t>ol*rized. Obsolete; 
replaced oy Fug 25A. 

Fug 2bkt Identification friend or Foe. 

Rf%dio ' frequency . Receiver sweeps 123 to 128 Mc. 
(Transmitter covers hand 150/160 Mc.) 
Units: transmitter receiver coding unit and power 
supply in one unit. 

Provides identification to early warning radar. 

Fug 136- Pulse repeater for Egon control. 

FreouencyJ 125 Mc. 
Component of Fug 25A 


Radio altimeters, navigati on*^ *ldg frftd Tplind^ mMiy; devices: 

Fug 101 F 

gerateS Rrdio pltimeter low altitude, 

?requency-~3r<4 to 400 Mc. 

Swept- at sifted of 80 cycles per second. 

Three unitss transmitter, receiver and indicator. 

O-nerationi frequency modulated rrdio altimeter, 

Tvo ranges s to 150 meters and 

to 15,000 meters are nrovided but the 
installation was not so used operationally. 

Fug 102 Pulse 

types Radio altimeter high altitude. 

Frequency: 181.8 mc (?) to 500 Ite. 
Operation* mil sal radio alti meter, 
Receiver ?nd indicator in cockpit; transmitter and 
power supply in ^usfilage. Not in generAl use but 
m*y be found in large multi-engine© aircraft. 
Receivers superheterodyne, 1? tube 8 ♦ 
Antenna. s mounted either inside fuselage ™ith 
perepeetB panels or one to each wing. 
Two ranges* to 5,000 meters ?md 
to 10,000 meters. 

Fug 103^ Radio altimeter high altitude. 

Freoupncy: 427 mc (0 to 500 Mc. 
Ranges* to 5,000 meters «nd 
to 10,000 meters. 

D/F EZ 4 

V <Z 6* mZ 6 is the receiver for PeO VI homing receiver. 

r-Z 4 - not identified. 


(Peilgerrte) i DF receiver. 

SVeauency; 0.25 to 0.4 Mc. 

Ranges 160 miles arrToximate. 

Antenna? fixed loop 13" long, 2h n diameter. 

Oged as a hosting receiver wior to the 

introduction of Fug 16Z. 


(Peilgerat* VI ); DT receiver. 

Frequency! 0*15 to 1,3 Mc« 

Fu£ 320 

(SchwAH See), 

T gerate 
(Benito) J 

Fuii 1 ?,Fs 

X gerate 
(Ruffian) i 

Antenna; oval loon, metal n H int on loop housing 
provides sense. M*y be used as a ser^rate re- 
ceiver in Fug 10 *nd is one of the few German 
sets using crystals. 

Beacon buoy transmitter.* 

Frequency: 40 or 45 He. 

Remarks* emergency s*a transmitter. 

Jettisons ble sea radio bepcon "buoy transmitter, 

Air navigation =and bombing. 
Frequency i 40 Me* 

System employe the Lorens beam tyr>e of signrl end 
nermits range measurement. Bifferert systems were 
employed by the Germans for bombers an* fighters. 
Mobile control installations were also employed. 

■Blind landing eouipaent (Lorenz)* 

Blind bombing device. 
Freouency? 66,5 to 75 Mc. 

Signal visual dct-desh, left-right be»ms. 
Antenna* 2 vertical ouarter-vpve rods in stream- 
lined housing. 

Snocia.l blind bombing device believed to be 
obsolete late in 1944. 


PuG 2z 
PuG 3a? 

PuG 7r>; 

FuO 10; 

FuO 15; 
Pu > 16s 

-believed to 'be obsolete 

Airborne rrdio 

Frequency* 0.3 to 0.6 Mc 4 

l ower outtmt 20 w^tto **nd 100 watt 3 

Antennas Fixed and trailing 

Installed in- Bomber aircraft 

Airborne rrd.lo 
Freouency: °.5 * .3,75 Mc 
Rpnge* 15 miles for ^ %x\* H/T 
Power out -out • °0 watt a 

A.nter.a^i Placed in fighter aircraft j trailing in bomber-; 
Was replaced by FuG 16F 

Airborne radio 

Pr^-nuency* .3 - .6 tic 

Hanges 300-500 miles for C.W. » n d B/T 

Power outputs 40 vatts (S.W.); 70 watt© (I**W.) 

Antennas &oih fixed ^nd trailing 

Airborne radio, "Christa" 
Frequency! 37. 8 - -<7,8 Mc. 

Common set OT>er?«ting on either PM or AM to rcplrce PaO 1S2 

Airborne radio 
Frequency s PiM2.5 ilc * 

Ranges? 20 miles at ground level, 6 100 miles in the nir 
Power output? 10 watts R/T 
Jtrfoenn^ . Fixed wi.^ 6 ? ll l! long. 

Installed in« All bombers for air~to««ir pnd ?ir-to- 
groimd comffl&al cat ion . 


Stead *hls 



Anti-jajwning procedure. 

^iroloyed with W&r^burg, Freya *nd Seetakt 

Purpose* facilitates rapid shifting of the frequency of 

the radar set so pa to escape electronic jamaing* 

Ant i~ jamming devil ce used oa WSLrsburgs and Mannheias. 
Provides a means of tracking a formation by D/F ing on 
the airborne Jamming tranemit ter • 

Anti-Jeisrairyj device used on- W^rsburg and Bless radar, 
Pumosf?*' Provides a neons of "bri-jht^nin?; up the main 
range and fire range scopes only when T>olarlzation of 
pntenn^s 1b pt ri«;ht armies to th* 'polarisation of 
3 lb "idng »ignsls r 

Ant i- Jamming device used on vtfirsburg AA control radar. 
Puroose: Provides a means of ~ll reception of tone 
from T>ror>eller modulation to distinguish aircraft 
from Window, 

Tn.unu * : 

Aohro '.i te* 

An ti- Jamming device. Used on Wilrzburs, 
Purpose? Provides a neans of using the Bo-order effect 
to distinguish between rapidly moving tercets, e.^ % 
»ircra.ft| and stationary targets, . e , Window or 
ground clutter. 

Anti« jamming device fitted to all Wfirzburgs . 
Purpose? A short- time constant £C circuit discriminating 
agfil nst en c ;er^y re^lectad from Window end installed 
directly pfter the detection stape of the receiver, 

U-boat deception device. Consists of a gas filled 
balloon and reflector dipoles released by U-boats when 
search receivers detect ASV radar signals. 

Iheti \i 

Decoy target simulator. 

A radar decoy composed of corner reflector or metallic 
strips used by a submarine and designed to be nut over- 
board when pearch receivers warn submarines of Allied 
ASV. Gives the same type o^ echo that a U-tscat would 
^lve and lasts for 18 hours,. * 



^Qg.ych r eceiver? . 

Fl\M* ant 3 

PuMB 9 

(Wan^e G 2)* 

FuKB 10 

(**orkum) f; 

FuKB 26 
( f i?unifl)5 

Pug 350 
(FuMB ? 

S*dir H 67 E 
r»nd R 87 m 

Broad h*nd antenna for Wanze G«2 search receiver. 

Senrch receiver. 
Frequency; 166 to 250 he. 

Installed in lM>o*t8 to detect code signals. 
Korlifi cat ions r»re W a ngp I non-direction*! with CRT 
presentation, Wnn«e ? non~rpdi*ting version of V^nze 1 

Senrch receiver. 
Frequency $ 100 to 400 Mc. 

Installed on U~hoats to detect ASV rpd.*r si^npls. 
Ueed in conjuction with a broM band antenna end low 
frequency amplifier for v;r»rnirv* purposes t 

Search receiver. 

(1) FaMB 24 (J'llege) 1500 to 3750 he 

(2) FuKB 05 (hucke) 1500 to 7500 Mc. 
Installed on submarines for interceotlon of 9 raid 
Z cm rrtdir signals. 

Search receiver* 

Sever*! versions of this? search set; 

(1) FuG 3502 

frequency; 2500 to 3750 K c . 

Use* homing receiver for Rotterdam HpS. 

(2) FuG 350Za 

Same r»9 faval F u MB 7, 

(3) PuC 350Zb 

Frequency s 3000 fccs. 

Use 5 horning on 10 cm radar. 

(4) FuG SSOZce* final airborne version. 

(5) FuG 350Zrs-unknown. 

(6) FuG 350Az (N*xrs ZX) 

Freq? 7500-1S000 Kc 

Use? Homla; on Meddo HgX rsdar. 

Wot identified. 



8 30G2* 
i*C 647A; 

Ro sends hi l 
Koni cni 

Receiver for British airborne 1ST II • 

Receiver for SCR b35A. 

The American version of pirtome I^S* II- 


German code i^me for American- H2X, 

German code nnme for British H2S. 

Crerai&n modification of American H2S 4 

German code name for Monica. 

British b*cfcwprd~looking AI for honbers, 
Frequency ?^?.5 Mce. 

Fu^ 217 (EeDtun 
R II) s 

Fug S18 (Keptun R 

FuMG 404 

( JagdschlOBs) ; 


Wasserman M 

Adler HM'io 

Di'-G- 4K and 5K 

DM0 3& 

Airborne warning radpr. 

Frequency* transmitter 1.6 meters plus or minus 4 cm. 

receiver 1.84 meters and 1.76 meters. 
Presentation ert picture giving rsnge a to 10 km, 
Provider warning against night fighters. 

Airborne v-aming radar, 

Frequency: 1.6 to 1.9 (163 to 170 M C J 

Similar to Rep tun H but contains the Wismar auti- 

jaioming fenture providing wide bond of frequencies • 

kflng range rad?«r resembling s Vf$>s airman on its side, 
used for controlling night fighters in conjunction 
with V/psserman. 

Long range search radar with height D/lP 
Frequency s 1°5 He* 

Equinped with nnr^bolic reflector nnd 
rsrovides height O/p ing. 

Long r*«nge search radar with height D/F 
Wave lengths; 1.9 to ?.5 meters 

1.9 to 1.9 meters 

2 A to 4 .0 meters 
One of m*ny oso^ifi cations to Wnsperrcan r^dar. 

HrdiG telephone set need for communication between 
GUbiT^riaes to aircraft. 

Decimeter communication eouioment* 
Preouency: BKO 4* 500 to 560 He 
DK& 5K S02 to 55^ He. 
Operations 2 channel voice or telegrp^h. 
Employed in link communication systems and aa 
relay stations. 

Decimeter eoimnuni cation equipment. 
Frequency? 600 to r >53 Kc. 

Operations 9 s^eoch channels or 27 telegraph 
channels lolus control voice channel . 

200 W AS 595 

TAK 1107? 

Tower Bet BK IV 
(TM 3,0'V) A) % 

T 36 40* 

1.5 kv. Sender; 

P 53 N* 



Ultra short wrve 
communi cation 


Frequency* 2.5 to 20 Kc. 
Tower: 200 watts 

Operation? CW KCV voice or teletype 

Operates with interceptor PuffSc which covers frequency 
used on line of coirmuni *?tion linxs. 

Rectifier set for 220 volt a 
Used with 200 V/ AS 59. 

Motor generator set . 

Two cylinder, 9 HP engine used with 200 V \S 59 end 
other set 3. 

°20 volts KQ % 13.6 p^peres, 3,000 watts. 

Teletype machine. 
Operation: 110 or 220 volts AO. 
Used &s t?*^e teleprinter with inter- 
national 5 unit code. Operates with German 
Cottiiieroial eouionient hut not British commercial 
equimrent . 

Coauaunicatlcm trnnsmitter. 
Frequency c 0.1 to 0.6 Mc. 
Power c 1.5 lew. 

Employed for comrcunicet ion OH^ to Army Groups «n& 
on main GAP nets. Receiver LWRa is usefl with this 

Not identified 

Oum::,t toster. Otherwise not identified 

Artificial t.^r^et testing device for W&rssbur;; 
Provides t^r^et ras-oonse ^t known ranges for the 
purpose of aiding in rnn^e calibration. 

Not definitely identified "but believed to be communication 
equipment intended for use in AFT 5 8 but not adopted as 
standard in Germany. 

Adler Is Searchlight control equipment for use against aircraft ♦ 
Mrerege range, About 25 tan; against receding bombers > 
rpr^es up to 35 km. Because of the small field of vie** 
(12 °) the equipment was unsatisfactory. 

Artier II?. Bange appx^oximptely the snme as Adler I. Fj.r:ld of view, 
however , was increased to 20° • 

ifivA^orografies Kxperircental IS detector using thin oil fi*& in 

OTfecuatftd container for creating a screen *:*or Mcture. 

'Ipmingo; Revolving IR aircraft warning receiver for use on sub- 
marines* Mftn^e 7 km, Against bomber. Bqripment mounted 
outside boat in hemispherical glass dome* Inclined 
reflective© which cau be rotated 25 tines » second by an 
electric motor scena the sky Above horizou through 360° 
and throws r^dintion on * Thallium Sulohiie cell* The 
motor *lso generates voltages' to produce ;* rotating time * 
base on nn indicating cnthode my tube inside the bo*t> r ? nd 
rny sources of beat radiation nt temperatures Above 500° 
t*ro shown p,s rfidi»l deflections from which b spring can he 
estimated to *bout 5°. "Sl^ingo 11 nlso fitted fco surface 
ships And can be used rm all around viewing detector for 
en IR signnllln*; system, 

Grose Bi id windier i Squioirent installed on small U«bopts and airplanes in 

order to detect surface shios by the transmission of he?>t w-ves 
Sarly models worked with r- scanning disc similar to the discs 
Amoloyed on early television. The improved typo hM instead 
two vibr^tin^ re^do which scanned the ares where detection 
wns d-'- j 3ir**d. This Inttsr rethod proved rather successful, 
& cooled PbS cell w,-?s winced fit the focr.l "noint of n uar&bclic 
receiver . 

Kiel Ills The FfcO 380 (Kiel III) is essentially an nirWne infra- 
red f»ircr?--ft intercept equipment for instA.llafcion in German 

fighters for use a^inst Allied bombers. Infrared 
radiations given o'ff by bomber Aircraft picked up by 
tho equipment* s scanning raechnnism, which scaiiS r« conical 
Pattern si;rilnr to that of certain tyoes of American 1 . rpdAr 
The e?n-*?iTj kicked up la concentrated on n sensitive le?*d. 
sulphide ceil, &v % through the U3e of conventions 1 Amplifier 



rtnd timing circuits, PPl presentation Is obtained. 
Diarceter of I.E. scanning el^ent 
-Axiimim diameter of cons of sc^n °0° 
Kfitimpted range froni which 
reflections er* obtained 

(interoolnted from digram) Greater th*n 5.7 kms. 

Small explosive bort directed to the tpr^et by pn infra- 
red detection device. 

Seehuxft III or Jfciter? Infra-red telescope used by night fighters •for 
homing on to Allied infrn-red recognition Imiros. 

Spanner II? Iafra-red rirborne receiver for locating *ircrpft by their 

exhpusts. Averege rsnge, 1? to 15 tan.; FocpI lengthy lb cm, 
1:0.95; Field of view, 30°. 

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Small arma : 
7.92 mm MG 34 : 

Weight with bipod 
with tripod 


Cyclic rate of fire 
Effective range t as LMG 
ac HKG 

7 r 92 mm MG 42 : 

Weight with bipod 
Cyclic rate of fire 

Effective ran^e, as LMG 
as HMG 

7.92 mm (0.312 in) 
26& lbs 
42 lbs 

900 rpm 
600-800 yda 
2000-2500 yds 

7.92 mm (0.312 in) 
23 3/4 lbs 
120CV1400 rpm 
Reco 1 1* op er at ed 
600-800 yds 
2000-2500 yds 

Machiqp carbine^ (Mft^c^^qni?*?!^)* 

9 nua MP 40 


Weight without magazine 

Hate of fire, cyclic 



9 mm 
9 lbs 
32 round 

500 rpm 
180 rpm 

9 mm Parabellum 
Blow- back 

7.92 mm MP 43/l and 44 

7.92 m 
11 lbs 

35-38 round magazine 

(short bursts or 
(single^ shot only 
Special short rifle- 
caliber ammunition 

8? jam M nm** 

A- 3t.8 W 36 W d ?7: 


Weight in action 
Maximum celling 


88 mm (3.46 in) 
5.49 U.S. ton! 


Maximum horizontal 

K!V: HE 

Weight of projectile: 

Hi 1 , 


16,200 y&e 
2,690 ft/ sec. 
2,600 ft/sec. 

30 l"bs 
21 1*8 

8.8 cm Flak 36 nod 37 differ only in the data transmission 
eye tea. No 8.8 cm Flak 38 has been identified. 

8.8 cm Tlak 41: 

Weight in action 
Maxima calling 
Maxima horizontal 


Weight of projectile: 

88 ma (3.46 in) 
S.85 U.S. tona 
49,200 ft 

21,580 yds 
3,280 ft/uec. 

20.68 lbs 
22.45 lbs 

1Q .5 ca T\ f 


Weight In action 
Maxima ceiling 
Effective ceiling 
Maxima horizontal 

M?: HB (.13.2 lbe) 

105 cm (4.13 la) 
11.03 TJ.So tona 
36.750 ft 
31,000 ft 

19,100 yds 
2,890 ft/sec. 

Kommandogerat 40 (A* Predictor (Araer. "director") 40) 

Thie predictor (director) employe a 4-meter base stereoscopic rac^e-* 
finder mounted directly on it. Gun data is transmitted directly to the 
guns. It usee the linear speed method of data computation, and reouires 
5 men to operate It. It incorporates a machanieia which copes with change 
in target altitude and target course (curvilinear flight). Can be used 
with different types of heavy AA ^uas by alteration of cams. 

? ( Q ma AA ffl^: 



Weight In action 
Effeetlva ceiling 

20 con (0.79 
896 Ibe 

3*500 ft 


Kaximusi horizontal 

Rata of fire practical 

Weight of projectile: 

5,230 yds 
180-220 rpffi 
2950 ft/see. 
2625 ft/sac, 

4*2 089 

5.2 oca 

b. 2 cm Flakswilllng 38 ; 

Twin barrelled version of (a), having same performance. 

c. 2 cm Flakvierlln^ 58 ; 

Pour-barrelled version of (a), having same performance, 
5 cm Flak 4^ (50 icm automatic action AA gun) 


Weight in action 
Effective ceiling 
Maximum horizontal 

Practical rate of fire 

Muzzle velocity 




Projectile weight t HB 

50 mm (1.9? in) 
3.42 short tons 
10,000 ft 

14,760 yds 

130 rounds per minute 
2,755 ft per second 

•10° to ^90° 

4-wheel trailer, motordrawn 
4.8 pounds AA gift Jfcayl jp: 


Weight in action 
Maximum ceiling 
Maximum horizontal 


Weight of projectile; 



128 ma (5.04 in) 
18.75 U.3„ tone 
48,555 ft 

22,910 yds 
2,886 ft/sec* 

57 lbs 
58.13 lbs 



S^rMSILiia (AA zighb 38): 

An electrically operated ran^e^rate eight which commutes lateral 
and vertical leads nlus superelevation* The asi&nth rate and elevation 
rate ars measured through tachoxnater generators celled to the guns 
traversing and elevating gears, Slant range is introduced as a battery 
voltage, modified by a rheostat, calibrated 4n hundreds of meters. • In 
tracking, the reticles of the sight head are displaced by the battery 
voltage and tachometer voltage in such a manner that tha %m is trained 
automatically on the future position* 

Thi* sight ie normally used with the 2 cm Flak 38. 

200 cm Flak echeinverf e,r L 4p (200 cm AA searchlight 40 H 

Caiidl e-po w or 2 , 430 ; 000 p 000 

LaEp High current density inverted arc 

ffeft cm 3.P3,B.4l (28 sim Antitank gun 41): 

Oaliber (initial) 28 im (l„l in) 

(emergent) 30 mm (0.78 in) 

Length of barrel 5 ft ?«52 in 

Weight in action 501 pounds 

MumIo velocity 4,600 ft/3ec. 

75 mm _Heeoill l e8,sf....gin: 

Caliber 75 mm (2 C 95 in) 

Weight in action 321 lbs 

Maximum ran^o 8,S0Q yde 

MV: HH (IS roe) 1,238 ft/seo* 

Masinoa traverse 360° 

Maximum elevation -15° to /42° 

Traction Airborne 

7« 5 cm Pak 4Q; 


Caliber 75 mm (2«95 in) 

Weight in action 3,136 lbs 

MV with Hfi (12,64 lbs) 1,800 ft/aec. 

APCBC (16 2,630 ft/aec. 

AP4G (9.125 11>b) 3,250 ft/sec. 



Ariaor penetration 

-5° to ^22° 
Mo vor^&r&wa 

With APGBC at 1,000 yde, cQ Q 
from normal— 102 ss& (4*02 in) 

Caliper, initial 

Weight in act ion 
KT: AP (5.68 Ills) 

Armor penetration 

75 tm (2.95 in) 
55 usa (2d? in) 
3,136 lbs 
3,936 ft/sec, 

-10° to A3° 
Motor* drawn 

With AP at 1,000 yds at 30° from 

normal— 130 saa (5,12 in) 

150 ana Howitzer: 


Weight in action 
&axi8R2iB ran^.e 
MY (Charge 8) 

Projectile weight (HE) 

240 wi Eqvlt2er,i 
24 cn H 39; 


Weight in action 

150 ssa (5.866 in) 
12 , 098 1T>b 
14,630 yde 
1,705 ft/eee. 
-X C 

Horse or tractor 
95,7 lbs. 

30 ! to ^45° 

240 sran (9.4 in) 
30,24 U.S. tone 
19,700 yde 


Wt l f 970 ft/sec. 

Traverse 360° 
Slevation 70° 

Projectile weight (HE) 365 lb* 
Mounting Platform, static 

Fyigjerf atirt : 

Consists of a hollow-charge antitank projectile launched from 
an expendable tube. The weapon is recoillasa, the tube being open at the 
breech end. 

The latest model t Panzerfaust 100, has the following character- 

Penetration of armor 200 mm 

Range Sighted to 150 meters 

Weight 15$ lbs 

RaketeTOangerbuchge 5^ ( ,f Pan2er achreck 81 ) 

A weapon similar in appearance to the American "Basooka", used 
like it in an antitank role with a hollow- charge rocket projectile* 

Maximum effective 

range 132 yds 

15 cm Hebelwerfer 4JL : 

Caliber 150 mm (5,9 in) 

Weight l t 195 lbs 

Maximum range, 

m (75.3 lbs) 7,330 yds 

Smoke (78 lbs) 7,550 yds 

Six-barrelled equipment on 2- wheeled mounting with split trail. 

21 cm Hebelwerfer 4fl ; 

Caliber 210 mm (8.27 in) 

Maximum range 8,600 yds 

Weight of rocket (HE) 248 lbs 

Five- barrelled equipment on 2~wheeled mounting with split trail* 



23 !Z2 ca Schweres W»yf^rat 43^: 
(1) m 280 Ban Socket 


Weight 134,5 lbs 

Maximo© range 3,100 yds 

(2) Incendiary 320 san Rocket 

Weight 173 11)3 

■Maximum range 2,400 yd® 

A sextuple projector* similar to the 28/32 cm Hebeiwerfor 41. 

Weight of rocket (IIS) 277 lbs 
Maximum range' 5*000 yds? 

A version of the 15 cm fiebalwerfer 41 s having ten barrels i and 

mounted on an armored half-track vehicle, 

A giiaple launcher of tubular steel* firing a 7*1 lb rocket 
containing 8 oas of propaganda leaflets. 

4ffig pnition and expl osives; 

Mfi £t %r 3hgll t s aa a8 39 s 

8 cm, mv 38, 8 ca VOr 39s 

These projectiles , known colloquially as "bouncing boobs' 1 are 
outwardly identical and have only minor internal differences* A small 
charge in the head of the projectile explodes Instantaneously, throwing 
the rest of the shell into the air 6 where it bursts after a small delay, 
giving an air-burst effect* These shells had been discarded by the aiddle 
of 1944, being by then considered not worth the trouble. Projectile 
weight is 7 3/4 lbs e 



Hgsogen (AIsg called Cyclonite, r ?4, or RDX): 

Cyclotrlmothylenotriiiitrasiiaej a very powerful high explosive* 

Dl ethyJL enegly coldi nA tratq (KEGH): 

Thi© is used, ia conjunction with nitro-cellulose, in a fre- 
quently encountered German double- "base propellant* 


iWIHIHMilH HI (fulfil 


Weight in action 

Armor, maximum 




Maxiiaum speed 


Weight in action 

Armor, Eiaximm 

Dimensions * 

length ( excluding gun) 


Maximum ©peed 

24*6 U,S* tons 

5? ssm 

1 - 5 cm Kwk 39 

2 - MGs 

1? ft 8 in 
9 ft 9 in 
8 ft 3 in 
35 mph 

Petrol* 296 HP 
at 3,000 Tpm 

P g f K p fw „ .IY 

26 U.S, tone 


60 mm 

1 « 7,5 cm Kwk 40 

2 * MGe 

19 ft 4 in 
9 ft 7 in 
8 ft 6 in 
25 nrph 

7-12 1 petrol, 295 HP 
at 3,000 rpm 

50 U.S. tons 

110 mm # 

1 - 7*5 cm KwK 42 

2 - HCrii 

21 ft llh in 
10 ft 9* in 
9 ft 4 in 
35 reph 

Petrol, V-X2 t 690 HP at 3,000 rpm 

Weight i& action 
• Amor, bqxIc&gi 

Dimensions 3 

length (excluding gun) 


Maximum speed 

62,75 U.S. tone 

10- n& 

1 8.8 cm EwX 36 

2 - MOe 

20 ft 84 in 
12 ft 3 \n 
9 i't 4 3/4 in 
25 irph 

V«?.2, peiirol, 
6**0 HP ut 
3,000 r:m 

75 TIoS, tons 

180 m 

1 « 8.8 cm KuK 43 

2 - MCe 

23 ft 10 la 
11 ft Xl£ in 
10 ft 2 in 

26 oroh 

V-12, petrol, 590 HP 

at 2 f 500 rpm 

Armored paras 

Foiir^ wheeled* 

Weight in action 

Dimensions ; lezigth 



5 25 U.f. tons 

15 ft 7 in 

6 ft Si in 

5 fi 1]£ in 

8^ ^ 

1 - 20 sen machine cannon 

i - MG 

Weight in action 

Dimenai ' m t length 



8*35 :T Sc tons 

19 ft 1 in 
7 ft 3 in 
7 ft 10 in 
8-15 mm 

1 - 20 rasa machine cannon 
1 - MG 

8-cylinder, 155 BHP f Petrol, 




BAST PRIOR TO 32 JU1-JS ^frfo 



Frio.? to the ourtrfv-k of hostilities between CtarK&ny and 
Soviet r^soift & lar^e volume of material was rnovad from Germany to 
tha Fnr .?;-\st (J"ap*n, Chi up. Kanehuria nnn Korea) by tranB-Si'barinn 
railwy, Curing the period June 1^4^ to I'.-.-y 1941 the following 
transfers vere recorded but :lt is considered t^ro'-able that traffic 
in of the volusns no tod did in fact reach destination, ^xact 

detail of the raptorial is not available, but it is clear that the 
Jr-ptnesc planned r/ar hn«G of heavy industrial equlpaant, armaments, 
machine tools, prototype and si*eci»?l ii:aterl?le, in Europe »nd to move 
e-uch notarial overland, thero^y avoiding the British blockade of soa 

Complementing Japanese -purchases in Karons, a large volume 
of jnpt^, mainly raw. product*, wae transferred to Germany from 
Japan, fc&Zichurxa an* China ^Iso by tranfc-Siberiaa railway, and it is 
of interest to note that recorded movement© in the first five months 
of 1941 c-reatly exceeded tonnrgets in the whol« of 1940, 

With tte outbreak of w^r betwocn Sonnany and Soviet Russia 
all transfers of goods in my volume vere confined to surface blockade 
runners and, subsequently , to submarine?. 



1 , A^.*Jbs»X-i^^ 

M/iehlnary for Kukden Arsenal 
^quipKent for Maachukuo Army 
Ammtuii fcion 

M • A . K . Caterpillar trucks 

Lasts <{ tt 

ixpntha tractors of Artillery type 

High. Sr>eed artillery tr#etox's 

Optical accessories & lathea for Arsfiiinls 

In H^nchuria 
Arsaour steel 

Parts snd accessories for Jpnpnea* Navy 
Motor torpedo boats 
Portions of aisnll torwio oo^ts 
Technical , optical piiv other i^teri^l for 

Kaval rmrooees 
Marine engine 3 50-500 H.F. {for fishing 


Mprine ermines for fishiru; bo^ts 

72 carloads 
59 B 
8 trsinloads 
30 vehicles 


50 w 
40 M 

3 cp r load 3 
900 tons 
93 carloads 
15 bo?ts 

150 wrlonds 

2b engines 
65 * 

5* 4^i^l^^.jvniL^^ g^t^sg&AflUan * 

Hoiiikel Ill's 
Junkers 88 1 b 

Massprschaitte 109 fighter bombere 
1,000 H.P, Jumo Aircraft engines 
Daiii-il«r*Sen« Aircraft enjoin* s 
Junkers Aircraft ermines 
Bosch Ki^n&toB for aircraft 
Air ore ft factory machine lathes 
Machinery for Aircraft factory 

3* ^civya&J^^ 

5 aircraft 

10 Jt 
Cm) engines 
70 pieces 
50 Dices b 

5 C&36 8 

?2 carloads 

Machine tools anA ncceaeoriee 

Tube rolling pquiwient 
Lathes 3 iv* machinery 
Schmidt Offenbach Lvthps 
Mnchi^es for manuf p cturi hiajh s^e^d 3?py 
l-*t*v58 for drilling motor cylinders 
High Speed Drills 

Snglneeriiy.j gauges A other eivsiHetf^ing 


Bia. 4,500 

330 cases 

105 carloads 

15 crrloads 

1 trainloar! 

7fc machines 
511 7>iocee 

120 caftes 

Hacksaw blades 

Arcos Iron Welding Bods 

Machinery for distillation and steel 

nl^nts at Anshan 
Sppre roll » for blooming mill* 
Blast furnace eouipment 
Poldhutte Shear Steel H A" Quality 

4. PU Flftttt 

Specially latfge and complete tdLant for 

processing cosing head gasoline to* 
natural gasoline comprising 10 sets 
of 4 raw chines each, an* including 
compressors for 300 atmospheres 
taking 600 H.P. 

Xquiwnant for gasoline, cok^ chemical 
(tdistillAtion) works 

Rotor drills for deep drilling 

Machinery for processing gas to gasoline 

Crude »iil refining machinery 

5. fining ^lUmftiti .fttfi* 


220 gross 
300 tons 

240 carloads 
236 rolls 
114 carloads 
50 tons 

40 carloads 
5 sets 
3 sets 
130 carloads, 


Host modern oo»l cutting machinery 
Mining machinery (dee? drills) for 

Kir in Province 
Coal Distillation Plant 
Equipment for coke producing ulent 

Peking . 


10 sets 

5 carloads 
72 carloads 

72 * 

6. ^Tfly^lofitrtg 

Parts and accessories for Hydro-electric 

pi *nt on Talu River 
Machinery and parts for Yalu Hiver 

Hydro-Slectric Plant 
Machinery for Xirin Electric Station 
-Hydro-Electric Plant 


80 carloads 

478 " 
35 » 
91 * 



A. Lprge oil driven grabs 2 vehicles 

? ton trucks 60 n 

Agricultural tractor© 100 * 

Goods locomotives (Mikado 141) 30 * 

^lOcoraotives 5 * 

Skoda locomotives 5 19 

B, Magnetos 13 cases 

Bosch M»gnetoe 300 n 

Rqulptnent for bepn oil refinery 
Soy* bft^n oil extracting enuipment 
Sulphuric pci<3 r>roducin;; enuipment for 
S. Mpnchurlp' 

30 carloads 
114 * 

1^0 carload* 


Reliable information hp* been received that four 100*000 
kilowatt hydro-turbines, which were being built for the Japanese 
by Siemens-Schuck^rt t were not des»tch*d via Siberia before this 
rout*jr»8 closed. 

:1 :•• -* ' 

. ^ 

.... :ia #